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ABSTRACT
I here examine Sartre's philosophy, as it has developed from 
his early works to his later works, as providing us with a 
view of the human being as a "freedom."
In Part 1, I examine Sartre's view in Being and Nothingness 
of the human being as an integrated conscious bodily existent 
or ontological freedom.
In Part 2, 1 examine Sartre's Psychology of the Imagination 
and Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions as concrete 
applications of the Being and Nothingness approach.
In Part 3, 1 examine how Sartre in Search for a Method 
situates the human being in society but retains his 
perspective of freedom.
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INTRODUCTION: BEING-IN-OUESTION
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Speaking etymologically, philosophy is basically defined as 
"the pursuit or love of wisdom." Naturally enough, though, 
much attention has been paid throughout the history of 
philosophy to the question of what exactly is to count as 
this wisdom and to how it is to be attained. However, the 
pursuit of wisdom not only refers us to the object of the 
pursuit - knowledge - and to things, events and facts outside 
us but also to the pursuer, the human being engaged in this 
pursuit. As Sartre often puts it (as Heidegger before him), 
the human being is "the being whose being is in question in 
its being."! Also naturally enough, then, throughout the 
history of philosophy various attempts have been made to 
answer the question of what the human being is. This 
question is of prime importance, since if at the start we 
make false assumptions about what the human being is, all our 
subsequent inquiries into human affairs will be contaminated 
with error. However, if we examine the direction in which 
modern philosophy has developed, it could be argued that 
today the way we answer this question stands in need of re­
examination .
Descartes is often described as the "father" of modern 
philosophy. Central to his philosophy is his dictum "Cogito 
ergo sum" or "I think therefore I a m . "2 Under Descartes' 
conception of the human being, one exists indubitably for 
oneself as a thinking thing or soul. At the beginning of the 
modern tradition, then, we find the mind or consciousness 
treated as a sui generis object of study and as the 
foundation of knowledge.
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What may seem advantageous about Descartes ' philosophy is 
that it attempts to allow for our experience of ourselves as 
conscious human beings who are capable of thought, emotion, 
intentions and so on rather than being mindless automata. 
However, his attempt to do this by identifying consciousness 
with a separate mental substance entirely distinct from 
anything in the physical realm leaves him with a great 
problem. We are presented with a dualism of mind and body 
and it is difficult to conceive how these two substances of 
distinct natures can be united in the human being.
One strategy to avoid this problem is to deny the existence 
of a separate mental substance and explain everything in 
terms of the physical. Such is the strategy of a prominent 
school of thought in philosophy today which adheres to 
Central-state Materialisms in which the mind or consciousness 
is identified as being nothing more than the central nervous 
system (or, more simply, the brain) of the human body. So as 
we near the end of the twentieth century, we can see that 
philosophy has travelled far from Descartes to a point where 
many philosophers accord no special status to the mind or 
consciousness but, on the contrary, see it as part of the 
physical world.
Central-state Materialism - as propounded by one of its major 
advocates, D.M. Armstrong, in his book, A Materialist Theory 
of the M i n d 4  - accepts as probably true the hypothesis from 
neurophysiology that "the mind is nothing more than the 
b r a i n , "5 i.e. that there is nothing more to the mind than the 
physical brain or, more accurately, the central nervous
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system. Hence the title of "Central-state Materialism"
attached to this view. The proof of the hypothesis,
Armstrong says, must come from science, particularly
neurophysiology. All he wishes to attempt is;
"to show that there are no good 
philosophical reasons for denying that 
mental processes are purely physical 
processes in the central nervous system 
and so, by implication, that there are no 
good philosophical reasons for denying 
that man is nothing but a material 
object."6
Armstrong identifies the mental state as being "a state of 
the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of 
b e h a v i o u r ."7 This state is in turn identified with a purely 
physical state of that person’s brain. It is the state of 
the brain which causes the behaviour, and this causality is 
of no special mental type: "causality in the mental sphere," 
Armstrong says, "is no different from causality in the 
physical sphere."8
Armstrong treats perception, imagination, will, intention and 
any other such "mental" phenomena in Rylean fashion as being 
dispositions to behave in certain sorts of ways. The 
difference between him and Ryle, he points out, is that he 
(Armstrong) does not stop at identifying a disposition but 
goes on to characterize that disposition as caused by a 
physical state of the b r a i n .9 Thus perception is described 
as a disposition to behave in a discriminatory fashion 
towards objects if impelled to do so.
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Having explained his physicalist thesis, Armstrong gives us 
his Central-state Materialist conclusion about the pursuer of 
knowledge:
"The knower differs from the world he 
knows only in the greater complexity of 
his physical organisation. Man is one 
with nature." 10
The mind is simply the brain, a material object, albeit a
highly complex one, and "mental" operations are simply the
complex physical occurrences in this material object.
Under Central-state Materialism, then, the human being’s 
behaviour is determined according to the physical laws of the 
operation of the brain. Such an approach would easily be 
capable of incorporating other notions of psychological 
determinism such as Skinner’s Behaviourism. Skinner said 
that the environment affected the human being and the latter 
gave a determined response, the behaviour, with no 
intervening mind or consciousness.H Central-state 
Materialism posits the physical brain as that which is 
affected and gives the determined response.12
Central-state Materialism could also find its parallel in 
determinist views of social theory such as, for example, that 
of Althusser. 13 Just as in Central-state Materialism there 
is no special mental being, so in Althusser’s analysis of 
social structure, the human being is not a free subject. For 
Althusser, people, groups and events are merely embodiments 
of the social structure. Humanism is an illusion. Through 
ideology, the individual person believes that he or she is a 
subject. But the truth, according to Althusser, is that he
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or she is only reflecting the social structure.14 Central- 
state Materialism, then, can be seen as part of a wider trend 
that exists in the "human" disciplines towards deterministic 
explanations.
I have presented Central-state Materialism as an attempt at 
explaining what the human being is without positing the 
existence of any mysterious ethereal "mental" substance which 
we will then find difficult to attach to the physical. 
However, it could be argued that an examination of the 
consequences of a rigorous application of the Central-state 
Materialist approach to the human being brings to light, in 
its turn, a fundamental problem of its own for this approach.
Whether this reflection is ultimately shown to have a basis 
in truth or in illusion, whatever explanation may eventually 
account for it, on reflecting on the question of what the 
human being is, I can initially point to my experience of 
myself as a thinking, feeling, intending and purposively 
acting human being. I experience myself as being more than 
just any other material object. I experience myself, rather, 
as "central;" that is, I have experiences which are "my" 
experiences, the world is centred around me as the subject 
experiencing it. I experience myself as being in some way 
above and beyond the muteness of physical objects and 
physical occurrences. Even, for example, the simple 
perception of a tree is intimately an experience "for me." I 
experience myself as not just being part of the world but 
also as being a point of view on the world and I react to 
other people as being of the same nature. The things and
Page - 11
events of the world "mean" something to the human being and 
this is carried even to the extent that we have complex 
emotions about our situation in the world, we formulate 
abstract concepts about the world, we can create and be 
receptive to works of fiction and so on. In summary, on 
reflecting on our experience, it appears to us - however this 
is to be explained - that the human being is not bogged down 
in the physical world but, as a centre of experience, 
inhabits what we could call a "realm of meaning."
Central-state Materialism would view the terms in which I 
have just described our experience as imprecise and would 
view this experience as able to be accounted for by the 
natural sciences. For Armstrong, the mind is. the central 
nervous system and mental processes are physical processes in 
the central nervous system and both the system and the 
processes are governed by physical laws. Under this view, 
the "mental," "conscious," or "spiritual" aspect of the human 
being is accounted for in terms of the great complexity of 
the human being as a material object. The central nervous 
system of the human body is highly complex and, still 
operating under physical laws, can be stimulated by the 
environment and respond to this stimulation in complex ways. 
There is nothing more to the mind than this.
However, if we consistently carry out this reduction of the 
mental to the physical some very serious consequences ensue. 
If our intentions, feelings, concepts and so on are said to 
be in fact, purely physical states of the brain then a case 
can be argued that there is a sense in which the intentions.
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feelings and concepts are lost aa intentions, feelings and 
concepts and that we are plunged into a meaningless muteness 
from which we can never escape.
Let us take an example. I have a concept of world peace and 
I believe this is a cause I should work for. I therefore 
join the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and take part in a 
demonstration outside a nuclear weapons establishment. Under 
Armstrong's Central-state Materialism, my concept of world 
peace, my beliefs about it and my intention to take part in 
CND's activities in reality are physical states of my brain, 
a certain arrangement of neurons firing, for instance. 
Remember that Armstrong has said that mental causality is no 
different from physical causality. So no matter how 
breathtakingly complex the whole process is, what happens 
under this view is that events in the outside world, 
themselves physical, stimulate my physical brain which 
responds according to physical laws determining me to engage 
in certain activities which are themselves, again, purely 
physical events. There is a system of physical events 
causing other physical events. My concept, beliefs and 
intentions are lost aa concept, beliefs and intention in any 
distinct sense. If they are simply physical states of a 
material object determining other physical events then it 
might just as well be the case that in response to 
stimulation from the environment I am caused to make a 
complex arrangement of chattering noises with my teeth and 
wave my arms in another complex arrangement. There would be 
no qualitative difference between being determined to enact 
that physical behaviour and being determined to take part in
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the demonstration. Neither would there be any qualitative 
difference between being determined to enact the complex 
teeth-chattering and hand-waving arrangement and, to take 
another example, giving a rendition of the old Scottish song, 
"MacPherson's Fareweel."
Seen from this perspective, we are plunged into a complete 
muteness and undifferentiation. One's knowledge that 
Central-state Materialism is the truth about the human being 
would itself be a causally determined physical state of the 
brain, the replacement of which by another physical state 
would make no qualitative difference. There would be no 
experiencing centre or subject as described in my initial 
reflection, there would be only physical objects of certain 
physical states and subject to certain physical events. 
However, with no experiencing centre there to observe this, 
even this differentiation would not be known as such. A 
complete muteness and undifferentiation would hold sway.
Seen from this point of view, then, one could say that the 
human being is not just one with nature but submerged in 
nature so that there is not even anyone there to know that 
there is nature. In this sense there would be no meaning. 
Central-state Materialism, viewed from this angle, would be a 
reductio ad absurdum since if it were correct there would not 
in any meaningful sense be such a thing as correctness.
Could there be a way out of this conundrum by simply saying 
that there is no problem in admitting that only the physical 
exists? Could we not view the human being in a similar way 
as we would, for example, the chess-playing computer? It is
Page - 14
purely a complex material object operating under physical 
laws but it can play a meaningful game of chess and, while we 
know that there is an ultimate physical explanation, we can 
loosely talk of it as intending to make such and such a move 
in an attempt to win the game, etc. We would loosely talk of 
the human being in terms of an experiencing subject for ease 
of language but know that Central-state Materialism is the 
ultimate explanation.
The answer, I believe, is that this would not give us a way 
out. The chess-playing computer is only a material object 
performing physical operations according to physical laws and 
is totally oblivious to the meaning attributed to it, that it 
is playing chess. Only an experiencing centre witnessing the 
computer could rise above the pure occurrence in total 
ignorance of physical events to see the computer as "playing 
chess" and loosely employ ideas that it was intending, and so 
on. But if the human being is similarly only a complex 
material object then this loose employment of ideas is itself 
only a physical occurrence and we are back at square one.
If my reasoning is correct, then. Central-state Materialism 
leaves us in meaningless undifferentiation. The same would 
apply to psychological and social determinism since I would 
again not be a centre of reference or subject but a thing 
operating under deterministic laws so that there would be no- 
one there to hold the theories in any meaningful sense.
Central-state Materialism and determinist theories of the 
human being in general, then, can be seen to have a
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debilitating consequence pulling away the foundation from 
underneath them. However, just because the consequence of 
Central-state Materialism is dire does not mean that the 
theory itself is wrong. Might it not be the case that we 
simply have to accept it?
But here it could be argued that we meet with another problem 
for Central-state Materialism. We encounter a great 
discrepancy between, on the one side, the theory and its 
consequence and, on the other side, our experience. Even if 
it is logically possible to construct a theory explaining 
human behaviour in terms of the human being as purely a 
(complex) physical object, I can still point to my experience 
of inhabiting a realm of meaning. I experience my concept aa 
a concept and the song as a song, as within the realm of 
meaning, and I cannot conceive how they can ba mere physical 
states of my brain. My knowledge of the song seems entirely 
different to me from a brain neuron firing.15 I cannot 
conceive how I am submerged in the muteness of the physical; 
whatever the Central-state Materialist theory says, I can 
still point to my experience of myself as an experiencing 
centre or subject inhabiting a realm of meaning. A lacuna is 
left in our understanding of what the human being is. 
Similarly, theories of psychological and social determinism 
still leave me with my experience of being more than a thing 
causally affected by psychological and social factors.
At the end of this discussion it would seem that there is at 
least good philosophical ground for questioning the notion 
that the human being is explained by physical or
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psychological or social determinism and for attempting to 
find an alternative way of explaining what the human being 
is. What I wish to arrive at is a way of understanding the 
human being such that I can allow for my experience of being 
conscious without reducing this consciousness to something 
else while at the same time not simply going back to 
Descartes but accounting for the relationship of 
consciousness to the body and to the environment or society.
In this work, I will attempt to show how the philosophy of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, as it has developed from his early works to 
his later works, can furnish us with such an understanding of 
the human being. In contrast to determinist views, Sartre's 
is an approach which centres around freedom. The human being 
is characterized as being a "freedom" in the fundamental 
sense of not simply being a material object but being a 
conscious experiencing "for-itself," freed from the muteness 
of physical objects. Sartre in the course of his 
philosophical development investigates this freedom in its 
situation as a bodily human being in the world and as in a 
world which is social.
In Part 1, "The Freedom of the For-itself," I explore 
Sartre's Being and Nothingness16 (hereafter referred to as 
BN) and try to show how this work provides us with an initial 
foundation to allow us to study the human being within a 
realm of meaning rather than of muteness. This is by means 
of his conception of the human being as an ontological 
freedom or "for-itself," an embodied consciousness distinct 
in nature from the purely physical. However, I argue that BN
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does not fully address the relationship of the for-itself to 
the constraining society in which it lives. Nonetheless, 
though, I further argue that this does not detract from the 
truth of his basic view of human consciousness.
In Part 2, "The Freedom of the For-itself Applied," I 
explore The Psychology of Imagination!? of Sartre and his 
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.18 i try to show that, 
although they were written before BN, they can 
retrospectively be interpreted as applications in concrete 
areas of the approach to consciousness already begun in the 
earlier works but more fully developed in BN. I try to show 
how they supplement BN by providing examples of consciousness 
in operation.
In Part 3, "The Freedom of the For-itself Situated and 
Engaged," I shall explore Sartre’s more socially concerned 
later work. Search for a Method.19 I try to show that he 
here rectifies his neglect of the full weight of social 
constraints by his examination of the human being as living 
in a social situation, while at the same time preserving his 
non-deterministic view of human consciousness as in BN. So 
much so that Sartre places hope in the transformation of 
society by the activity of human beings. But it is to the 
ontological freedom of the for-itself in BN that I now turn.
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PART 1: THE FREEDOM OF THE FOR-ITSELF
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CHAPTER 1:__THE CONSCIOUS HUMAN BEING AND THE WORLD
 THE PROBLEM
In my introduction I attempted to show, focusing on the 
example of Armstrong's Central-state Materialism, that 
physical determinist theories of the human being suffer a 
twofold deficiency. Firstly, the determinist theory, 
according to its own principles, must itself be determined in 
the theorist. The theory is then no longer meaningfully a 
theory for it is merely the determined product of another 
determined product. No experiencing subject exists to hold 
the theory meaningfully as a theory. Secondly, this result 
of determinism can be counterpoised by our experience of 
ourselves as, on the contrary, being indeed experiencing 
subjects and not merely determined things.1 I then pointed 
to the possibility of trying to develop a non-determinist 
approach to the study of the human being which would allow us 
to accept our experience of ourselves as subjects without, 
however, lapsing back into the Cartesian difficulty of 
positing the existence of a mysterious spiritual entity 
inhabiting the physical body. I hoped to find such an 
approach in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Such an approach, however, if it is to have any validity, 
cannot rest at vaguely pointing to some aspect of human 
experience. Whether we attempt a physical determinist 
approach or an alternative approach, we are confronted with a 
multifaceted problem: the human being as a physical body
situated in and dependent on the physical world while at the 
same time having "consciousness" of itself in this situation
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and the ability to act on the world. I attempted in the 
introduction to show that physical determinism cannot 
adequately account for the "consciousness" facet of this 
problem and that the theory consequently collapses. But now 
I in turn, in my attempt to study the human being without 
reducing consciousness, will have to try to account for how 
this consciousness is related to the physical body and to the 
material world or, in short, for the relation of the 
conscious human being and the world. Otherwise my approach 
would lack a proper foundation and would lay itself open to 
being treated as a superficial description capable of re­
integration into a determinist theory.
In this chapter, I will try to show how an adequate solution 
to this problem can be found in Sartre's BN. I will be 
trying to show how we can extract from BN an answer to the 
question of what in a basic sense the human being is if he or 
she is not simply a material object. Firstly, however, it 
may be useful to put the question in a historical perspective 
to highlight some of the difficulties Sartre has to deal 
with. Obviously I cannot tackle every philosopher who has 
ever said anything on this issue. (We could easily, for 
example, go back to Plato in The Republic^ where the everyday 
world of the senses was the secondary reality and the objects 
in it were taken as such only through their participation in 
the ideal "Forms.") I shall, rather, take a few examples 
from the era of modern philosophy which present the perennial 
problems.
1.2 THE PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
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In one's natural experience prior to philosophical 
reflection, one takes oneself for granted as a bodily person 
with a "mind" and confronting the "external" world "out 
there," outside oneself. Philosophy, however, has had the 
greatest difficulty in explaining this. Descartes,3 for 
example, notes that through the senses we believe in an 
external world. However, the method of radical doubt throws 
this into question. We are then left with the order of the 
world only, the way it appears to us through the senses, for 
we do not really know if there is a world outside the senses. 
Only afterwards, with the proof of God’s existence and of his 
perfection hence non-deceptiveness do we gain the assurance 
that there is an external world as we believed.
With his "cogito" argument, Descartes wants to show that we 
have intuitive certainty of our own existence.4 But this 
existence is in the first instance purely as a "thinking 
thing," a disembodied mind or soul.5 Proof of the existence 
of one's body only comes afterwards (as in the case of the 
external world) with the proof of God's non-deceptiveness.6 
Having set up a dualism of mind and body, Descartes then has 
great difficulty in re-uniting the two. How does a spiritual 
substance unite with a material substance?
In Locke's empiricism? our immediate objects are the "ideas" 
we gain through the senses of the external world of "matter." 
Matter is a "supposed I know not what"8 outside of us 
(created by God) which causes the ideas we have of objects. 
This was his representative theory of perception. Of course, 
Berkeley^ is able immediately to make the criticism that if
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we are true to the empiricist principle that all our 
knowledge has to come from experience then we have no 
justification for postulating the existence of outside 
matter. How can we know that there is such a thing?
Locke also tackles the problem of the order of the world with 
his distinction between simple and complex ideas. However, 
there is a good deal of ambiguity here. The mind, he says, 
is like white paper10 or a dark roomll which is passively 
furnished with simple ideas from the senses. Yet our 
perception of an object as a whole object is said to be an 
activity of the mind by which it forms complex ideas out of 
the separate simple ideas of the colour, hardness, smell etc. 
of the o b j e c t .12 But are the ideas we have anything other 
than complex (if we accept his notion of ideas)? Are there 
such things as these simple sensations? Of what nature is 
the mind that it combines these passive and active elements?
Berkeley, as I have said, rejected the postulate of "matter" 
outside our experience. For him, our only objects are our 
ideas (which term, according to Locke's usage, includes not 
just thoughts in the usual sense but also perceptions, 
sensations etc.) The appearance of the world to us, the 
spirits or beings who have ideas, is the world for Berkeley. 
It is quite sufficient to accept that world with no need for 
the unjustifiable postulate of an outside world of "matter."
However, Berkeley is well aware of a great problem his 
immaterialism or idealism has to cope with. This is the 
experience we have - however it is to be accounted for - that
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the things "out there" do not appear and disappear by fiat of 
our wills. For example, the burning heat of the sun is there 
making me feel uncomfortable and I cannot wish it away. In 
my experience I also find that these things appear to other 
people too and not just me. Berkeley's detailed way of coping 
with this is to divide spirits into the finite ones like you 
and me and the infinite spirit, God. It is God who has 
continuously the ideas of the sun, the world with its objects 
and so on and who communicates these ideas to us. This, for 
Berkeley, caters for the "resistance," if we may call it 
that, of things. Berkeley pursues this down to natural 
science's discovery of laws of nature and so on. The 
conformity of the universe to laws or a determinism in its 
operations is part of the benevolence of the infinite spirit 
in communicating to us an ordered system of ideas (with the 
occasional exception of miracles). If God communicated any 
old ideas to us in bizarre, orderless fashion, we would not 
be able to learn anything or operate in a coherent way in the 
world. This even explains, according to Berkeley, why God 
allows such apparently nasty things as destructive 
earthquakes and so on to occur. God cannot continually 
intervene to stop such things lest we no longer have an 
ordered system of ideas. The system of ideas adequately 
supplies us with a world with no need for an outside 
"matter."
But, we may enquire of Berkeley, is it not true that we no 
more directly in our experience encounter God than we do 
Locke's matter? Berkeley does try to account for this by 
saying that we have a "notion" of God through His effects.
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the object-ideas in the world. His creations. But it could 
still be argued that this "God" is still only a hypothesis 
and is not directly experienced so that if the postulate of 
matter is unjustifiable, so then is that of Berkeley's God.
Hume,13 following on from Locke and Berkeley, takes 
empiricism to its ultimate conclusion. He "goes the 
whole hog" by concluding that although we may naturally 
think there is an external world, there is no justification 
for this. For all we directly have are the "impressions" we 
get from the senses and the derivative " i d e a s ."14 Hume is a 
sort of "matter-less" Locke or "God-less Berkeley." There is 
no justification for positing anything outside impressions 
and ideas - be it matter or God, or even, indeed, one's 
"self" for all one can observe at any one time is a 
particular idea or impression. Reality becomes reduced to 
bundles of perceptions.
The problem here, it could be argued, is that it is being 
attempted to make an observation of experience restricted 
solely to the immediately present so that we are left with a 
succession of separate impressions and ideas. But should not 
our experience of ourselves as unified persons across time in 
what seems to us a cohesive world also be taken into account? 
Hamlyn describes Hume's theory as a reductio ad a b s u r d u m lS in 
which the apparatus of a representative theory of perception 
is given - the impressions and ideas - but in which nothing 
is there for the latter to represent.16 Also, what is the 
meaning of an impression, idea or perception with no-one to 
have them?
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In more modern times A.J. Ayer and the sense-data theorists 
have carried on this "God-less Berkeley" tradition. For 
Ayer, our statements and objects could be reduced to 
statements about sense-data with no concern for anything 
outside the sense-data.1? For example, to say that if I go 
round to the other side of the house I will see that side is 
simply to say that if I make such and such a movement, I will 
get such and such sense-data. However, Ayer himself, with 
honesty admitted later in his career that reduction of 
everyday objects to sense-data was not satisfactory. It does 
not seem to do justice to the way objects appear to us in our 
experience at any rate as cohesive objects, "solid," unified 
things.
As distinct from Hume with his bare, present impressions, 
KantlS looks at the experience of oneself as a subject and 
then attempts to construct the way such an experience is 
possible. This results in Kant’s categories by which the 
subject orders his or her experience.
Here again we have the issue of how the world is ordered.
Kant places the ordering task in the human subject. However, 
a question mark arises over that which the subject is 
ordering. For Kant distinguishes between the phenomenal 
world, the world as it appears to us, and the noumenal world, 
the world as it is in itself which is unknowable. How, then, 
we may ask, do we know that there is a noumenon and what is 
its relationship to the world as it appears to us?
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Another question arises about the categories and how they are 
operated. In more modern times again, Merleau-Ponty, to take 
our final philosophical example, often refers to the Kantian 
tradition as "intellectualism."19 we need to know how the 
human being has an ordered experience of the world in a 
spontaneous fashion without an effort of intellectual 
performance. E.g. perception of an object as a whole lamp 
immediately as such without any explicit "working out" of 
what it is, even though I see only part of it, from a 
distance, in perspective etc.20
The common thread throughout all these examples is the 
problem of how philosophy is to account for the experience of 
the human being with its mind and body and confronting an 
"external" world. We are presented with a whole variety of 
answers ranging from realist to idealist positions. Mental 
realism in which the mind really exists as a distinct mental 
entity. Material realism in which there is a solid, 
independent material reality or universe out there. Idealism 
in which the world ia ideas, combined sometimes with mental 
realism (e.g.Berkeley’s spirits) and sometimes left to its 
own devices (e.g. Hume’s bundles of perceptions). We could 
also see Central-state Materialism, which we looked at 
earlier, as a kind of supreme physical realism.
In this chapter on the conscious human being and the world, I 
want to attempt to show how Sartre offers us a balanced 
approach, giving us a way through the perplexities of 
idealism and realism. This is a balance which attempts to 
cater for our own contribution to the "reality" we experience
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and for that feature of reality which means that it is there 
bumping up against me regardless of my whim, its "coefficient 
of adversity,"21 as Sartre puts it at one point. It is also 
a balance in which the human being is seen as a unified 
conscious bodily being so that we are neither presented with 
a view of the human being as a purely physical thing nor with 
a view of the human being as possessed of a mysterious 
spiritual substance.
1^3 OVERVIEW OF SARTRE'S APPROACH
Let me first of all give a brief overview of Sartre's 
approach in BN to the question of what the human being and 
the world are. To start from the very beginning, Sartre 
gives to his massive work the subtitle "An Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology." Thus Sartre places himself 
within the phenomenological movement of p h i l o s o p h y 2 2  begun by 
Edmund Husserl around the beginning of this century, a 
movement pledged to describe "the things themselves" or the 
phenomena as we find them in our experience. Of course, as 
ever in philosophy, the various phenomenologists have come up 
with their own varying descriptions of what the phenomena are 
and of how phenomenology should be carried out, with for 
example, the founder Husserl, concentrating on how things 
appear to or are even constituted by the consciousness of the 
human being whereas his erstwhile pupil, Heidegger, focuses 
on the phenomenon of "Being" with the human being primarily 
directly engaged in it rather than contemplating it. The 
history of phenomenology, however, and where Sartre fits in, 
though an interesting area of study itself, will not be my 
main concern here. Primarily I wish to attempt to give a
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practical study of Sartre's philosophy, using it as a tool to 
examine the human being, and hopefully what Sartre's 
phenomenology is will shine through in the process.
To get back to my overview, Sartre defines his 
phenomenological ontology as "the description of the 
phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is, without 
intermediary."23 As he describes it being is divided into 
two different regions: "being-in-itself," the mute existence
of things in themselves, and "being-for-itself," the 
conscious being of the human. Being-in-itself is the non- 
conscious plenitude of existence independent of the human 
being or for-itself. However, being-in-itself simply is and 
there is nothing more that can be said of being as it is in 
itself. It is the for-itself by being conscious of the in- 
itself that makes the latter into a world. Consciousness is 
a "nothingness," it is nothing but this directedness towards 
the in-itself which necessarily entails that consciousness 
negate the in-itself by being consciousness of itself as not 
being that in-itself, otherwise consciousness would be in no 
way separate from the in-itself and therefore could not be 
conscious of it.
Consciousness, as a nothingness, arises supported by being as 
the unity of the body, surpassing the body towards the world. 
The for-itself, then, is always conscious of the in-itself 
from a point of view or perspective. For Sartre, this does 
not contradict his view of ontology as describing being as it 
manifests itself without intermediary. Being as it is in 
itself is not like anything, it is only through the for-
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itself being conscious of it that it becomes organised into a 
world and the for-itself can only be conscious of being from 
a perspective with which to organise it. But in so doing, 
the for-itself is directly bumping up against the being which 
is not it. Being-in-itself is a "world," properly speaking, 
only through the for-itself but at the same time being in- 
itself has no need of being organised into a world and 
remains in itself only itself, untouched by the playings on 
its surface by the for-itself. Being-in-itself does not need 
the for-itself but the for-itself, as a nothingness, depends 
on the in-itself if it is to have anything to be conscious 
of.
Sartre does not claim to be able to explain the ultimate 
origin of the two types of being. All he feels capable of
saying is that "everything takes place as if the in-itself in
a project to found itself gave itself the modification of the 
for-itself."24 The "as if" is important for Sartre. He is 
in some way allowing for the idea of a process whereby there 
is a development from mute being to conscious being, that of
the human being, a process which might suggest a kind of
pantheism. But the "as if" qualifies everything. Sartre 
will not allow us to find any refuge in being "at one" with 
the universe. Being-in-itself is ignorant of itself, and the 
individual for-itself is radically separated from being-in- 
itself. That is, existence gives rise to conscious human 
beings but a full-blooded totality in which the whole of 
being as an entity is actually conscious of itself as such is 
never achieved. Sartre describes the two regions as the 
"quasi-totality"25 being. Being becomes "conscious of
Page - 30
itself" only through and at the price of the coming into 
existence of the for-itself as a radically distinct new form 
of being, a negating being. It is as if the contingently 
existing being-in-itself attempts to become the conscious 
foundation of itself while maintaining its solidity, to 
become "in-itself-for-itself." But it succeeds only in 
giving rise to that negation of being-in-itself which is the 
for-itself. The latter in its turn yearns to be "in-itself- 
for-itself," i.e. to achieve the solidity of being while 
remaining conscious. But this is impossible and the for- 
itself remains the negation of being.
These issues will become clearer, hopefully, as we turn to 
Sartre's view of the conscious human being and the world in 
more detail.
 FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO BEING-IN-ITSELF
Firstly let us explore the region of being-in-itself. Sartre 
details three main features of this being which are 
summarised in his statement that "Being is. Being is in 
itself. Being is what it is."26 Or, in respective 
"translations," the non-conscious being independent of the 
human is uncreated, unaffirmed and contingent.
To take the unaffirmedness of being-in-itself first, Sartre 
wants to say that the world we experience only is the "world" 
for us and through us. Being as it is in itself simply ia 
and there is nothing more that can be said of it as it is in 
itself. For example, in "geological plications"27 or 
earthquakes it is only for the human being that destruction
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takes place. The for-itself sees boundaries within being 
between one thing and another and sees these things destroyed 
by the earthquake. But without the human being there is no 
such thing as destruction, there are only shifting masses of 
being (even this is saying too much) and there is not any 
less being than there was before. It is only through the 
human being's experience of the world that the world is 
properly a "world." Being as it is in itself is simply a 
mute plenitude of existence.
Hence the characterisation of being as "unaffirmed." Being 
as it is in itself independently of the human being or for- 
itself is not affirmed as being of this or that character or 
as being divided up into such an such entities, it just is 
itself. Sartre even puts us on guard with the use of the 
notion of "self" with regard to being-in-itself. As it 
simply is, it is so completely "itself" that this notion of 
self does not really apply to it and the term "being-in- 
itself" is a first shoddy attempt of l a n g u a g e . 28 Being is so 
completely itself that it does not have any relation to 
itself. It is "glued to itself," it is "solid" ( " m a s s i f " ) . 29 
It does not affirm itself, it is totally "in-itself," it just 
is.. It is unaffirmed.
Now if - and we will look at this "if" a little later - we 
accept the notion that in our experience of "reality" we are 
relating to being independent of us then Sartre, it seems to 
me, is correct to say that in itself it is a mute plenitude 
of existence. Even if, for example, we investigate what the 
pre-historic world before the emergence of humans was like -
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the shape of the continents, the dinosaurs and so on - it is 
as if we are travelling back in time, like H.G. Wells in his 
time machine, putting ourselves in that world to describe 
what it would have been like to us. We cannot avoid bringing 
it under our experiential terms. If we travel still further 
back to the "Big Bang" as the "origin of the universe" we 
find ourselves talking of a huge explosion, as infinite 
expansion and so on - human terms, retrospectively bringing 
the Big Bang under our experience. Even the atom is 
something identified as such in a human theoretical 
framework. Independent being outside our frameworks, or 
being-in-itself, would be lost in anonymity.
But if we can accept that if there is such a thing as 
independent being then it is mute and undifferentiated in 
itself, can we accept in the first place the thesis that 
there is such a realm of independent being? Could we apply 
Berkeley’s criticism of Locke's matter to Sartre's being-in- 
itself, namely that it is an unjustifiable positing of 
something outside our experience? And even if we could 
accept the hypothesis of being-in-itself, would it not be 
only as a probable truth? And then in what sense would this 
be part of a phenomenology? (As we have seen, Sartre's 
phenomenology is supposed to describe being as it appears to 
us). To see how Sartre attempts to cope with this, we must 
now look at Sartre's characterisation of consciousness and 
how this leads him to being-in-itself. In the course of this 
we will meet the two other features of being-in-itself, its 
uncreatedness and its contingency.
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For Sartre, the human being or for-itself is an indissoluble 
synthesis of body and consciousness or of body and "soul," to 
use the traditional terms.30 I shall return to this point 
later but let us for the moment concentrate on the aspect of 
consciousness. Sartre follows Husserl in the 
phenomenological reflection on human consciousness which 
yields the maxim that "all consciousness is ... consciousness 
of. something."31 Consciousness must be of something 
otherwise it could not be consciousness since it would have 
nothing to be conscious of. Sartre then tries to draw his 
own insights on consciousness, starting from this basic 
point.
Consciousness, for Sartre, is an emptiness in that everything 
is outside it in the world. We must not be misled by this. 
Sartre's consciousness is not like, for example Locke's empty 
dark room which gets filled up from the outside. It is in 
fact the opposite. All objects are posited as outside of 
consciousness and consciousness directs itself towards them. 
E.g. the table is not experienced as in consciousness but as 
out there in space, beside the window, e t c .32 Consciousness 
is always intended or directed towards some object posited 
outside of it.
Sartre next examines what it is to be conscious of an object. 
The important fact, he believes, is that to be conscious of 
an object the necessary and sufficient condition of being so 
is to be conscious of being conscious of that object. For, 
his reasoning goes, it would be absurd to say that I was 
conscious of an object without being conscious of being so -
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this would be a non-conscious consciousness or, in other 
words, not consciousness at all. But now Sartre faces this 
difficulty; if consciousness of an object is consciousness 
of consciousness of an object, do we then in turn have to 
look for a consciousness of that consciousness and so on ad 
infinitum, reminiscent of Spinoza's "idea ideae" or idea of 
an idea?33
Sartre attempts to get out of this problem by stopping the 
regression at the point where we have reached consciousness 
of being conscious. For that consciousness, as Sartre 
describes it, is with us all the time but not as a piece of 
reflective knowledge. It is a non-positional or non-thetic 
consciousness of itself. This is what Sartre terms the "pre- 
ref lective cogito" which he believes goes beyond Descartes' 
(reflective) cogito.34
We might usefully bring out what Sartre means by non-thetic 
consciousness and the pre-reflective cogito by comparing his 
view of consciousness with that of Armstrong.35 Self- 
consciousness, for Armstrong, is simply another (physical) 
state of the brain in which one part of the brain scans 
another part. This means that there will always by in the 
end an unscanned scanner. So Armstrong tries to stop the 
regression by simply accepting that ultimately consciousness 
cannot be conscious of itself. Armstrong identifies three 
levels of operation of the mind (or brain). Firstly, the 
simplest level is that of automatism, as when a motorist on a 
long monotonous drive keeps the car on the road, changes gear 
etc. without consciousness of it, later "coming to" and
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realising that he or she has driven for miles in this state. 
The second and third levels are the two types of 
consciousness: the first, in which, for example, one is
thinking furiously about a problem and is "lost to the 
world"; and the second, self-conscious introspection. 
Armstrong's three levels, then, are: acting automatically
without consciousness of oneself, consciousness of something 
(in this case, a problem) and of nothing else, and 
introspection as the only case of self-consciousness.
Sartre would reply that in the case of the motorist or the 
thinker, one must be conscious of oneself in some way as 
driving or thinking of the problem. If someone stops me and 
asks me what I am doing, I will reply immediately: "I'm
driving" or "I'm thinking." Sartre actually uses the example 
of non-reflectively counting cigarettes.36 i am not 
reflecting on myself counting them, I am simply conscious of 
the cigarettes as being twelve in number. But I am conscious 
of myself in some way as counting. If someone asks me what I 
am doing, I can reply immediately: "I'm counting." There
must be a unifying self-consciousness otherwise I would not 
be able to produce reflective knowledge of what I am doing, I 
would be totally cut off from my automatic or non-self- 
conscious acts.
That which is often called the "mind" is, then, always 
referred to by Sartre as consciousness and this is always 
self-consciousness but not primarily in the sense of 
reflectively positing some piece of knowledge about oneself. 
Primarily we are engaged in our activities without reflecting
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on ourselves doing them, but this does not mean, for Sartre, 
that one is unconscious of oneself. Consciousness is 
conscious of itself by an immediate awareness of itself that 
it does not put into a proposition of knowledge. It does not 
take up a position on itself to reflect on itself or to put 
forward a thesis about itself. Non-thetic self-consciousness 
is a non-reflective self-awareness that traverses all our 
activities. Consciousness is also capable of transforming 
itself into a reflective consciousness of itself but this is 
not the primary case.
Sartre writes "non-positional consciousness (of) s e l f "37 with 
the "of" in parentheses to highlight his stipulation that it 
is not a case of reflective knowledge with a subject positing 
an object. In his native French (conscience (de) soi), 
bracketing the "of" is the best he can do. But in English, 
his wish can be carried out even better with the pre-existing 
term "self-consciousness" which I have been using already, 
following Hazel Barnes’ English translation of BN (although 
the term is being used in a different sense from its usual 
sense in English of self-embarrassment before others). 
Sartre's notion of non-thetic self-consciousness does seem to 
get at our experience of being engaged in our normal 
activities without contemplating on them while at the same 
time not being a mindless zombie. The activities that were 
not reflected on at the time are nevertheless part of the 
flow of my life and it is as such that I later reflect on 
them.
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Consciousness, for Sartre, is consciousness through and 
through with no other motivation than itself.38 it is "causa 
sui."39 We must be careful not to misinterpret this. Sartre 
does not mean that consciousness by some mystical process is 
at one stage non-existent and then suddenly creates itself 
out of nothing. What he means is that however human 
consciousness comes into existence, it is its own cause of 
being conscious of whatever it is conscious of.
Consciousness is not mechanically produced as a psychic event 
from some external cause, it is a spontaneous reference to 
self of something. Sartre gives the example of pleasure. 
Pleasure and consciousness of pleasure are the same thing.
For Sartre, pleasure and consciousness of pleasure are 
inseparable from the point of view of both. That is, a 
pleasure that was totally ignorant of itself would no longer 
be pleasure. But at the same time the pleasure is not in the 
first instance reflective introspection on pleasure.
"Pleasure," as Sartre puts it, "must not disappear behind its 
own s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "40 The pleasure is the activity of 
consciousness and the latter is fully engaged in that 
activity. To stress the inseparability, Sartre writes 
"consciousness (of) p l e a s u r e " 4 1  with the "of" in parentheses 
once more. We could again eliminate the "of" altogether by 
saying "pleasure-consciousness."
Sartre's notion of consciousness as "causa sui" is an attempt 
to cater for that absolute reference of what one experiences 
to oneself as a centre that I described in the introduction. 
We will return to this issue later but let us now continue 
along Sartre's path from consciousness to being-in-itself.
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Sartre examines the objects in the world as they appear to 
consciousness - the phenomena. Sartre accepts that in this 
area modern thought has made progress "by reducing the 
existent to the series of appearances which manifest it"42 
and he proceeds to give an exposition of this position. The 
"modern thought" referred to is the idea of the phenomenon as 
found, for example, in the phenomenology of Husserl and of 
Heidegger.43 Sartre accepts the position as far as it goes 
but then adds to it his own further requirements.
The position replaces the old dualism in which the object’s 
appearance to us is the superficial exterior behind which is 
hidden the interior, its true reality or essence. An example 
of this kind of thinking could be Locke's representative 
theory of perception in which the object gives us its 
coloured, odorous appearance behind which is hidden the real 
colourless, odourless material object.
In the new position, I can never see an object such as a cup, 
for example, in its entirety all at once. It is revealed to 
me in a series of appearances (or, to use the 
phenomenological German, "abschattungen" - literally 
"shadings"). There is an infinity of possible appearances I 
could have of the cup. There is no hidden reality behind the 
appearance. The essence of the cup is the principle of the 
series. This is the new duality of the infinite (one object 
across the infinity of points of view on it) in the finite 
(the individual appearance).44
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Basically, the new position is saying that an object is 
revealed to us in the appearances we have of it and we take 
each individual appearance as fully the object although from 
a particular view. Sartre now wants to question the being of 
the appearance, its existential status. In accordance with 
Berkeley's criticism of Locke, could we not simply say that 
its being is its appearing to or being perceived by 
consciousness, that for the object esse est p e r c i p i ?45
Sartre's answer emanates from what he believes are the 
implications that have to be drawn from the dictum that 
consciousness is always consciousness of something, 
implications which Husserl failed to realise. Consciousness 
is always consciousness of something. When we look at the 
something, the appearing objects in the world that 
consciousness is conscious of, there is another aspect that 
has to be attended to. Eg. going back to Sartre's cup, I am 
conscious of it as a "reality," it is there and it is not me, 
"the series of its appearances is bound by a principle that 
does not depend on my w h i m . " 4 6 _  Sartre is pointing to that 
sort of obstinate substantiality of the things we come up 
against in the world. The table is out there in space, a 
centre of opacity for consciousness. It would take an 
infinite process to inventory the contents of a thing such as 
the table 47 (as with the aforementioned lamp of Merleau- 
Ponty ).
Sartre had already pointed to this aspect of experience in 
The Psychology of Imagination where in contrast to the 
poverty of the mental image of an object, the object as
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actually perceived has infinite details that one can go on 
d i s c o v e r i n g .48 in a similar vein in the even earlier Sketch 
for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre notes that to get what 
we want from the world we have to utilise it in accordance 
with its deterministic l a w s .49 Sartre, as I said earlier, 
later refers to this as the coefficient of adversity in 
things.
Basically, Sartre wants to appeal to our everyday experience 
as the best proof against idealism; the door I have to open 
if I want to get into the room, the mountain which I have to 
climb with effort if I want to get to the top, the infinite 
detail I can discover in an object, e.g. the pattern of the 
rock, its hardness, even the view of it under a microscope, 
etc. Sartre, mindful of this aspect of experience brings in 
his "ontological p r o o f ."50 This, to put it simply, says that 
consciousness has to be conscious of something and that to be 
so it must have something actually outside it and independent 
of it. Consciousness must have something to go on, it could 
not as a pure existence on its own constitute the world of 
objects out of its own internal resources.
Sartre's reasoning is this. Consciousness is directed 
towards objects experienced as outside it where these objects 
are opaque and resistant to consciousness. They do not 
appear and disappear at my whim. A pure consciousness on its 
own could not produce such a world of objects out of its 
"ideas" so to speak such that it would both itself constitute 
the world and also have it as something separate from itself 
to be conscious of and with opacity and resistance. If the
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world of objects were purely the creation of consciousness, 
it would be in no way distinct from consciousness. 
Consciousness as a pure existence on its own is not possible, 
it could not get out of itself to be conscious of anything.
To Sartre, then, "consciousness in its inmost nature is a 
relation to a transcendent being."51 Here we find Sartre's 
balancing act. Consciousness is conscious of the being 
outside it and independent of it but it is only through this 
process that being is affirmed as a "world." The existence 
of being is not merely a probable hypothesis for Sartre.
Being as it is in itself is not like anything. Being is 
manifested by the phenomena with their coefficient of 
adversity. The phenomena are only phenomena for 
consciousness but they have a being independent of 
consciousness; there is a "transphenomenal" being of the
phenomena.52
The objects that appear to us have a foundation of being. 
Being is not a special separate quality of an object that one 
can observe, the object simply "is" and all its qualities are 
equally its being.53 The object would not be recognized as 
that object with those qualities without the for-itself but 
nevertheless its being does not depend on the for-itself. 
Being is manifested and veiled at the same time54 in that it 
appears to us but that by the same token it always appears 
with a mode of being, as the appearance to us of particular 
objects from a particular perspective and so on. However, 
this is not a distortion of being as it is really like in 
itself because in itself it is not like anything, it is just
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in itself. it is this being that we take as our world of 
objects:
"This being is no other than the 
transphenomenal being of phenomena; not 
of a noumenal being hidden behind them.
It is the being of this table, tobacco, 
lamp, more generally the being of the 
world which is implied by 
consciousness."55
So before we engage in philosophical reflections on being, we
are already dealing with it. We have "pre-ontological"
comprehension of being, as Sartre puts it, borrowing
Heidegger * s term.5 6
We have been looking at Sartre's argument that a pure 
consciousness on its own could not constitute a resistant 
world to be conscious of and that consciousness is, then, 
related to transcendent being. But to be fair to Berkeley, 
he did not simply say that human consciousness creates its 
world by itself. It is the infinite spirit, God, who 
communicates the "world" to us in the form of an ordered 
system of ideas. Does this not cater for the coefficient of 
adversity?
For Sartre, this would fail too. The inability of pure 
consciousness to get out of itself applies even to a divine 
consciousness whether it is conceived of in Berkeley fashion 
with God creating a world out of ideas or whether it is 
conceived of in the fashion of traditional creationism where 
God is the originator of the material being of the universe. 
Creation, Sartre says, ultimately supposes a break between 
creator and creation. I work on my creation and at the end, 
although it is my product, it is separate from me, it has
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being independent of me.57 (we could say he is pointing to a
"Frankenstein syndrome.") This is visualised very well in 
Michelangelo's famous painting "the creation of man" in the 
Sistine Chapel of the Vatican. The creation of man by God is 
symbolised by God's finger touching that of man. Well 
actually not quite. There is a little gap between the two 
fingers as if God had touched man, so passing life over to 
him, and had then withdrawn, his creation complete. But for 
Sartre, the divine consciousness as a pure existence on its 
own could not create anything separate from itself, it could 
not withdraw and leave the gap. Even if God did manage to 
create being and then withdraw, it would still be left to 
explain how the resultant being sustains itself in existence. 
And if we instead say that God continually sustains it, it 
loses any distinct existence as creation outside the 
divinity.58
These considerations at last bring us to the two other
characteristics of being: it is uncreated ("it is") and it
is contingent ("it is what it is"). For Sartre, being is
uncreated. Having denounced creationism, Sartre does not
offer an alternative explanation of how being came about
because there is no explanation: being is and that is that.
The contingency of being follows from this. Being just is,
there is no supreme, amazing justification for it. Being
just is what it is, it is contingent:
"uncreated, without reason for being, 
without any connection with another 
being, being-in-itself is dfi trop for 
eternity."59
Page - 44
(Of course, even these three things Sartre has learned about 
transcendent being from philosophical reflection - that in 
itself it is unaffirmed and that it is uncreated and 
contingent - would not be known by being itself).
If we accept Sartre's view that the world or, to cast our 
nets wider, the universe, is a manifestation of transcendent 
being then to say that being just is seems to be an 
understandable conclusion to reach. Consider that great 
search for the origin of the universe. Here we find 
ourselves for ever in pursuit of an elusive first cause. If 
we say that the cause of the universe was the Big Bang we 
then want to know what caused it. And indeed some theories 
point to the Little Whimper as the cause of the Big Bang.
But still not satisfied, we would then want to know the cause 
of the Little Whimper and so on ad infinitum. Eventually we 
have to say that, well, no ultimate cause of the existence of 
the universe is discoverable, being just is and that is that.
But at this point someone could perhaps object that we are 
not under any logical obligation to accept the idea that the 
universe is a manifestation of transcendent being. The 
ontological "proof," our objector might say, cannot be an 
indubitable one hundred per cent logical proof. All we have 
to go on is our experience of the world, even if this 
includes encountering a coefficient of adversity, and we 
cannot find a way outside that experience to discover its 
cause. Just now we met what we might call the "astronomer's 
paradox:" we cannot reach a first cause or beginning of the 
being of the universe because we will always be able to
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question after the cause of this cause, yet to say being just 
is and does not have a beginning is infinitely perplexing to 
us such as we are within the universe where normal causality 
is observed. What this paradox demonstrates is that within 
our system of experience a certain logic applies but it 
cannot be consistently applied outside the system to explain 
why it exists in the first place. Hence Sartre reaches the 
perplexing point where he says that being just is. That, our 
objector might continue, is only one possible way of looking 
at our system of experience. Other views are just as 
logically possible. What Sartre has allowed for himself can 
be allowed to other views. Sartre has said that being just 
"is." It is just as open to others to say that God just is 
and that this divinity is the creator of the universe whether 
in the fashion of "conventional" creationism or in that of 
creationism a la Berkeley. it would even be open to us to 
say that human beings just are such that their 
consciousnesses in some way project a world for themselves to 
be conscious of. Within our system of experience, we find 
ourselves unable to produce objects at will from nothing but 
neither do we find things just "being" without beginning.
The alternative views to that of Sartre are just as entitled 
as he to posit explanations of our experience perplexing to 
that experience itself.
Is Sartre defenceless in the face of this objection? I think 
not. There is in my view a sustainable case for the defence. 
First of all, Sartre is not, I believe, attempting to give an 
indubitable rational "proof" of transcendent being in the 
same spirit in which, for example, St. Anselm produced his
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ontological "proof" of God's existence purely by reasoning on 
the concept of God.60 Sartre's positing of transcendent 
being is done more in the spirit in which he later puts 
forward a "cogito of the other's existence"61 in which he 
says we cannot "prove" that the other human beings we 
encounter are conscious existences like me but tries to show 
how it is immediately as such that I regard them in my normal 
experience. Similarly, Sartre tries to show how in our 
normal experience we strike an attitude towards the world as 
the resistant being outside us. It could be argued that 
Sartre's positing of transcendent being is based on an 
examination of our experience, fits in with that experience 
and is to be preferred to other logical but fanciful 
possibilities.
That consciousness as a pure existence on its own is not 
possible does seem to be the proper conclusion to draw from 
our experience of the world. Sartre tries to describe that 
experience. Our experiencing the world makes it the world 
for us but at the same time we encounter that world as 
resistant to us, it is not something we gratuitously invent. 
In our experience objects are. That is, we do not experience 
ourselves as conscious of phantom objects with a secret being 
elsewhere. The objects we see, hear, touch etc. are the 
resistant being outside us as we encounter it. This does 
seem to adequately capture our normal everyday experience 
where, for example, when I look at this word processor with 
which I am typing now, I am conscious of it as an object 
outside me. I see it with my eyes under certain lighting 
conditions and from a certain angle etc., but I am not
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conscious of a "seeing" or of an image. My seeing the word 
processor is my relating to it. I act towards it as that 
object out there, the word processor which ia, an object I 
cannot make appear or disappear by magic.
Now we human beings such as we are with this experience of a 
resistant world would find it impossible to conceive or 
imagine what it would be like to be a pure consciousness 
existing on its own. What could a conscious existence prior 
to any relation to anything to see, hear, touch or in any way 
encounter as an outside possibly be conscious of? On what 
basis could it "think" of anything and project this into a 
resistant world? When Sartre says, then, that consciousness 
is a relation to a transcendent being, he does seem to be 
adequately describing our experience of the world and to be 
adequately bringing out the conditions for the possibility of 
that experience.
So for Sartre, in our everyday experience we already treat 
the world as transcendent being and ourselves as necessarily 
relating to it. But the point still remains that outside the 
system of our experience, trying to explain how it 
originated, the rules found inside it do not apply. It would 
still, then, be logically possible to view our system of 
experience as having its origin entirely within the resources 
of a pure divine or human consciousness. However, such views 
grate against what Sartre has been able to bring out about 
the nature of our experience and involve wild speculative 
jumps of belief in order to posit the idea of the original 
pure consciousness. Here in the realm of the logically
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possible, all manner of bizarre interpretations could be 
arrived at. It would seem more reasonable to accept along 
with Sartre what experience itself suggests to us, namely 
that we are relating to a world with a being independent of 
us, and that we have to say that being just is lest we pursue 
the infinite regress to the elusive beginning or posit the 
existence of pure consciousness unrelated to anything, which 
reflection on our experience suggests to us is impossible.
Sartre's notion that consciousness is related to a 
transcendent being precludes him from accepting in full 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction. He accepts the 
"eidetic" part, going to the essence of a phenomenon, but not 
the bracketing of questions of the existence of the world.
Of course, Husserl's view on this issue went through various 
developments and transformations but Sartre focuses on 
Husserl's use of the idea of "hyle,"62 a flux of data towards 
which we remain neutral as to its mode of existence. 
Consciousness, by directing its intentionality towards the 
hyle, constitutes the world as a world. As Sartre interprets 
it, the hyle seems to be both subjective and objective to 
consciousness since it is within consciousness but must also 
supply objectivity, it must provide that infinity of detail 
and resistance in objects.
For Sartre, this neutrality towards the world's type of 
existence and restriction to talking of the hyle towards 
which consciousness is directed is untenable. Firstly, the 
idea of consciousness containing the hyle along with its 
infinite detail and resistance cannot be allowed. Such a
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containment would not be envisaged as possible under Sartre * s 
ontological proof. It would solidify consciousness into an 
ordinary thing. Secondly, we would still be left with the 
question of the being of the hyle.
From this perspective, then, in which consciousness is an 
emptiness directed towards a transcendent being, Sartre 
declares that the first procedure of philosophy ought to be 
to expel things from consciousness and re-establish its true 
connection with the world.63 Sartre has already pointed us 
towards the nature of this connection; it is one in which 
consciousness relates to transcendent being, thereby making 
the latter become a world for the former. At the same time, 
he claims to avoid the Locke or Kant-type problem of positing 
the existence of a real world behind the scenes to which we, 
restricted to appearances, cannot penetrate. To see in more 
detail how this formation of the world is accomplished we 
must follow Sartre as he more fully sets out the details of 
the relation of consciousness to transcendent being or being- 
in-itself.
1.5 CONSCIOUSNESS AS NEGATION
The primary aspect of this relation is, for Sartre, one of 
negation. We have already implicitly encountered this in the 
stages of Sartre’s argument we have looked at so far. Sartre 
has said of the objects one is conscious of in the external 
world that they are not me and that the appearances of them 
are bound by a series whose principle does not depend on my 
whim. And in his ontological proof Sartre has said that 
consciousness as a pure existence on its own could not create
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objects out of its own resources in such a way that they 
would be other than or not consciousness in order that they 
would be something for consciousness to be conscious of. 
Making this explicit, Sartre says that consciousness is 
conscious of itself as not being the in-itself.
Consciousness, for Sartre, is essentially negativity. To be 
conscious of something necessarily implies consciousness of 
oneself as not being that something.64 One_has to view the 
thing as something separate from oneself otherwise one would 
not be able to recognize it as a thing to be conscious of. 
This characterization of consciousness_as negativity will 
permeate the whole of Sartre's philosophy.
Some important questions immediately come to mind here, 
though, regarding Sartre's notion that consciousness is 
conscious of itself as not being the in-itself. First of 
all, being-in-itself is said to be an undifferentiated 
plenitude of being. But are we ever conscious of such a 
thing and conscious of not being it? At any rate, if we were 
to ask someone what he or she was doing, his or her first 
reply would be unlikely to be; "why. I'm negating being-in- 
itself, of course!" The more likely reply would be a 
description of the ordinary particular activity he or she was 
engaged in at that moment. Are we, then, conscious of (not 
being) the in-itself through the particular things we are 
conscious of? If so, how? Indeed, in concrete individual 
situations Sartre will talk of particular "in-itselfs" such 
as tables, inkwells, etc. But if being-in-itself is an 
undifferentiated plenitude how can he talk of particular "in- 
itself s"? Finally, to encapsulate the whole problem, how
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exactly does our consciousness/negation of being-in-itself 
make the latter a world and what status does a world so 
constituted have? We will arrive in time, I hope, to the 
answers to these questions as we follow the development of 
Sartre's theory. The first step for Sartre, however, is to 
convince us that negation is a relevant factor to be 
considered in our examination of the relation of the 
conscious human being to the world. He tries to do this by 
showing from concrete examples that negation is an important 
aspect of our everyday experience.
Sartre offers us a series of examples which he believes 
manifest not only the negating activity of consciousness but 
also the objective existence of non-being or nothingness. He 
arrives at the first example, the question, by turning on his 
own activity of philosophical questioning. Let us focus on a 
simple example of a question to follow through Sartre's 
reasoning. If we take the question "what does the Loch Ness 
Monster look like?" we see that it is presented as if there 
has to be some positive reply. I could reply; "Nothing. No 
such creature exists." To come across such a reply is, for 
Sartre, to encounter the objective existence of a non-being. 
Even if one does gain a_positive reply, negation is still 
involved. If the monster is green and scaly then it looks 
like that and not soft, pink and cuddly or whatever. And 
even asking the question in the first place implies the non- 
being surrounding the truth (since it is this and not that), 
and the possibility of non-being in transcendent b e i n g G S  (as 
in the case of the world not containing the fabled monster).
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Sartre anticipates an objection that could be raised, namely 
that non-being is not objectively encountered but is simply 
an after-product from judgement. E.g. I expect to find 1500 
francs in my wallet but find only 1300. I have not 
experienced the non-being of 1500 francs but have counted 
1300 francs. Reality is fully positive and negation is 
simply a quality of our judgement about reality.66 Sartre 
readily admits that human expectation is involved but he 
still insists that consciousness thereby encounters objective 
non-being.
To show this, Sartre steps down from reflectively posited 
questions to examples of "questioning-in-action," if I may 
call it that. E.g. my car is broken down and I look at 
(question) the carburettor. It is possible that there is 
"nothing there" in the carburettor, i.e. that it is not the 
cause of the problem. The nothingness here could not appear 
except on the basis of my prior expectation of "something 
wrong" there, but nevertheless it is not purely subjective.
I experience the non-being of a problem with the carburettor 
as an objective fact.67 For Sartre, this common type of 
experience shows that in our normal everyday activities we 
are just as prepared to encounter a disclosure of non-being 
as of being. As well as the pre-judicative comprehension of 
being spoken of earlier, we have a pre-judicative 
comprehension of non-being.68
A clearer example Sartre gives is that of destruction69 which 
we looked at briefly earlier. Being as it is in itself 
devoid of the intentionality of consciousness towards it does
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not contain any "destruction" because there is no-one there
to experience being as composed of particular objects that
can then be observed to meet their demise. In an earthquake,
in itself there are only shifting masses of being. There is
destruction only for the for-itself or consciousness.
Consciousness by a division of being by limits can see
different objects as such. This involves negation - e.g. the
wall begins here and not anywhere else and ends there and not
anywhere else. Only because consciousness sees being as
divided into different things can there be destruction as
such. E.g. I see a wall destroyed rather than there just
occurring a rippling of being. But although destruction can
only be seen as such by consciousness, it is nevertheless an
objective event. As well as a transphenomenality of being,
there is a transphenomenality of non-being.70 To take
Sartre’s example of the vase, being-in-itself is indifferent
to its shattering, it is only seen as a vase and then a
destroyed vase by consciousness - but I could not magically
reverse the event: "its destruction would be an irreversible
absolute event which I could only v e r i f y . "71 Or a city is
destructible and this is an objective fact but at the same
time it is so only because human beings see it as a city and
maintain it against danger. As Sartre puts it rather
startlingly:
"destruction is an essentially human 
thing ... it is man who destroys his 
clients through the agency of earthquakes 
or directly, who destroys his ships 
through the agency of 
cyclones or directly."72
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Sartre’s final example is perhaps the most persuasive in 
trying to demonstrate that nothingness is something we 
actually normally experience rather than a product of 
judgement. This is the intriguing example of "the
nothingness of Pierre."73 i have an appointment to meet 
Pierre in a cafe. However, I am late and Pierre is a 
punctual person. Will he have waited? I enter the cafe and 
scan the faces of the patrons. I focus successively on each 
individual as the figure on the ground of the cafe and then 
throw him or her back to the ground as I see that he or she 
is not Pierre. If Pierre is not there, once I realize this I 
have effected a double nihilation: all the people are
negated, ignored in the ground as not being Pierre, and 
Pierre is negated as not being there. I am expecting Pierre 
to be there but he is not and this annoying "not" is
something I actually experience, I experience the nothingness
of Pierre. There is a nothingness of Pierre only because I
expected him but it is nevertheless an objective event. It 
is not a matter of judgement. I could amuse myself with 
judgements about historical figures - e.g. "Wellington is not 
h e r e"74 but such judgements presuppose the existence of 
nothingness that we concretely experience as in the episode 
in the cafe.
Sartre does seem to be correct at least in that nothingness 
is a feature of our experience. We can all readily relate to 
the example of searching in the crowd of faces for the person 
who turns out not to be there. Indeed, nothingness can 
become the dominant aspect of one’s life: e.g. inability to
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cope with life after the death of a loved one. One feels the 
gap, the nothingness of the loved one.
At the same time, Sartre has again taken care not to imply 
any idealist invention of the world by pointing to the 
transphenomenality of non-being (in addition to that of 
being), as in the case of the breaking of the vase, an event 
which cannot be magically made not to have occurred. Having 
brought to our attention this aspect of our experience he 
calls nothingness, Sartre now inquires after its origin and 
this will lead us into seeing more precisely how the for- 
itself 's negation of being-in-itself makes the latter into a 
world.
First of all, Sartre rejects any "realist" notion of 
nothingness in which the latter just subsists of its own 
accord as an absence of something. Sartre wants to counter 
this common notion of nothingness, as found, for example, in 
"naive c o s m o g o n i e s ."75 These present the idea of the 
absolute pure nothingness that was there "before" the 
universe existed. There was absolutely nothing and then 
there was the universe.
Sartre's criticism of this conception is that it is 
projecting human expectations and interests into this 
supposed pure nothingness. To think of it as the 
"nothingness" which was there "before" the universe existed, 
one first of all has to posit the universe or being as 
existing and then think of it as negated in the before. But 
this nothingness itself devoid of us would not be a "before"
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nor even a "nothingness" because there would not be a being 
for it to be nothingness of and neither would there be anyone 
to posit such a negation. The "before the universe existed" 
is inconceivable. Devoid of the projections we put into it, 
projections it itself cannot have, the original emptiness 
gives way to "a total indetermination which it would be 
impossible to conceive, even and especially as a 
nothingness."76 This gives Sartre another reason for saying 
that being simply is.
Having ruled out any notion of nothingness as a simple pure 
emptiness subsisting by itself, Sartre looks for the origin 
of nothingness within the relationship of being-in-itself and 
being-for-itself. We have already seen Sartre characterize 
the in-itself as am undifferentiated and solid plenitude of 
being. One way of visualizing this point is to say that 
being-in-itself is "compressed." Not in a literal physical 
sense, of course. Being-in-itself is compressed in that it 
has no point of view on itself in which to appear opened out 
into a differentiation of various parts and entities. So 
understood in this ontological sense, we can use the image of 
being-in-itself as a solid compressed mass lost in an 
anonymous undifferentiation. In contrast, according to 
Sartre, the human region of the for-itself represents a 
" d e c o m p r e s s i o n "77 of being. It is a "fissure"78 or "h o l e "79 
in being. The source of the nothingness experienced in the 
world is the for-itself because the consciousness of the for- 
itself is itself a nothingness. If we examine what this idea 
of consciousness as nothingness means, this will lead us into
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seeing how, in Sartre's theory, the nothingness of the world 
is produced.
First of all, consciousness is not a nothingness in the sense 
of simply not existing at all.80 This would take us back to 
the idea of a pure emptiness which would require a witness to 
establish it as an emptiness of something and which therefore 
could not produce nothingness in the world. For Sartre, 
consciousness is indeed not a graspable thing-substance (it 
is no thing) but it does have an existence. It exists as the 
nothingness of being or, as we put it earlier, consciousness 
is conscious of itself as not being the in-itself. This is 
expressed through consciousness of (not being) particular 
things.
Consciousness is always consciousness of (not being) 
something, it is a situated nothingness.
For consciousness to be such a nothingness entails that it is
in a way beyond being, freed from the restraints that
compress the latter. Sartre returns to the question as an
example of how consciousness as nothingness is beyond being.
He declares that:
"If we admitted that the question is 
determined in the questioner by universal 
determinism, the question would thereby 
become unintelligible and even 
inconceivable."81
The determined question is conceivable, he says, because a
real cause can produce only a real effect ("real" here being
used in the sense it has in a theory viewing the universe as
entirely determined positive reality). Such a determinism
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lies in the full positivity of the in-itself. There is no 
trace of nothingness there. A question which was determined 
within the in-itself would not properly be a "question." It 
could not be known as a question, it would simply be another 
determined event and even this would be lost in the 
undifferentiated solidity of being-in-itself. For Sartre, 
the human ability to question takes us beyond this 
determinism. One questions being and in this sense one has 
withdrawn from it; rather than it determining one, one is 
outside determinism, questioning being. In this sense, as 
Sartre suggested to us earlier, the questioner nihilates 
himself or herself. He or she also nihilates the thing 
questioned by neutralising it, so accepting the possibility 
of a disclosure of non-being as well as of being.
Extending out from the example of the question, it is as such 
a nothingness beyond being that the for-itself can be 
presented with a differentiated world. If we were within the 
compressed being-in-itself we would be unable to loosen 
ourselves from it to see it as divided into different 
entities (as in the earlier example of destruction).
In his discussion of negatites, Sartre gives us some details 
of how consciousness performs this differentiation and 
thereby produces nothingness in the world. "Negatite" is one 
of Sartre's neoligisms, a noun made out of the verb "to 
negate." Sartre gives the example of the distance between 
two points.82 Let us take Glasgow and Edinburgh as our two 
points. To think of the distance between Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, I must focus on the stretch of the road between
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the two cities and no further in each direction. I negate
anything beyond the points or outwith the stretch of road.
Being-in-itself is just a mute plenitude and could not itself
know distance. But at the same time, distance is not purely
subjective; to get to Edinburgh I have to cross this
distance. Distance is a negatite, an objective nothingness
found in the world but which I am nevertheless responsible
for producing. The world we experience is run through with
these negatites of which there are numerous examples similar
in structure to distance;
"absence, change, otherness, repulsion.
There is an infinite number of realities 
which are not only objects of judgement 
but which are experienced, opposed, 
feared, etc. by the human being and which 
in their inner structure are inhabited by 
negation as by a necessary condition of 
their existence. We shall call them 
negatites."83
Our actions in the world, use of instruments and so on, 
already presuppose our accomplishment of these negatites.
For Sartre, then, the nothingness experienced in the world is 
produced by being-for-itself. It could not come from the in- 
itself since it simply is. Neither could it simply exist, as 
we have seen Sartre argue, on its own as pure emptiness. 
Nothingness has to be produced by someone as nothingness of 
being. This has the consequence that nothingness depends on 
being in the first place and has to be produced by being-for- 
itself, the being of the human. Consciousness as nothingness 
is necessarily embodied, a structure of being-for-itself. 
Consciousness, for Sartre, produces itself as nothingness. 
Consciousness, he has said, is causa sui, it is a spontaneous
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meaningful reference of things to itself. Sartre views this 
as being a nothingness in comparison to the solidity of 
being-in-itself. Consciousness in his view, then, produces 
itself as nothingness. In doing so, it also produces the 
nothingness found in the world.
Sartre's succinct way of putting it is to say that 
nothingness "is nihilated."84 This is another Sartrean 
neologism which could be more literally translated as "is 
nothingized." He is emphasising how nothingness is produced 
by being-for-itself. We have already come across Sartre 
using the term "nihilate" synonymously for "negate." To 
negate something is to surround it with nothingness, to 
"nothingize" it.
In a similar vein, Sartre also says that nothingness "est 
ete" or, literally, "is been." Hazel Barnes, the translator, 
renders it as "is made-to-be"85 taking it that "been" is 
transitive and is again emphasising how nothingness is 
produced by consciousness. This, I think, is correct. 
However, the phrase "is been" perhaps conveys more readily 
the idea of a nothingness in the world, like the nothingness 
of Pierre, being already in objective existence while at the 
same time passively receiving its existence from 
consciousness.
There are two features of the nothingness produced in the 
world that Sartre brings out at different places that could 
seem contradictory. As against Hegel, Sartre does not hold 
that negation is already in being-in-itself. Being-for-
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itself has to produce nothingness. Being-in-itself does not 
need negation. In this Sartre says that "non-being exists 
only on the surface of b e i n g ."86 Being does not need 
nothingness, the latter comes along and "haunts" it.87
But Sartre also reacts against Heidegger’s idea that all 
negation consists of going out to nothingness, going beyond 
the thing to the nothingness outside. For Sartre, the 
nothingness is far more integrated with the things, at the 
heart of them, as in the example of distance. "Nothingness," 
Sartre says, "lies coiled in the heart of being - like a 
w o r m . "88 How does this square with what was said before, 
that non-being is only on the surface of being?
Sartre's view, I think, must be that non-being is on the 
surface of being in the sense that being has no need of non- 
being, it is beyond need of differentiation. But for being- 
for-itself nothingness must run through being since that is 
the way the for-itself is conscious of it (through negation). 
But this is not to distort being since being is not in itself 
"like" anything, it is undifferentiated and hence has no true 
likeness to be distorted.
In this discussion of consciousness as the "nothingness," 
Sartre has been trying to portray consciousness as a sui 
generis type of existence, to be distinguished from being-in- 
itself. Another aspect of the meaning of consciousness as 
nothingness emphasises this. Consciousness, Sartre says, 
"must be what it is not and not be what it i s . "89 Being-in- 
itself is compressed and just is what it is. But the for-
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itself as consciousness is a decompression of being so that 
the law of identity cannot be steadfastly applied to it. 
Consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is.
Sartre gives the example of b e l i e f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s .90 Let us 
take my belief in Sartre’s philosophy. My consciousness is 
belief but at the same time it is not solidly identified with 
belief. Consciousness is the producer of its belief and has 
to maintain it. Belief is something volatile. An even 
better example, perhaps, is religious belief. The believer 
has to fight doubt, pray for a stronger faith and so on. In 
this way consciousness is the belief which it is not (it 
makes itself belief but is not completely identified with 
this belief) and vice versa it is not the belief which it is 
(it is not completely identifiable with the belief it makes 
itself be). It is part of the price of consciousness 
existing as nothingness, as escaping the compression of 
being-in-itself and so being able to relate to a 
differentiated world, that it cannot be solidly identified 
with any of its activities. It is separated from them by 
nothingness. It has for its ideal remaining consciousness 
but also achieving the solidity of the in-itself. This is 
the ideal of the "in-itself-for-itself."91 E.g. being a 
great man or woman of faith without the least shadow of 
doubt. But such solidity cannot be achieved. We will return 
to this ideal later.
Earlier we looked at Sartre's notion of consciousness as 
necessarily self-consciousness. That is, to be conscious of 
something is, for Sartre, necessarily to be (pre-
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reflectively) conscious of oneself as being conscious of that 
something. Sartre now returns to self-consciousness to re­
examine it in the light of his view that consciousness is a 
nothingness. For Sartre, it is only being-for-itself as 
having this structure of negativity that can have this self- 
consciousness or "presence-to-self."92 The non-conscious 
region of being-in-itself knows no differentiation, it has no 
negativity itself. Sartre borrows the term "being-in-itself" 
from tradition to designate this mute plenitude of being93 
but, as we have already heard him say, the term is not 
strictly accurate. Being-in-itself is no mute and compressed 
that one cannot even say that it itself has the relationship 
with itself of just being itself. Being-in-itself just ia, 
it cannot have a self.
Presence-to-self, then, according to Sartre, is a structure 
of being -for-itself, maintained by consciousness in its 
negativity. Presence-to-self belongs to consciousness as 
nothingness. Consciousness is always taken up in some 
activity; it is belief or joy or the perception of some 
object and so on. Correlatively - to view it from the other 
side - belief, joy or perception of an object have to be 
consciousness of belief or of joy or of an object. Perhaps, 
then, we could say that belief (to concentrate on this 
e x a m p l e ) 94 and consciousness are identical. However, total 
identity with self, Sartre has told us, lies in the realm of 
the in-itself and in such an identity the self and self- 
consciousness have no possible meaning and cannot appear. So 
to say that consciousness is belief cannot be to make a 
statement of identity. But neither can we say that the
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belief is one distinct thing and that consciousness, another 
separate entity, comes along and is conscious of the belief. 
This would leave us with our old "consciousness of 
consciousness of consciousness ...." problem.
Sartre's solution is to say that consciousness as self- 
consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. For 
belief to exist meaningfully as belief rather that be lost 
within the anonymity of the in-itself, belief must exist as 
consciousness of belief. This is consciousness being 
conscious of itself (pre-reflectively) as consciousness of 
belief. Or, to put it another way, the for-itself is present 
to itself as believing. In one sense consciousness is the 
belief, the believing is the activity consciousness is 
engaged in. Consciousness cannot be grasped as not directed 
at anything, so the consciousness is not anything but belief, 
it is believing consciousness. So belief is consciousness 
(of) belief and consciousness (of) belief is belief. But an 
impalpable nothingness separates consciousness and belief.
The belief-consciousness is a unity which cannot be cut 
cleanly into two separate parts - the nothingness between 
consciousness and belief cannot be grasped. However, 
absolute identity would make consciousness disappear. 
Consciousness is engaged as belief but at the same time it is 
not belief. To be conscious of oneself as believing is to be 
conscious of oneself as not being identical to the belief. 
Hence, as we noted earlier, one has to work to maintain a 
faith. Hence also consciousness has other activities besides 
belief. There is a nothingness between consciousness and 
itself95 or consciousness is the nothingness of itself.
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Without this nothingness, consciousness would be sucked back 
into the in-itself.
For Sartre, then, consciousness produces itself as self- 
consciousness and this is a negating activity. Self- 
consciousness, as in the example of belief consciousness, is 
"a duality which is unity."96 Sartre also describes it as "a 
reflection which is its own reflecting."97 Reflection and 
reflecting are not being spoken of here in the sense of 
introspection etc., but rather in the sense of a game of 
mirrors. Consciousness does not operate in a Spinozan 
infinite regress as "consciousness of consciousness of 
consciousness ..." but rather as a unity through a double 
reference. Belief, joy, knowledge of objects in the world 
etc. cannot exist except as the activity of self- 
consciousness (they refer to self-consciousness) and self- 
consciousness in turn refers to belief, etc., it only exists 
as directed to something. But this double reference is 
within a unity so it is not like two mirrors reflecting into 
each other. It is rather, like a mirror reflecting into 
itself.
Sartre's view that self-consciousness is a nothingness has 
great implications for the very concept of the self or "ego." 
In discussing "The Self and the Circuit of Selfness,"98 
Sartre goes so far as to say that the ego is an "in- 
itself, "99 it is a produced object. He is here reiterating 
the view he put forward in his earlier work. The 
Transcendence of the Ego.100 A simple way of putting it, 
though a rather crude way too, is to say that, for Sartre,
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consciousness is "impersonal." But is this not a rather 
shocking position for such an ardent advocate of the view 
that study of the human being must refer to consciousness and 
its intentionality?
A closer look shows that Sartre's objectivisation of the ego 
does not contradict his view of consciousness. We have to be 
careful to note in what sense the idea of ego is being used. 
In general usage, the term sometimes denotes in a vague way 
one's "person" or "personality" and sometimes it specifically 
refers to the operation of the mind in saying "I..." Now 
Sartre, in his investigation of the human being in which 
consciousness and its intentionality must be explicitly 
referred to, cannot just label consciousness an ego or take 
operations of reflection (or of the "I") for granted. Sartre 
wants to examine the genesis of the ego.
Sartre has already stated that consciousness cannot be simply 
identified with anything. This even applies to the ego. We 
cannot just say "consciousness is an ego" in any of the above 
senses. This would be a solidification of consciousness and 
hence, for Sartre, the disappearance of consciousness. 
Consciousness is first of all immediate pre-reflective self- 
consciousness. It is already a pre-reflective presence-to- 
itself. This is what releases the human being from the 
compression of being-in-itself so that it can inhabit a realm 
of meaning. But this primarily pre-reflectively.
Secondarily, consciousness is able to carry this presence-to- 
self (a negation) further by making itself reflective
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consciousness, by engaging in operations where it can say
I I  j  I I
For Sartre, consciousness is individual and not an object 
like any other. His denial that it is an ego is in the sense 
that consciousness is not the "I" of its reflective 
operations. The "I" is produced by this individual 
consciousness. By "I" it is referring to itself but it is 
not solidly an I operation. Similarly, the ego in the sense 
of one’s personality - e.g. in the sense that someone might 
say that "Tony Beekman has an inflated ego" - is not 
something which consciousness solidly is. If the charge 
against me were justified (which, of course, I in my great 
humility can tell you it is not), still my consciousness is 
not that inflated ego. An inflated Tony Beekman ego did not 
just pop into the world. Rather, an individual 
consciousness, by the strategies in life it has taken, has 
produced for itself this personality. (We will return to the 
subject of personality later.)
So Sartre is not in fact denying that consciousness is 
personal or that it can make "I" operations. He is, rather, 
trying to look at the process of consciousness making itself 
personal. Consciousness "makes itself personal" and:
"what confers personal existence on a 
being is not the possession of an ego - 
which is only the sign of the personality 
- but it is the fact that the being 
exists for itself as presence to 
itself."101
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The image of a circuit fits Sartre’s idea of selfness well. 
Pre-reflective self-consciousness is self-consciousness 
through the circuit of intending towards its objects and 
intending towards itself intending towards its objects. 
Reflection involves explicitly positing the "self" but this 
posited self is a moment of the process of consciousness not 
its entirety.
Sartre’s view of the ego as an object, more fully set out in 
The Transcendence of the Ego, is intended as a criticism of 
Husserl’s characterisation of consciousness as an Ego. This 
may not be entirely fair to Husserl in that it could be said 
that he was using the term in a loose sense to designate 
consciousness with its intentionality as distinguished from 
ordinary objects. Husserl in the course of his career set 
out various types of ego. He did not seen consciousness as 
immediately reflective consciousness. In his later w o r k ,102 
Husserl speaks of "sedimentation" through which we 
unquestioningly operate with ways of seeing the world handed 
down to us from the scientific culture of the day and, 
indeed, his whole philosophy was characterised by the idea 
that we firstly operate in a "natural attitude" so that we 
require phenomenological reflection to examine how, for 
example, we accomplish our organised perception of the world. 
There are, then, in Husserl a few embryonic hints of the idea 
of pre-reflective consciousness. At any rate, Sartre makes 
the issue explicit an rigourously applies the findings of his 
study of the genesis of the ego.
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1,6 CONSCIOUSNESS AS BODY-FOR-ITSELF
However, at this stage in our quest to find an adequate 
foundational approach to study of the human being and the 
world, we encounter a difficult problem. We have been freely 
using the term "consciousness" here and have been looking at 
Sartre's description of it as self-consciousness, negation 
and so on. But we have already met one proviso, namely that 
consciousness is not primarily reflective. At the outset of 
his discussion of nothingness Sartre also makes clear that he 
views "the concrete" as "man within the world."103 Sartre 
wants to make explicit reference to consciousness in his 
explanation of the human being in the world but it is not a 
case of an ethereal, knowing ghost-substance encountering 
first an unorganised being-in-itself and then, on the basis 
of reflective decisions, imposing ideal boundaries within it 
to make it a world. The human being within the world is a 
synthetic dynamic process and consciousness is one aspect of 
this process. We are talking, then, of the everyday "flesh 
and blood" human being.
Yet when we look at the body of the human being with its 
flesh and blood, bones, organs, central nervous system and so 
on we do not immediately find "consciousness," that 
existential marvel which Sartre believes he is dealing with. 
What can the relation of consciousness to the body be? How 
can there be such a relation? Perhaps we are going to end up 
with the old Cartesian difficulty of uniting the spiritual 
entity which performs the cogito with the physical body. 
Rather than be left in this position, might it not be better 
to accept some sort of physicalist explanation of the human
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being such as that of Central-state Materialism? While 
accepting Central-state Materialism as the ultimate 
explanatory theory of the human being, we may at the same 
time accept Sartre's notion of consciousness for preliminary 
descriptive purposes.
This would not at all satisfy Sartre. To say that 
consciousness was really a complex process of brain neurons 
firing and so on would be, for Sartre, to return 
consciousness to the mute plenitude of being. For Sartre, 
consciousness is not reducible in this way. However, while 
refusing to reduce consciousness to something else, Sartre 
also believes that he can surmount the difficulties which 
tripped up Descartes. To Sartre, the human being or for- 
itself is wholly body and wholly c o n s c i o u s n e s s .104 Let us 
now examine how he attempts to demonstrate this.
Consciousness, Sartre has told us, is causa sui. Given the 
fact of its existence, while it exists it is a break with 
mute being, a free reference to self. However, Sartre also 
sees consciousness as being consciousness on the ground of 
"facticity."105 Consciousness did not magically create 
itself out of non-existence. It is not its own foundation.
As a matter of contingent fact, there is consciousness. The 
for-itself did not ask to be born, it finds itself "thrown 
into a world and abandoned in a situation. "106 This is the 
facticity of consciousness: while it exists it is a causa
sui reference to self but it did not originally found its own 
existence or create itself. The for-itself, then, is as 
contingent as being-in-itself. "We appear to ourselves as
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having the character of an unjustifiable fact."10? We too 
are "de trop."108 it is this realisation that we are not our 
own foundation that Sartre sees as the underlying truth of 
Descartes' second proof of God's existence.109
The body, for Sartre, is an aspect of the facticity of the 
for-itself. The for-itself, he says, is its own nothingness. 
But nothingness has to be nothingness of being and has to be 
nothingized by a being. This is the human being, being-for- 
itself. Facticity entails that consciousness arises as the 
embodied consciousness of being-for-itself. Sartre's 
previously intimated view that consciousness has to be of. 
something and that it could not be so without relation to 
transcendent being would already entail that consciousness 
has to be embodied. A disembodied consciousness would have 
no way of relating to being, it would have no way of being 
conscious of anything.
But how is consciousness embodied? Sartre is fully aware of 
the "ghost in the machine" difficulty of Descartes. The 
physiologists have studied the physical body and the laws of 
its operations. Sartre actually admits the implausibility of 
uniting a mental entity to this physical body:
"if after grasping "my" consciousness in 
its absolute inferiority and by a series 
of reflective acts, I then seek to unite 
it with a certain living object composed 
of a nervous system, a brain, glands, 
digestive, respiratory and circulatory 
organs whose very matter is capable of 
being analysed chemically into atoms of 
hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, 
etc., then I am going to encounter 
insurmountable difficulties."110
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However, this is not Sartre's capitulation to physicalism.
It is this very view of the body from the standpoint of 
physiology that Sartre challenges. Not that Sartre is going 
to deny what physiology has discovered about the body, that I 
have endocrine glands, etc. I have read about the 
physiological body in books and a surgeon may have shown me 
an x-ray picture is of my body. The knowledge of the 
physiological body is secondary, that is not the body as it 
is for me. I do not normally see my endocrine glands.Ill 
The physiological body is the body of others, the body 
investigated in its aspect as a physical thing viewed from 
the outside. The difficulties of uniting consciousness with 
the body stem from concentrating on this view of the body. 
Physiological knowledge has its place but it is a static kind 
of study of the body. It isolates the body from its 
situation of being a living, acting human being to 
concentrate on its internal physical goings-on. To study the 
relation of consciousness to the body we must study the body 
as it is for me, my body as I experience it immediately.
Sartre takes the example of a doctor examining one's wounded 
leg while one sits up on the bed looking. Sartre claims that 
here "there is no essential difference between the doctor's 
perception of my leg and my own present perception of it."112 
But is there not a difference in my situation from that of 
the doctor in that it is m y leg and I can feel it? I could 
feel my leg being touched. Sartre readily admits this but 
what he wants to get at is the difference between observation 
itself of one's body and being that body "in action"
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perceiving, moving, etc. Cold or a shot of morphine could 
remove the feeling from my leg, leaving me with the
perception of it only.113 This perception is of the same
nature as the doctor's: it is perception of an object in the
midst of the world. That I can see parts of my body is a 
contingent fact of my biological make-up. It would be 
possible - as with a certain species of insect Sartre informs 
us of - to have a body so constructed that the organism could 
not see any part of itself.114 Or at the opposite extreme, 
it would be possible to have a body such that with one eye I 
could see the other.115 But I would see only an object-eye, 
as distinct from my experience of seeing with the eye. 
Perception of the body per se is of an object.
For Sartre, then, there is an important distinction to be
made between, on the one hand, the way I immediately 
experience my body and, on the other hand, my observation of 
my body or of the body of another ( or another ' s observation 
of my body). In the above example, I explicitly observe my 
wounded leg as this physical object being worked on.
Observing another's body, I may, for example, see the person 
using his or her arm to pull a chair towards him or her.116 
But my body as I immediately experience it is not an observed 
object or an instrument I use. The body is not, here, an 
object I confront and then use. My experience of my body is 
not that of being a ghost pilot operating the body-machine.
Sartre's way of putting it is that I "live"117 or "exist"US 
my body. My body, as perceiving and acting, is my point of 
view on the world and an instrument of action. But it is the
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body which I am. The point of view is the point of view which 
I am, the point of view on which I cannot have a point of 
view. I immediately see objects, I do not "see the 
seeing."119 It is not like using an object, I am the seeing. 
Or in action, my hand is not an external tool which I then 
take up and use. I am my hand so that in writing, for
example, I do not have to pay explicit attention to it: "I
do not apprehend my hand in the act of writing... I am my 
h a n d ."120 The pen is the tool which I use.
I perceive and act towards things in the world. This world 
of things is such a world from my bodily point of view. My
body is the centre of reference of the world. But it is the
centre which I immediately am, so that I do not ordinarily 
give reflective attention to it. It is indicated, says 
Sartre, by a sort of gap.121
For an illustration of this we can think of the type of scene 
in a film where, for example, a killer is stalking his or her 
victim but we do not see the killer. Instead all we see is 
what the killer sees as he or she slowly approaches the 
victim. Or alternatively, we are identified with the unseen 
hunted person and we see what he or she sees from the vantage 
point behind the crack of an opening in the cupboard door.
The objects seen refer back to the unseen centre of 
reference.
For Sartre, then, the human being is neither a pure spirit 
nor merely the physiological body nor even an addition of the 
two. Consciousness "exists its b o d y . "122 The body is a
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structure of consciousness. And more specifically, it 
"belongs to the structure of non-thetic self- 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  "123 since it is not primarily an object of 
reflection. However, paradoxically, due to this very fact 
that the body is not reflectively attended to, the body 
cannot simply be identified with non-thetic self- 
consciousness. I live my body as I carry out my activities 
in the world. So I pass over my body towards the world. 
E.g. I surpass my hand towards the writing of this piece:
"Non-positional consciousness is 
consciousness (of the) body as being that 
which it surmounts and nihilates by 
making itself consciousness - i.e. as 
being something which consciousness has 
to be without having to be it and which 
it passes over in order to be what it has 
to be...consciousness of the body is 
lateral and retrospective; the body is 
the neglected, the "passed by in 
silence." And yet the body is what this 
consciousness Is.: it is not even
anything except body. The rest is 
nothingness and s i l e n c e ."124
Consciousness "has to be the body" in the sense that it is 
embodied and has to be, it cannot choose not to be body. But 
then consequently it is this body "without having to be it" 
in that the body is its unavoidable facticity unlike the 
various projects consciousness undertakes, with which it 
cannot be solidly identified. It "has to be" the project in 
the sense of actively making itself such, passing over it to 
those projects which I actively "have to be" (using "to be" 
in a sense like that of "to make.") The body is what 
consciousness "is" in the sense that the body is a graspable 
thing whereas consciousness is nothingness, the break with
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being that allows the for-itself to pass over its body to its 
projects.
It is because I live and pass over my body that Sartre 
includes his discussion of it in the section on being-for- 
others. The issue of the body arises when we take the 
other's point of view on the body and observe it as a 
physical object.
Sartre's conception of the relationship between consciousness 
and the body is, I believe, of great significance in 
attempting to reach an understanding of what the human being 
is. Sartre starts off from our experience of ourselves as 
being immediately both conscious and bodily beings. Sartre's 
notion of the lived body does seem to accurately describe to 
us our experience however this experience is to be explained. 
I do not experience myself as a ghost operating the body- 
machine nor as a purely physical thing (in which case I would 
not have an experience anyway). I am this hand which is 
writing. That is, it is immediately me that is writing. I 
am this acting body conscious of itself. I am a physical 
being that acts but I am_immediately the performing of my 
acts, I am conscious and my acts mean something to me.
Before we try to find explanations for our experience, then, 
within that experience one appears to oneself as a conscious 
bodily unity which is a point of view on the world, an 
experiencing centre.
Now in trying to explain this experience both the Cartesian 
and the physicalist step outside this unity to examine its
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different aspects. From this centripetal perspective, rather 
than the centrifugal perspective of the experiencing person, 
the unity breaks up before the very eyes of the Cartesian and 
the physicalist. That is, from the outside they see the 
completely physical body with its complex physiology and 
cannot observe "consciousness" there. But they still have 
the evidence of their conscious experience. To Descartes 
this evidence is there, it cannot be denied. I think and I 
cannot ignore this. Yet the contrary evidence presents 
itself to him from the external perspective on the body: the
body is this purely physical thing which can be dissected in 
the laboratory. To resolve the two sides to each other 
Descartes posits the existence of this other type of 
substance, the mental entity or soul, that is joined to the 
physical body. But this leaves us with the problem of how 
such an ethereal substance can exist and be joined to the 
physical body.
The physicalist also has the evidence of his or her conscious 
experience but places trust primarily in the physical 
observation of the body. Therefore he or she tries to 
explain consciousness in terms of the physical.
Consciousness simply is. the complex central nervous system or 
it is a causal process just like that present in the chess- 
playing computer which is a purely physical thing yet has the 
"mental" capacity to engage in such activities as playing 
chess. However, such views attempt to explain away 
consciousness. The occurrences themselves of brain neurons 
firing or of computer circuits operating are purely physical 
occurrences. Yet we still have our experience of ourselves
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as consciously acting, thinking and so on as such, the 
physical explanations do not account for my experience to me 
in my experience. It seems, then, that we are placed in a 
trap where we have to choose between two equally inadequate 
options.
At this juncture it is possible to view Sartre’s theory of 
the conscious bodily human being as a balanced approach which 
offers us a way out of the trap. Sartre starts off from 
reflection on our conscious experience. Sartre wants to 
examine this experience and explain what it is and how it 
operates. But he first of all accepts consciousness as 
consciousness and does not try to reduce it to something 
else. One could view this as a "truer empiricism" than that 
of a physicalist theory. I experience myself as conscious 
and no translation of this experience into the physical 
goings-on inside my body can satisfy me within my experience.
I experience myself as consciousness as such. So it could be
held that it is quite reasonable to accept the evidence of 
our experience that the human being is conscious as such.
That is, however it is possible, the human being has
consciousness which is an actual aspect of the human being
capable of being treated in its own terms.
Sartre proceeds to step outside the immediate unity of our 
conscious experience to examine how it is possible. But 
Sartre keeps in mind this unity and returns to it with his 
discoveries. He looks at how consciousness is possible but 
regards the grounds of its possibility as giving rise to 
consciousness as such rather than as an explanation which
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displaces consciousness. I am conscious. I have to be 
consciousness of something and I must have a way of being 
conscious. My way of being conscious is as existing the 
body. So of course the central nervous system and its 
operations are involved. But we do not have to reduce 
consciousness to this. The human body is of this physical 
structure and with this central nervous system and so on 
which gives rise to the unity of the body, consciousness.
The body is of such a nature that the level of consciousness 
is reached. Consciousness is not simply to be identified 
with the physiological processes in the body which make it 
possible: the whole point of the level of consciousness
being reached is to be something more than just ignorant 
physicality. The human being is treated under this approach 
neither as a purely physical automaton nor as a body-machine 
joined to an ethereal "soul" entity. We accept the human 
being as at once a finite biological existence which is at 
the same time run through by the conscious unity it is the 
occasion of. We have here a balanced approach which allows 
us to study the human being in all its aspects, "physical" 
and "mental," an approach which presents to us the whole 
conscious bodily human being.
It is possible, I believe, to retrospectively view Sartre's 
pre-BN works as concrete applications of this approach to the 
study of consciousness and the human being and as evidence of 
its practical usefulness. This issue will be more fully 
elaborated on in Part Two but let us briefly consider it 
here. To take first his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, 
Sartre there examines the type of position in which as
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outburst of emotion is viewed simply as being physiological 
changes in the body. But Sartre notes that anger and joy 
entail almost the same physiological c h a n g e s .125 Yet the 
experiences of joy and anger do seem to have essential 
meaningful differences. A study of the emotions that said 
joy and anger were simply similar but slightly differing 
physiological changes in the body would not seem to be very 
informative. Sartre instead accepts the anger and joy as 
meaningful affective operations of the conscious bodily human 
being. Physiological changes such as the quickening of the 
heart-beat, reddening of the face, laughing, etc. are brought 
under the unity of the conscious emotional bodily human 
being. These are the way one lives and fully believes one's 
emotions. I will not here go into whether or not Sartre's 
interpretation of what each type of emotion means is correct 
but what we can say, I believe, is that his general approach 
allows us to study the emotions in all their aspects, the 
"mental" and the "physical."
Sartre gives the mental image the same treatment in his work. 
The Psychology of Imagination. Here he tries to describe our 
imaging experience and then apply explanatory analysis to it 
in such a way that the explanation is integrated with the 
description rather than presenting us with an "illusory 
experience with scientific explanation behind it" scenario. 
When I form a mental image - of an absent friend, for example 
- however I accomplish it, I do have the experience of 
mentally "viewing" my friend. Sartre starts from this base 
of accepting the experience as such but allows for open 
examination of how the experience is accomplished. Sartre's
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conclusion is that there is not any actual physical or 
mystical picture which is "in" the head. Nevertheless the 
experience is not to be denied. The experience is 
accomplished by a synthesis of one’s knowledge of the 
imagined object, the affective sense one has of it, the 
kinaesthetic movement by which one mimes it and one's acting 
towards all this as if it were the object present.
The body too, then, is part of this process for Sartre.
Sartre gives his own experience as an example; he was 
imagining a swing swinging and found that his eyes swung to 
and f r o .126 The body’s kinaesthetic movement is used in the 
synthesis of the image. Here Sartre examines how we mentally 
image things. He openly uses analytic detective work but at 
the same time places his discoveries back within the unity of 
the experience rather than using them to debunk our 
experience. Whatever way we accomplish the experience, it 
"does the trick" and delivers to us an imaginary view of our 
intended object.
It is possible also, I believe, to see the practical 
usefulness of Sartre’s approach specifically in relation to 
consciousness itself. In BN and the antecedent works, Sartre 
accepts consciousness in its own terms as a meaningful 
reference to self. But, as we observed earlier, he does not 
portray consciousness as a ready-made contemplative ego. So 
whether we are examining a spontaneous outburst of emotion, a 
dream, contemplative reflection or whatever, Sartre is able 
to accept that these are meaningful experiences for 
consciousness but at the same time he is able to allow for
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the "facticity" of consciousness so as to study it under the 
particular mode of operation it is engaged in at the time.
To take the example of the dreaming consciousness from The 
Psychology of Imagination,127 Sartre studies the dream as a 
meaningful operation of consciousness. The dream is fully 
the product of consciousness. But Sartre does not pretend 
that there is a contemplating ego there coolly writing the 
dream story and then enacting it in the dream. Sartre 
examines the particular mode of consciousness of the dreamer; 
it is a pre-reflective and "neutral" mode in which all 
"thought" takes place immediately in the form of the pictured 
events of the dream story. Similarly in the Sketch for a 
Theory of the Emotions, Sartre studies one’s emotional 
outburst as a meaningful operation of consciousness but one 
in which consciousness has stepped down from a rational level 
to a level of spontaneous "magical" action as if this could 
transform the situationl28 (e.g. in my own case, waving my 
fist in the air and shouting a demand to the late absent 
train to hurry up and appear). And generally in BN, Sartre 
with his notion of pre-reflective consciousness, is able to 
study our everyday activities - such as opening a door or 
walking down a street - as meaningful to consciousness 
without any ridiculous transformation of these activities 
into high contemplation. Sartre has reached a balance where 
he can study the whole concrete conscious bodily human being 
in all its types of activities, from the most spontaneous act 
to the most contemplative reflection.
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The usefulness of Sartre’s approach to the conscious bodily 
human being could also be seen, I believe, as being evidenced 
in his treatment of the senses, historically a great problem 
for philosophy and which he deals with in the chapter on the 
body in BN. This is perhaps the most compelling example in 
showing the advantage of Sartre’s procedure of focusing on 
the human being’s experience for itself and then integrating 
with this experience any discoveries about how it is 
possible.
Sartre describes the sensation of the usual scientific view 
as "sensation ... inside the b o x . "129 it may be useful to 
take another look at John Locke’s philosophy as an early 
example of this type of view and one which throws up certain 
difficulties Sartre tries to dispel with his approach.
For John Locke, sensation was a case of the external world 
acting on the senses of the human being, causing in the mind 
ideas of the objects in the external world. The difficulty 
that arises is that Locke is imprisoned within his sensation. 
All he has is the "image in his head" (or sensation inside 
the box). He has a "copy" of the external world but no proof 
that the copy is accurate or even that there actually is an 
external world to copy.
In contrast, Sartre - in rather vitriolic fashion - attacks 
the whole idea of sensation. He derides it as:
"a hybrid notion between the subjective 
and the objective, conceived from the 
standpoint of the object and applied 
subsequently to the subject, a bastard
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existence which we can not say whether it 
exists in fact or in theory - sensation 
is a pure daydream of the psychologist.
It must be deliberately rejected by any 
serious theory concerning the relations 
between consciousness and the world." 130
Why such a spirited attack on the idea of sensation? After 
all, we cannot very well deny that we have bodies such that 
we have the senses of sight, touch, hearing, etc. Fair 
enough, but what Sartre is attacking is the tendency - as 
epitomised by John Locke - to study sensation outwith the 
unity of the conscious bodily human being. For example, 
light may be studied in terms of light hitting the retina of 
the eye, the receiving of an image and so on. This is 
studying the body of the other once again and not sight as it 
is for me. What is objectively discovered about how seeing 
is possible is not reintegrated into our overall experience 
of seeing. Instead it is identified as being what seeing 
"really is." Thus we are left with the Locke-type trinity of 
the subject, the real external world and the mediation of 
sensation to give the former information of the latter.
Sartre instead puts the senses within the framework of the 
relationship of the conscious human being and the world. In 
Sartre’s framework, the for-itself by being conscious of 
being makes the latter a world. The whole system is 
contingent but given that it exists I have to have some way 
of being conscious of being. As a matter of fact, the way I 
am able to be conscious is as this type of body with its type 
of senses. But, in accord with the notion of the body as it 
is for me, or "body-for-itself"131 as Sartre puts it at one 
point, the senses are not instruments I use to receive
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"sensations" like getting a reading on a scanner. E.g. I do 
not see perceptions or examine visual sensations - I see 
things. "Senses are everywhere," Sartre says, "yet 
everywhere inapprehensible. "132 i live my body with its 
senses so that I relate to the objective world which I 
encounter in this process rather than to the senses 
themselves.
To focus on the case of visual perception, I do not here pay 
attention to the sense of sight. I simply see objects. Now 
I have to see them from perspective; I cannot see them all 
at once nor see all sides of an object at once and there is
an infinity of ways an object can appear. But my perception
is not then a subjective distortion. The world is not "like"
anything in itself for me to distort. This is the nature of
the world and objects for me as a seeing conscious human 
being. The rules of appearance are objective and derive from 
the nature of things. The world is such that an inkwell 
hides a portion of the table on which it is placed. Or to 
take a more instructive example:
"if the object gets smaller when moving 
away, we must not explain this by some 
kind of illusion in the observer but by 
the strictly external laws of 
perspective."133
The house in the distance may cast a small image on my retina 
but it is not a small image I perceive. I live my sensory 
organs so that my "sensation" is a direct relating to 
objects. I perceive, then, not a small image but, rather, a 
large house in the distance.
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I am conscious of the world, not of my body's senses. But 
the world refers back to me as the (bodily) centre of 
reference. The visual, auditory, tactile world refer back to 
me as this conscious seeing hearing touching human being. Or 
if someone is blind, the world is referred back to him or her 
as an auditory, tactile world.134 That is the way the world 
is for him or her. To take another case, if I have sore eyes 
the world refers back to me as this objective world in which 
it is difficult to read and so on.135 i relate to a world 
which is objective, even though it refers back to me as the 
experiencing centre without whom it would not be this way. 
This entails that the objects I perceive are not just blandly 
noted to be there. Perception of the world pre-figures my 
possible actions. E.g. seeing the cup from only this 
perspective refers me to the possible action of lifting up 
the cup to see its bottom.136
In general, then, Sartre studies sensation within the context 
of the experiencing conscious human being or for-itself, 
returning sensation to the unity from which Locke plucked it. 
Since, under Sartre’s view, I am the perceiving, Locke’s 
difficulty of the subject using the sense-tool to receive a 
questionable image from the external world is avoided.
 THE FOR-ITSELF AND THE WORLD
We have now travelled a long way with Sartre. First of all 
we met him studying the human being as consciousness. What 
lay behind this was attention to the experiencing aspect of 
the human being. I can point to myself as having this
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feature of not just being an ignorant object but being 
someone who is a centre of experience. One could try to 
explain how this experiencing consciousness was possible but 
it was not acceptable to explain it away; whatever 
explanation was attempted I would still have my conscious 
experience. Sartre then pointed out that consciousness is 
primarily pre-reflective; I am this experiencing 
consciousness for whom the world has meaning and this applies 
whether I act with spontaneity or deliberate reflection. 
Sartre then inferred that consciousness was a relation to a 
transcendent being. Its negation of this being made the 
latter properly a world. What lay behind this was the 
reflection on our experience which told us two things: 
firstly, the world I experience does not just arrange itself 
according to my whim, at its basis is something out there 
independent of me without which I would not have anything to 
be conscious of; and, secondly, the world nevertheless would 
not be the "world" outside my experience, it is not "like" 
anything in itself outside someone's experience of it.
Sartre has now told us that this negating consciousness is 
the immediately embodied consciousness of the concrete human 
being or for-itself.
Gathering all this together, it is possible to view the 
emergent Sartrean picture of the human being for itself and 
the world as a balanced one avoiding both idealism and 
realism. The human being is neither viewed as having a 
mysterious soul nor as being a biological automaton. As 
regards the world, this is neither regarded as a deliberate 
ideal construct nor as simply being there that way as if the
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human being played no part in the way the world appears to 
him or her. The human being is seen, rather, as a conscious 
bodily unity, this concrete living experiencing centre. It 
lives and operates in this concrete world which puts up 
resistance to us but which only is this auditory visual 
tactile world through our consciousness of it. We are 
presented with a truer empiricism in which the conditions of 
the existence of consciousness are recognized - embodied 
existence in a world - but in which our own conscious 
experience of living in these conditions can be accepted and 
not explained away. We are talking of the concrete conscious 
human being, a physical being living in the physical world 
but doing so as a conscious unity. Sartre has talked of 
consciousness as negating being, as conscious of itself as 
not being the in-itself and so on. But armed now with 
Sartre's conception of consciousness as the pre-reflective 
conscious "existed" body relating to the independent realm of 
being as an objective world, we can see now that this 
negating activity is not some ideal deliberative thought- 
operation - it takes place as this conscious life of the 
concrete human being in the world. Sartre can now go into 
more detail on the subject of consciousness's negation of 
being and formation of it into a world with the understanding 
that this takes place within the concrete for-itself/world 
relation. He attempts this in the chapter on 
"Transcendence,"137 the general term by which Sartre denotes 
the idea of consciousness going beyond itself to be conscious 
of being.
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We have already seen Sartre's requirement that if the for- 
itself is to have any relationship with being rather than 
being enmired in the latter it must be conscious of itself as 
separate from being. So, for Sartre, the for-itself is 
conscious of itself as not being the in-itself. Sartre now 
describes this as an "internal"138 and " r a d i c a l"139 negation. 
"Internal" in that one of the terms of the negation is the 
for-itself itself. The for-itself defines itself by this 
negation. It is the for-itself's existence not to be being.
Now being as it is in itself simply is. In its plenitude it 
has no need of the negating activity of the for-itself 
whereas the for-itself requires being to be conscious of. 
Being as it is in itself is not "like" anything. It is 
beyond all such descriptions without any consciousness there 
to view it in any such way or in any way at all. The 
internal negation is, consequently, "radical" in that it is 
the for-itself's negating consciousness of being that for the 
first time makes the latter "like" something and makes it 
able to be seen as a totality. My being conscious of it 
makes it "there" for me. The for-itself is responsible for 
the way "there is" being for it. 140. But this is not a case 
of a false appearance behind which lies the way being really 
is. Being as it is in itself is not they way it appears to 
me - but it is not anything else! The for-itself is 
conscious of transcendent being and the fact that it is 
conscious from its point of view is part and parcel of being 
conscious. That is the way being is there for us but it is 
nevertheless still being that one is conscious of. One does 
not complain that one is not hearing music directly because
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one has to hear it through notes. This negating conscious 
relation to being takes place as our everyday consciousness 
of the world.
If the internal negation of being is expressed by our 
everyday consciousness of the world then this internal 
negation is matched correlatively by an "external" negation 
in Sartre's terminology.141 This negation is external in 
that this time it does not define the for-itself but is the 
negation by which the for-itself can see one object as a 
"this," a particular thing. This is a negation because to 
determine a "this" one has to set it out as not being 
anything else. So the external negation is that by which the 
different "thises" are set out as not being each other.
Sartre has made this distinction between internal and 
external negation but - in accordance with the notion that 
the negation of being takes place within the concrete 
relation of the for-itself and the world - these negations 
cannot be two absolutely separate negations carried out one 
after another. Sartre uses the word "correlative."142 An 
even stronger unity is suggested by how he deals with 
negation. The external negation can be seen as an aspect of 
the internal negation or vice versa. Of the this, Sartre 
says that the for-itself has to see it on the ground of 
totality.143 One has to see a this (external negation) on 
the ground of the totality of being which one negates 
(internal negation). The external negation requires the 
internal negation. Reciprocally, since the for-itself has to 
have a point of view on being, it requires to effect the
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internal negation by external negations, by relating to 
individual things and events. This reciprocity and 
complementarity of the two aspects of negation is well 
illustrated by Sartre in the field of perception. An 
individual perception of some object requires the world as a 
foundation, I have to pick out the perceived figure from its 
ground. Reciprocally, I never perceive the world in its 
entirety, it is revealed concretely as the ground of my
individual perceptions.144
Earlier we saw how, for Sartre, the internal negation defines 
the for-itself. The internal negation's relation to the 
external negation also implies, then, something about the way 
the for-itself is defined. Sartre, in this regard, describes 
the for-itself as a "detotalized" totality of negations.145 
The for-itself accomplishes the total negation of being 
through its individual concrete negations. I go on making 
these concrete individual negations (until death) so that I 
never achieve an absolute closed totality with which I can be 
solidly identified. "I both am and am not the total 
negation," Sartre says.146 While I live I continually make 
new negations. Each negation is part of the totality, an 
operation of the one for-itself, but I still have to go on to 
the next negation. The totality is an open "detotalized" 
totality.
The internal cum external negation is, then, Sartre's account 
of the genesis of the world as one I can relate to. It is 
the genesis of how for the human being or for-itself the 
world is a world rather than a mute plenitude with no-one to
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be related to. And this activity is not a simple affair. 
Sartre looks into the various complexities the for-itself is 
engaged in to make the world the world it is. For example, 
the spatio-temporal milieu in which we relate to objects is 
such a milieu only for the for-itself. Being as it is in 
itself has no-one to relate to it in these terms. And to 
take the individual "thises" we relate to, seeing a this, 
when one examines it closely, involves many aspects. We have 
seen how, for Sartre, relating to a this involves negation, 
setting out the boundaries outwith which "is not" the this. 
But the boundary-setting is not a simple pencilling-in of 
lines. To see an object as that object involves, for one
thing, perceiving its permanence as the same object
continuing over time.147
Sartre also points out that abstraction is involved. Here we 
can recall Hegel's attack on the "sense-certainty" position 
which held that one just stood there with open senses and a 
pre-packed, unadulterated world flooded in. Hegel, in 
contrast, pointed to the activity needed to perceive a this 
(use of universels and so o n ) .148 Sartre points to the 
abstractions already in an object through us. E.g. this 
green object. Sartre says that "the green never is. g r e e n . 149 
That is, there is no fixed epitome of green-ness in the 
world. There are the individual greens, the green objects I
see. It is the for-itself which has to identify a universal
quality, greenness, and set the object off as being of that 
quality.
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However, all this activity of consciousness in forming being
into a world is not some reflective stage by stage "mind
game." This negating activity of consciousness in forming
the world is what, on reflection, we are able to decipher
from our conscious experiencing of the world. it is what we
do but we do it as a pre-reflective embodied consciousness
immediately relating to transcendent being. Being
consequently appears to us as an objective world within the
circuit of s e l f n e s s .150 Thus my relation to a "this" is not
to some made-up image. An object such as a lemon, for
example, appears not as a summation of separate qualities but
as a total unity in which all the qualities interpenetrate
and arfi the object:
"the yellow of the lemon is not a 
subjective mode of apprehending the 
lemon; it is the lemon. And it is not 
true that the object x appears as the 
empty form which holds together disparate 
qualities. In fact, the lemon is 
extended throughout its qualities, and 
each of its qualities is extended 
throughout each of the others. it is the 
sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it 
is the yellow of the lemon which is 
sour."151
The for-itself's consciousness of being is the foundation of 
the whole situation. The for-itself is conscious (from its 
point of view) of being (in the form of the world) and it is 
only on the foundation of this relationship that there can be 
any subjectivity or objectivity. The for-itself with nothing 
to be conscious of would not exist (no subject) and being 
with no-one to be conscious of it would not be an 
objectivity, it would have no-one to view it as such. The 
world appears as an objective world in Sartre's framework
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since the world is independent being as I am conscious of it. 
And I am conscious of the world, not reflectively 
constructing it. I am aware of this concrete world of 
objects. My consciousness is part of what makes the world a 
world but this process lies within the non-reflective unity 
of the situation. The internal cum external negation belongs 
to the structures of non-thetic consciousness. My making the 
world a world is my everyday dealing with it.
We have now, then, examined the process by which, according 
to Sartre, the for-itself relates to transcendent being 
thereby allowing the for-itself to be a subject and making 
being take the form of an objective world. However, we may 
still here be left with a few philosophical ambiguities. On 
the one hand, Sartre seems to identify the world with being 
since the former is the form in which I am conscious of the 
latter. Also, Sartre will call individual objects "in- 
itself s." On the other hand, being as it is in itself 
independently of the for-itself, according to Sartre, does 
not have any form so that in that sense the world is not to 
be identified with being. Being-in-itself is indifferent to 
the world-form in which the for-itself in conscious of it.
The way being "is there" for us is, then, contingent and the 
external negations which determine the way it is there for us 
are branded as "ideal" by Sartre in that they do not affect 
being as it is in itself.152 This contingency of form was 
part of the subject-matter of Sartre's novel "Nausea" in 
which the main character. Roquentin, begins to see the 
everyday objects in the world which he had taken for granted 
as peculiar and surprising. 153 And in BN, Sartre says that
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the notion of beauty stems from the impossible ideal of a 
"this" whose form is totally necessary and unchangeable.
This is the ideal of the this/essence f u s i o n .154 This 
ideality of the world contrasts with the objectivity Sartre 
gives it as in the example of the lemon. Also, if being-in- 
itself is an undifferentiated plenitude, how can we talk of 
particular objects as individual in-itselfs? What are we to 
make of these ambiguities?
First of all, to Sartre, the human situation of consciously 
living in a world which is objective but in which we play a 
part in making it so is itself ambiguous. And as Jeanson 
puts it, "given an ambiguous reality, an ambiguous method is 
alone suitable."155 Transcendent being outside our relation 
to it does not have the world-form it has for us, it is 
completely undifferentiated. At the same time, however, the 
world is not an illusion behind which lies transcendent 
being. The world is being as I directly relate to it just as 
in the discussion of the senses it was said that my seeing an 
object is my relating directly to it rather than a perusal of 
an image of an object. So in this sense the world is 
transcendent being. The latter cannot appear in any other 
way. We are able to view the world as differentiated into 
various things and parts such as a mountain for example.
Being itself does not know this differentiation, only through 
the for-itself's relation to being can the mountain appear as 
a mountain. But at the same time being is the ground with 
its resistance and so on which we need to be able to see a 
mountain. There is something in being which makes it pliable 
to our differentiation even though it cannot know this
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itself. After all, we cannot simply choose that the mountain 
should disappear. So seeing the mountain is a relation to an 
objective thing while at the same time being is oblivious to 
this differentiation and is beyond caring even suppose this 
mountain be reduced to scattered rubble by an earthquake. In 
this sense, the world-form is contingent.
Sartre allows himself some flexibility in the use of his 
concepts to cope with this complex relation of the for-itself 
to being. The term "in-itself" is used by Sartre firstly to 
denote being as it would be outside of human consciousness of 
it. But he also uses it more generally of the particular 
object one is conscious of (such as the mountain) which is 
transcendent being (which in itself simply is itself) as I 
relate to it. He also uses the term "in-itself" to denote 
any type of object which the for-itself is conscious of and 
which is thereby an inert object in comparison to 
consciousness. E.g. the ego is, for Sartre, a passive in- 
itself, an object with no creativity of its own and which is 
formulated by consciousness.
 THE QUESTION OF THE "AS IF"
We have now, then, I hope, reached an understanding of 
Sartre’s approach as a balanced one which gives us the 
practical means to study fully the human being and the world. 
However, before we draw this chapter to a close, there is a 
final, or perhaps the ultimate, problematical issue to 
consider. We have been trying to reach an understanding of 
what the human being and the world are but we could now turn 
to question why and how this whole system came into
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existence. Why and how did being come into existence and why 
and how did it give rise to the existence of the for-itself 
or human being?
Up till now we have been examining the human being and the 
world and, given that they are in existence, asking what 
precisely they are. That, for Sartre, lies in the field of 
ontology and he has attempted to provide answers by 
reflecting on our experience of ourselves as human beings in 
the world. But now we are going beyond ontology and what can 
be answered by phenomenological reflection to ask why and how 
being came into existence and why and how it gave rise to the 
for-itself. This, for Sartre, lies in the field of 
metaphysics which "is to ontology as history is to 
sociology."156
For Sartre, metaphysics is a rather constrained area. It 
cannot succeed as a vehicle to transport us outside the for- 
itself - world relation to validate any hypotheses about why 
and how being exists and gives rise to the for-itself. All 
it can do is take the discoveries ontology has made and offer 
hypotheses to unify these discoveries, without these 
hypotheses being capable of any further validation.157
Sartre's phenomenological ontology has posited three main 
regions of being: the in-itself or transcendent being, the
for-itself, and the ideal being of the in-itself-for-itself 
or ens causa s u i .158 The for-itself to exist has to be 
consciousness of transcendent being while the latter only is 
the world through the for-itself's consciousness of it.
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However, transcendent being is the independent realm outside 
me which I bump up against and which does not need me to hold 
it in being, it just is and does not in itself require 
someone to view it as a world. So the for-itself and the in- 
itself are inseparable from the point of view of the for- 
itself but not from the side of the in-itself. In this sense 
the for-itself and the in-itself do no constitute a proper 
totality.159 The for-itself is conscious of itself and 
constitutes a break from being. It has the ideal of 
remaining conscious and at the same time achieving fullness 
of being. That is, it has the ideal of becoming in-itself- 
for-itself. But this is not possible because consciousness 
is essentially negativity and withdrawal from being so that 
to reach a point of satisfaction and solidity would be to 
smooth out the negative and end consciousness.
If being-in-itself were in some way to "attempt" to get out 
of its contingent state of simply being and instead become 
ens causa sui it would have to make itself conscious of 
itself. And according to Sartre the for-itself is, indeed, a 
consciousness of the in-itself and has itself the ideal of 
being in-itself-for-itself. This would imply that the in- 
itself was already conscious and had for itself the project 
of founding itself. Nothing allows us to say this, according 
to Sartre, from our ontological discoveries. We are 
conscious of the in-itself and it is we who make it a world 
for ourselves and who formulate the very idea of foundation. 
Therefore, within the field of ontology, Sartre limits 
himself to declaring that "every thing takes place as if the
Page - 99
in-itself in a project to found itself gave itself the 
modification of the for-itself."160
But everything also takes place as if this project fails or
only partially succeeds. It gives rise to the for-itself
which is conscious of the in-itself - but which is a distinct
entity, a negation of the in-itself, something separate from
the in-itself. Transcendent being lacks consciousness. It
then gives rise to the for-itself. But instead of this
meaning that the in-itself is then conscious of itself - in-
itself-for-itself - there is a separate entity, the for-
itself, which is conscious of the in-itself but which on its
side, as a negation of the in-itself, lacks fullness of being
and has in its turn the ideal of becoming in-itself-for-
itself. Instead of this ideal being realised we are
presented with a "detotalized totality,"161 to use that term
once again, of the in-itself and the for-itself. So Sartre's
metaphysical suggestion is to think of the for-itself and the
in-itself as a "disintegrated totality," a failed in-itself-
for-itself or ens causa sui, although we cannot suppose that
the totality was ever achieved in the first place:
"the real is an abortive effort to attain 
to the dignity of the self-cause.
Everything happens as if the world, man, 
and man-in-the-world succeeded in 
realising only a missing God. Everything 
happens therefore as if the in-itself and 
the for-itself were presented in a state 
of disintegration in relation to an ideal 
synthesis. Not that the integration has 
ever taken place but on the contrary 
precisely because it is always indicated 
and always impossible."162
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With his notion here that it is as if the in-itself in a 
project to found itself gave rise to the for-itself, Sartre 
is allowing in some way for the idea of the unity of a 
process in the universe leading from ignorant being to the 
conscious for-itself. When we consider the human being's 
facticity as situated in this universe it would appear that 
we are compelled to reach some conception of such a process. 
Looking at the universe starting from the Big Bang, going on 
to the formation of the planets and solar systems and the 
evolution of life on Earth leading eventually to the human 
being, it seems evident that in some way "everything is 
connected to everything else." We have, in fact, already 
been pointed in this direction in examining Sartre's 
ontological vision in which consciousness is the embodied 
consciousness of being-for-itself, a consciousness which 
emerges from and requires being. There are two main paths we 
could be tempted to take in a search for the answer to this 
question of how everything is connected to everything else 
and of where the human being fits in. One of these paths is 
that of the physicalist. A physicalist, such as Armstrong, 
who identified human consciousness with the central nervous 
system, could view the human being as the climax of the 
purely physical processes of the universe, a realm of various 
purely physical objects of increasing degrees of complexity. 
Here the human being is integrated within the process of the 
universe as one physical object among others and has no 
special status.163
I have already attempted to show that human consciousness 
cannot be reduced in this way. We are still left with our
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own conscious experience as such and no translation of it 
into physical terms can satisfy us within our experience. A 
"truer empiricism" would be to accept that the human being’s 
bodily existence is the ground of its consciousness but also 
to accept that consciousness is thereby reached as something 
distinct from a mere sum of physical events.164 if in this 
way we accept the human being as a distinct conscious 
existence then we in a sense break up the process of the 
universe as a purely physical one. The Sartrean conscious 
human being is by its consciousness separate from the rest of 
the universe.
We could then follow the other path in attempting to account 
for how everything is connected to everything. Here we would 
view the universe as in some way a project towards producing 
consciousness. The human being would be seen as the universe 
come to knowledge of itself. Sartre edges towards this type 
of view with his idea that it is as if the in-itself in a 
project to found itself gave rise to the for-itself.
However, Sartre draws back from completely accepting it by 
inserting his "as if" clause. The emergence of the human 
being is "like" the universe coming to know itself but not in 
a complete sense. Sartre injects an element of separation 
into the system. The for-itself depends on being so that it 
is part of a process but being does not likewise need the 
for-itself. The for-itself is a break in the system. Sartre 
does not present us with a smooth even continuum.
Why should we retain the "as if," rendering our theory 
incomplete as it does and leaving an element of the
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unexplainable? Hegel's view of the universal Geist, for 
example, dispenses with the "as if" and attempts to 
encapsulate everything within the necessary development of 
Geist. In this respect, the Sartrean universe is like a 
Hegelian universe infected with contingency and with a fault- 
line through its heart. Hegel does not acknowledge a fault- 
line; there is contingency within the Hegelian system and 
individual conscious existants must pass away to be replaced 
by others but the whole system is necessary and is the 
universal Geist coming to know itself.
However, there is in the Hegelian system, in my view, an 
unresolved problem concerning the universal Geist. The 
universal Geist is conceived of as having its existence 
through the development of the universe and through the 
various "shapes" the human being and human society goes 
through (senses-certainty, perception and so on, the master- 
slave dialectic, the various forms of ethical life etc.)165 
The universal Geist ia the process of the development of 
these formations. This is a very fruitful perspective in 
supplying us with a unity within which we can examine what a 
situation feels like for an individual conscious existent but 
within which we can also study the lines of development of 
this situation which the conscious existent is not aware of 
itself. The problem I see, however, is that both the 
individual existent and the Geist are said to be actual 
realities. There could be some unsatisfactory ambiguity 
here. What explicitly is the relationship between the 
universal Geist and the individual conscious existent? If 
there is no "as if" in the system it would seem that we must
Page - 103
say that the universal Geist for-itself is actually 
conscious. I am explicitly conscious of myself too, yet the 
universal Geist which is conscious of itself has its form 
through me and the unity of all the shapes it goes through.
It seems to me that without an "as if" there is an 
insurmountable difficulty in the identity of an individual 
conscious existent with the universal Geist. This 
identification, in my view, would mean either one or the 
other of two things. It must mean that I am swallowed up in 
the universal Geist in which case I lose my existence as a 
distinct consciousness in my own right. But then this runs 
contrary to my own experience of myself as a distinct 
conscious entity. Alternatively, if we insist that the 
individual conscious existent does not lose its distinctness 
then we are left with the grave problem - analogous to the 
difficulties in Christian theology of conceiving God as a 
Trinity of three distinct individuals who are also the one 
entity - of trying to conceive how multiple distinct 
individual consciousnesses can also be part of a universal 
consciousness.
Sartre is attempting to build his theory strictly on the 
basis of human experience and coming from this basis he 
cannot accept a view of the human being as integrated within 
a universe of completed totality. He cannot accept that the 
in-itself is already a project towards human consciousness.
But surely the human being's emergence as part of the 
evolution of the universe would suggest that this is the
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case? For Sartre, it does suggest the for-itself s facticity 
as emerging from being but still not the complete totality.
I am conscious of transcendent being which, as far as I can 
tell, just happens to be there and I do not experience it as 
conscious in contrast with my experience of the other human 
being (which we will more fully examine later) whom I 
immediately can experience as a conscious other, as in 
Sartre's famous example of shame.166
Here I feel a shudder through my whole body when someone 
catches me in a compromising position such as spying on 
someone through a keyhole. I treat the person immediately as 
a conscious other whose view confronts me. I do not 
experience transcendent being in this way as a direct 
conscious other. Nor do I experience myself as integrated 
with it in a complete conscious totality. There must be 
something in being, some potentiality, which develops and 
culminates in the intelligent consciousness of the human 
being. But as far as we in our experience are concerned it 
is we who have to recognize this potentiality as such; we 
have no evidence of being itself as conscious.
Also, I experience myself as a conscious individual. I know
that I am part of the wider universe and that the process of 
life preceded me and will continue after my death; yet, 
nevertheless, I am a conscious individual living this 
situation for me - the rest of the universe is not me and 
while the fact that the universe will continue after me may
be of some comfort, I as an individual will be dead and there
is no possible "higher resolution" for this situation.
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Sartre, then, does seem correct to insert his "as if" clause 
into the equation. As the human being is part of the 
universe and springs forth from it, we could say in a sense 
that it is the universe come to knowledge of itself. But 
this will always be in a detotalized sense since the human 
being as a conscious individual has become in this way 
separated off from transcendent being. It is from this 
perspective of seeing the human being as a separate conscious 
individual that Sartre marks a sharp division between the in- 
itself and the for-itself.
Sartre's erstwhile co-worker, Merleau-Ponty, similarly 
views the human being as a conscious bodily unity but he at 
the same time avoids positing a hard and fast division 
between in-itself and for-itself. For Merleau-Ponty, as he 
sets out his position in The Structure of Behaviour,167 the 
universe is a "universe of form"168 and the human being is 
placed within it as inhabiting one of various dialectical 
levels of form. The solar system is a "proto-intentionality" 
and within the world there are various dialectical levels of 
organism. Merleau-Ponty is able to describe each form of 
life in its particularity. The most simple dialectical level 
of organism (that of the simplest insects and animals) is the 
"syncretic"169 level in which the organism is imprisoned in 
the framework of its natural conditions. The next level is 
the "amovable"170 level of higher animals like the 
chimpanzee, for example. It has a primitive form of 
instrumentality. It can, for example, pick up a branch and 
use it as a stick. But the chimpanzee has a "short and
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heavy" manner of existence and adheres to the "here and 
now."171 The branch becomes a stick and is only that.172 
The human being, on the other hand, reaches the "symbolic"173 
form of existence, a cognitive level in which the tree-branch 
will remain precisely a tree-branch-which-has-become-a- 
stick.174 The behaviour of the human being is a form issuing 
from its existence as a conscious bodily unity in the world 
and is thus neither in itself nor for itself.
Merleau-Ponty may have an advantage there in presenting a 
less broken-up picture of the universe in which he can also 
take account of animal life as well as human life. Sartre, 
in fact, rarely mentions animals in BN.
In my view, what is required is a balanced approach which 
allows for the process leading up to the conscious human 
being but which also recognizes the human being’s 
distinctness as a conscious individual once the human level 
is reached. The human being does emerge out of a continuous 
process of the evolution of life. But Sartre from his 
perspective of examining the life of the individual for- 
itself wants to explicitly point out what it is like to be a 
human being. This is to be a conscious individual who has a 
facticity as emerging out of the process of evolution but who 
cannot thereby find any refuge from his or her separateness 
and individuality. There is a place, then, I believe, for 
Sartre's "as if" in a balanced view of the relationship of 
the human being and the universe.
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Sartre’s study moves out from a central focus of human 
experience. To account for evolution of life and so on he 
would require to give an expanded investigation of the for- 
itself 's facticity (extending out, as it were, to its history 
or even prehistory). This would be possible but it was not 
within the immediate scope of BN, which was primarily 
concerned with the human being - world relation, to carry out 
such an expanded study.
We can also find some suggestion in Sartre's works of how an 
expanded Sartrean study would deal with the non-human animal 
life-forms. Actually, we can here find some overlap between 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in that just as the latter describes 
the forms of life in their specificity so within the human 
being the former allows for different modes of consciousness 
and gives them a specific description. He examines pre- 
ref lective consciousness, reflective consciousness and, as we 
have briefly looked at already, the neutral positing dream 
consciousness or the spontaneous emotional "magical" 
consciousness. Sartre could extend his approach of seeing 
the human being as a conscious organic unity and examining 
the specific mode of consciousness to the animal kingdom. 
Sartre in The Psychology of Imagination said that the 
dreaming consciousness gives us a hint of what a 
consciousness enmired in the world would be l i k e .175 we 
could perhaps think of the non-human animals as actual 
instances of a type of enmired consciousness. But, using 
Sartre's procedure of setting out from human experience, it 
would seem right to set off human consciousness as the for- 
itself. The cat, for example, appears to me as a living
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unity but it could not fulfil the role that the other human 
being does in Sartre's story of the person feeling a shudder 
of shame on being confronted by another.
As we now reach the end of this chapter we have before us the 
skeletal framework or basic foundation, extracted from 
Sartre's BN, for studying human beings and their world. This 
foundation avoids both physicalist blinkers to the 
"spiritual" aspect of the human being, blinkers by which we 
would theoretically submerge ourselves within the in-itself 
thus denying the possibility of theory, and idealist blinkers 
to the human being's facticity as an embodied existent in a 
resistant world, blinkers by which we would theoretically 
deny ourselves the means of being conscious thus from the 
other side denying the possibility of theory. It is a 
foundation in which we study everything in terms of the 
relation of the conscious bodily unity which is the for- 
itself to the resistant world it lives in, a world, however, 
which is a world, a sphere of experience, only by our 
experiencing it. This foundation theoretically encapsulates 
every field of study. Even natural science must take its 
place within the for-itself - world relation as one project 
the former can engage in with respect to the latter. Armed 
now with this basic foundational approach we can go on to 
examine with Sartre the human being's actions, its hopes and 
desires, relations with others and so on or, generally, its 
life within the for-itself - world relation.
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CHAPTER 2; FREEDOM AND NOTHINGNESS
2 ^  THE HUMAN BEING AS A FREEDOM
Let us now briefly survey the ground we have covered so far.
I have been asking the question "What is the human being?" on 
the premise that this needs to be explicitly investigated 
since a faulty conception of what the human being is would at 
the outset contaminate with error any study of human affairs. 
I have attempted to show that a view of the human being as 
reducible to a determined physical object is one such faulty 
conception. If the thinking, feeling, intending and so on of 
the human being are identified as being no other than 
determined physical processes then, I have been saying, there 
is a sense in which human consciousness is lost aa 
consciousness. There are only physical things and events 
with no-one to experience them. There is no-one to 
experience a thought, for example, meaningfully as a thought. 
Even the determinist theory itself must be identified with 
physicality so that there is no-one to experience the 
determinist theory meaningfully as a theory. Everything is 
buried in a physical anonymity, a nameless mass with no-one 
to experience it in any way.
As against this consequence of physical determinist theory, I 
pointed to our experience of ourselves as living in a "realm 
of meaning," as being conscious as such. We experience 
ourselves as thinking, feeling, intending and so on as such 
and our knowledge of the determinist theory does not take 
away this meaningful experience.
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In the preceding chapter, I extracted from Sartre’s BN an 
approach to the question of what the human being is which can 
accept both our physical existence in the physical world and 
our conscious life in a realm of meaning. To Sartre, the 
human being or "for-itself" is a bodily existent permeated by 
a conscious unity. The human being is obviously in some 
sense a physical body related to the physical world and there 
is no consciousness without this but consciousness is not 
then identifiable with a physical organ and its purely 
physical processes. The level of consciousness is reached 
and can be accepted as such; consciousness has certain 
conditions of existence but it does not equal those 
conditions. The human being is a conscious for-itself which 
"lives" its body and relates to the world.
According to the Sartrean analysis we explored, the "world" 
is the outside realm of independent "being-in-itself" as 
related to by the for-itself. This realm of transcendent 
being is itself indifferent to this relating activity and 
left to itself is lost in anonymity. The for-itself, then, 
for Sartre, is conscious by the relating of itself to outside 
being. Specifically, the for-itself is a "nothingness" in 
relation to it. The for-itself separates itself off as not 
being the in-itself. The for-itself, then, for Sartre, 
produces the negative in all its activities and can never 
achieve the solidity of being that the in-itself has. That 
the for-itself lives its life as a negating activity is an 
integral aspect of being other than pure physicality lost in 
anonymity. It is the price of the experience of oneself as 
living in a realm of meaning.
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We have now reached what could be described as the foundation 
point of Sartre's approach to the study of the human being.
To answer the question of what, in a very basic sense, the 
human being is, Sartre replies that the human being is not 
simply a physical thing but is a conscious bodily for-itself 
living its life as an active nothingness. If I am correct in 
my defence of such a view, then this gives us the theoretical 
base for pulling away from what I described as determinist 
anonymity and for proceeding to study the human being in his 
or her realm of meaning. Here we are only at the starting 
point. To further develop our picture of what the human 
being is, we must now explore with Sartre what it means to 
live as a for-itself. What is the significance for the human 
being of this type of existence? What sort of life is a 
conscious life and how are we to study it? What implications 
are entailed for the various fields of investigation into 
human affairs? To try to answer these questions let me now 
use Sartre's model (the human being as a for-itself) and 
spiral forward with it to examine how it copes with the 
various issues of human existence.
Here the first and essential point Sartre puts forward 
is that to live as a for-itself is to be "free." Sartre 
cannot stress this point strongly enough. Indeed, he goes so 
far as to say that to be a for-itself is to be a "freedom." 
That is to say, being free, or not being determined by 
anything but negating everything in the light of his or her 
own interests, is precisely what being a for-itself means, so 
much so that we can describe the for-itself as being a 
freedom.
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Sartre posits this identification of the human being with 
freedom early on in BN. He notes the human being's ability 
"to secrete a nothingness which isolates it" and identifies 
this with "freedom."! What he is doing, then, is to identify 
the for-itself's mode of existence with freedom. He goes on 
to state that "there is no difference between the being of 
man and his being-free."2 Later on in BN, he actually 
explicitly defines the for-itself as an "ontological 
freedom."3 For Sartre, the for-itself in its being is a 
freedom.
What are we to make of this view of freedom? On the 
face of it, Sartre's identification of the for-itself as 
being a freedom may seem patently objectionable. After all, 
we can find in our experience many instances when our freedom 
is blocked. In order to act we have to obey the natural laws 
of the material world and we are born without prior choice 
into certain environmental, social and other circumstances. 
These conditions sometimes work against us so that we fail to 
achieve our ends. How, then, can Sartre define the for- 
itself straight-off as a freedom? Faced with these facts, 
indeed, we might conclude that the human being is more 
determined than free. Sartre himself is well aware that this 
objection has a seeming plausibility. "Much more than he 
appears 'to make himself,'" Sartre concedes:
"man seems 'to be made' by climate and the 
earth, race and class, language, the 
history of one's collectivity, heredity, 
the individual circumstances of his 
childhood, acquired habits, the great and 
small events of his life. " 4
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However, what we have to realise here is that Sartre does not 
mean by freedom that we have the power at all times to 
achieve what we want nor that the factors of class, 
environment etc. have no effect on us. I hope to show that 
Sartre is, rather, operating with what could be described as 
a balanced concept of freedom which fits in with human 
experience. On one side of this balance, Sartre readily 
accepts that the human being does not have unlimited power 
over the world but is in fact born without choice into it 
with the conditions it has. On the other side, the human 
being is a "freedom" in the sense that he or she is not 
mechanistically controlled by the conditions of the world. I 
experience the conditions of the world, separating myself off 
as not being them, rather than just being affected by them.
It is only through this experience that the conditions emerge 
as such from undifferentiation and it is only through this 
experience, in which the human being pursues his or her own 
ends, that the conditions can become a constraint or a help 
to us. That is, it is only in light of the ends we pursue 
that the conditions of the world take on the character of a 
constraint or a help. By exploring these points in more 
detail, I hope to show that Sartre's concept of the free 
human being is a defensible one.
For Sartre, to talk of conditions which constrain us only 
serves to beg the question of what the relationship of the 
human being with the world is and of how a constraint can 
appear within this relationship. Or in other words, Sartre 
is pointing out that the identification of pre-existing
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conditions which are imposed on the human being on his or her 
appearance in the world does not in itself constitute an 
argument against freedom. It merely sets the scene for a 
debate on how we respond to those conditions.
In his contribution to that debate, Sartre wishes to deny 
straight away that our response is caused by the conditions 
in a deterministic fashion. What Sartre has been trying to 
do all along is to undertake a study of the human being which 
can accept our conscious experience as such, to study the 
human being as an experiencing centre. This intrinsically 
entails, for Sartre, the rejection of any form of 
determinism. To hold that our acts were the end result of a 
strict causal chain of environmental, social or any other 
type of conditions would be to reduce the human being to a 
mere product incapable of fulfilling the role of experiencing 
centre and hence submerged in anonymity. Or as Sartre puts 
it himself:
"by identifying consciousness with a causal 
sequence indefinitely continued, one 
transmutes it into a plenitude of being 
and thereby causes it to return to the 
unlimited totality of being. " 5
There would then be no-one to experience the conditions 
mentioned whether as constraining, helpful or anything 
else; they too would be lost in undifferentiation and the 
very terms "freedom" and "determinism" would have no 
application. To hold such a position would be to deny 
the evidence of our own meaningful experience.
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I believe that Sartre is correct here. What his position 
entails is that the objections we put against physical 
determinism in the previous chapter apply equally to any form 
of strict determinism whether physical, social, psychological 
or of any other type. The argument in the first chapter was 
that if the human being was simply a physical thing whose 
actions were strictly determined by a chain of physical 
causes, then everything would be lost in a physical anonymity 
not even known as such. There would only be a series of 
physical events with no-one to experience them so that they 
would not even be known as such. A similar consequence 
occurs if we suppose that the human being is determined by a 
strict causal chain of social or psychological or any other 
type of factors. If all I do or say or think is mechanically 
determined by a prior social or psychological cause which 
again had a prior cause and so on, then there would be no- 
one, no experiencing centre, in any meaningful sense 
committing the acts or having the thoughts or saying the 
words. They would just be a series of determined events 
which - just as in physical determinism - would be lost in 
anonymity. There would be no-one to experience the 
determining social or psychological factors and know them as 
such.
The implications of Sartre's argument, then, is that 
consciousness and determinism are mutually exclusive. We 
have seen that Sartre has already come down on the side of 
consciousness since he reasoned that it was better to accept 
the evidence of one's own experience of oneself as a
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conscious centre rather than to accept a determinism which 
engulfed even the very statement of the theory into 
the undifferentiation of the in-itself. What Sartre is 
also now saying is that consciousness is thus at the same 
time identical with freedom. The human being is a 
conscious experiencing centre or for-itself. It negates 
being-in-itself by not being it, thereby positing it as 
the world and setting himself or herself apart as the 
experiencer of that world. And the for-itself 
accomplishes this general negation through all his or her 
everyday concrete actions in which he or she negates the 
events around himself or herself as the experiencer of 
those events who freely or consciously performs its own 
acts in relation to them. For Sartre, then, being free 
is what distinguishes us as being human beings.
We must again note, of course, that Sartre is not denying 
that external factors have any effect on us - only that they 
affect us in a deterministic fashion. To gain a clearer 
understanding of what Sartre is opposing here, let us look at 
two examples of theorists whose ideas, we could argue, reduce 
us to anonymity or "return us to the
unlimited totality of being," as Sartre put it. First, 
then, let us consider B.F. Skinner and his behaviourist 
psychology.
Skinner argued that the events around us causally 
determine what we do in just the same way as causes 
operate in the physical sciences. We could in principle 
trace the events in an individual’s life-history which
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determined him or her to commit the acts he or she did.
For Skinner, "it is the environment which acts upon the 
perceiving person, not the perceiving person who acts 
upon the environment. " 6  Human behaviour, then, is 
completely determined by the environment. The individual 
is stimulated by the environment and emits a determined 
response. There is no intermediary mind or consciousness 
- we simply feel "certain states of our bodies associated 
with behaviour" which are "by-products and not to be 
mistaken for causes."?
Under this view of the human being, then, my acts have 
all been caused by events outside me. It could not have 
been any other way. The environment I came across and 
the events in it caused me to behave in the way I did 
just as much as the heating of chemicals in a test tube 
caused them to react in a certain way. But if this is 
so, it would seem that I as the person behaving have 
disappeared in any meaningful sense. I have no "say" in 
my behaviour and I am not experiencing the environment; 
it is simply causing me to commit such and such acts.
There is then no-one left in this equation to 
meaningfully recognize the behaviour. The behaviourist 
has merely been caused by his or her environment to 
engage in behaviourist theory-expounding behaviour. It 
might as well be some other type of behaviour for there is 
no-one there experiencing the environment to recognize 
types of behaviour as such. Behaviourism, we could 
argue, has thus reduced everything, including itself, to 
the "unlimited totality of being."
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It is this mechanistic type of view of the causes of 
human actions that Sartre wishes to avoid by starting 
from the base of the human being as an experiencing centre. 
But let us note again that this does not mean 
Sartre has to deny that the environment affects us; only 
that it affects us in this mechanistic fashion.
The other example is Louis Althusser and his analysis of
social structure. For Althusser, people, groups and
events are merely embodiments of the social structure.
Thus humanism is an illusion. Through ideology, the
individual believes he or she is a subject. But the
truth, according to Althusser, is that he or she is only
reflecting a social structure. He exclaims that:
"It is impossible to know anything about 
men except on the absolute precondition 
that the philosophical (theoretical) myth 
of man is reduced to ashes. " 8
For Althusser, then, the structure of society determines 
our actions, and concepts such as Sartre’s experiencing 
for-itself are dismissed as illusory. The trouble with 
this kind of view, however, is that there is no-one left 
to even recognize a social structure as such. There is 
no individual separate enough from the social structure
to be said to be experiencing life under it. The
individual is merely determined to reflect it.
Everything is reduced once more to the "unlimited totality of
being."
Against these type of theories, Sartre points out that it
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is only through the human being that the conditions under 
which he or she lives take on the role of conditions. I 
am a freedom in the sense that I experience the 
conditions of the world, separating myself off as not 
being them, rather than just being affected by them. The 
world and its conditions are the field in which the human 
being operates. I act in the world around me and I 
choose the ends of my actions in relation to it. It is 
only through these freely chosen ends that the conditions 
can emerge from undifferentiation to take on the 
character of a constraint or a help to me. To Sartre, 
then, the coefficient of adversity in the world which can 
defeat our ends is not an argument against freedom, for 
it is only in the light of the ends chosen by a free 
individual that such a coefficient can appear.
As a basic illustration of his position on the freedom of the 
human being, Sartre takes the example of coming up against a 
crag.9 If I wish to displace it, it is a hindrance to me.
If, on the other hand, I wish to scale it to survey the 
countryside, it appears as a valuable aid either easy or 
difficult to climb. If I give up the ascent because it is 
"too difficult" we must understand that it only is so through 
my original aim of climbing it and to the extent to which I 
value this aim. If I aimed to climb the crag at any cost, it 
would be no obstacle to me. To another person with totally 
different aims, the crag may simply be a background feature. 
In itself the crag is neither aid nor hindrance, neither easy 
nor difficult. In itself it is submerged in the mute
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plenitude of being. It awaits me to "illuminate" it with my 
ends.
Nevertheless, even if the crag has to be illuminated by human
ends in order to emerge from undifferentiation, we can still
point out to Sartre that there remains in this situation
something independent of us which does not jump to the whim
of the "free" for-itself. For instance, we cannot by fiat of
our will determine the crag to be easy to climb. Sartre
readily accepts that there is in the human situation this
given or "in-itself" aspect, a "residue, " 1 0  in his terms.
However, Sartre sees this as an essential part of what
freedom is. A "freedom" which consisted of inventing one’s
own world and objects etc. at whim from thought would lose
its meaning as freedom. "If conceiving is enough for
realizing," says Sartre:
"then I am plunged in a world like that
of a dream in which the possible is no
longer in any way distinguished from the 
real, " n
There would simply be a bizarre swirl of dream-like events in
which the terms "freedom" and determinism" would have no
meaning. The terms only have meaning for me as a "free"
experiencing centre not "determined" by the independent realm
of existence outside me. "There can be a free for-itself,"
Sartre continues:
"only as engaged in a resisting world.
Outside of this engagement the notions of 
freedom, of determinism, of necessity 
lose all meaning. " 1 2
Sartre is trying to operate with a balanced concept of 
freedom. Being a freedom does not mean that I can achieve
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whatever I wish. Even if I wish to, I cannot sprout wings 
and fly. There is an element of the given in the world which 
can sometimes stop me achieving what I want. But I am a 
freedom in the sense that as an experiencing centre I act 
towards the given with my own chosen ends in relation to 
which the given takes on the characteristics it has for me. 
This, for Sartre, is the original philosophical concept of 
freedom. The empirical everyday concept of freedom as the 
ability to achieve what one wishes would have no meaning if 
we were not free in the deeper philosophical sense. 
"[S]uccess," he maintains, "is not important to f r e e d o m ."13 
To help understand this, we might consider the position of 
the slave. Slavery can have meaning for the slave only if he 
or she is in a deeper sense free with his or her own ends in 
relation to which he or she experiences it. The inert piece 
of rock, by contrast, even though I use it for my own 
purposes, is beyond the scope of application of the concept.
Under this balanced concept of freedom ,then, the free 
for-itself neither controls the given at whim nor is 
limited by it; rather, he or she is free in relation to 
the given. However, as part of the balance, this does 
imply, for Sartre, one limitation on the freedom of the 
for-itself: the very existence of the for-itself as
freedom. Or, in other words, the limitation is that the 
for-itself does not choose whether to be free or not; we 
are free whether we like it or not.
In putting forward this position, Sartre is following the 
same line of reasoning that he took when putting forward
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his argument, as we explored in the previous chapter, 
that consciousness as a pure entity on its own could not 
be possible. For Sartre, it is inconceivable how such a 
consciousness could have anything to be conscious of. 
Consciousness once it exists is an autonomous 
experiencing centre but it did not found its own 
existence. It simply finds itself with the fact of its 
contingent existence in the form of the conscious bodily 
for-itself negating the in-itself and in this way 
experiencing a world. The in-itself is itself a 
contingent existent but it has no need of the for-itself, 
it is beyond any need of being brought out of its 
undifferentiation and remains untouched in itself by the 
for-itself's experience of it. Asymmetrically, however, 
there is no for-itself without the in-itself to be a 
relation to. There is a "priority of the in-itself over
the for-itself."14
Sartre is now equating the for-itself with freedom so the 
same considerations apply to this latter. If freedom has 
no meaning outside engagement with the given or resisting 
world then the for-itself cannot be the foundation of its 
own existence as freedom. The for-itself could not, as 
some mysterious entity on its own before relation to the 
given, create itself as a free existent from nothing. To 
use Sartre's analogy which counter-balances that of the 
slave who is in a deeper sense free, we must note that 
"one cannot escape a gaol in which one is not 
imprisoned."15 If the free for-itself were to create 
itself, it would have to already be a freedom making a
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free choice of itself as freedom. This would require a
further prior freedom choosing freedom and then another
again and so on to infinity. It would also mean that the
free existent would have to have before itself the
options of coming into existence or not, an absurd
proposition. The limitation on the freedom of the for-
itself, then, is that very freedom itself. The for-itself
freely chooses the ends of his or her actions in
relation to the given in-itself but he or she cannot
choose not to do so. Translating Rousseau's doctrine of
being "forced to be f r e e "16 to the ontological level,
Sartre declares that:
"In fact we are a freedom which chooses 
but we do not choose to be free. We are 
condemned to freedom ... thrown into 
freedom or, as Heidegger says,
'abandoned. ' " 1 7
The for-itself simply finds itself in existence, freely
negating the given in-itself. In being free, then, the
for-itself is subject to "facticity" and "contingency."
We are "not free not to be free" and "not free not to
exist."18
Sartre has in this way produced a philosophical concept 
of freedom which allows him to avoid a deterministic view 
of the human being without thereby lapsing into an 
implausible "idealist" position. That is, he rejects the 
notion of the human being as mechanistically controlled 
by the conditions of the world but neither does he 
propose that the human being is the sole creator of the 
world who can meet no obstacle there. For Sartre, a 
situation of complete determinism entails that everything
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would be submerged in the undifferentiation of 
the in-itself since there would be no-one there to 
experience it. Equally, however, Sartre takes full 
cognizance of our experience of a world which resists us 
and how from this point of view it is inconceivable how 
an existent could be "free" without conditions to be free 
in relation to. Sartre instead recognizes that the human 
situation is an "ambiguous p h e n o m e n o n "19 in which the 
human being as an experiencing centre or free for-itself 
only discovers himself or herself as such in relation to the 
resistant world he or she acts towards and in which the world 
in turn only is revealed as such through the for-itself's 
experience of it. "[T]here is freedom only in a situation," 
says Sartre, "and there is a situation only through 
freedom. " 2 0
What does all this mean concretely for our study of the human 
being? In the previous chapter, we encountered Sartre's 
position that while the human being is in some sense a 
physical body related to the physical world, one consciously 
"lives" one's body and consciously relates to the world. 
Sartre has now designated this mode of existence as "freedom" 
and focused a little more closely on the world freedom 
relates to, noting that it presents us with a situation of 
certain environmental and social conditions. But just as the 
for-itself lives his or her body, so as a freedom he or she 
lives his or her situation. What this means for the study of 
the human being is that whether we are talking of race, 
class, language, economic structure or whatever, we are 
talking of a situation which has to be "brought to life" by
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the human being. The human being has to experience the 
situation, conduct action in relation to it and thereby 
develop its own free response to it.
What could be seen as of benefit in this position is that 
rather than determinist undifferentiation or idealist 
inconceivability, we have a concrete phenomenon to study; 
that of the human being who lives a resistant situation and 
who as a freedom chooses the ends of his or her action by 
which he or she experiences the situation and makes it such. 
However, many questions now arise regarding Sartre's 
position. What significance is to be accorded to a "freedom" 
which is that of being an experiencing centre but in relation 
to a given one does not determine and to what extent does 
such a "freedom" counterbalance the weight of the given in 
the situation? And how can we study the life of a human 
being in terms of freedom without thereby ending up simply 
recording the randomly chosen acts of a gratuity? Hopefully, 
we will find the answers to such questions as we proceed now 
with Sartre as he attempts to show how the issues of human 
life can be adequately explored using his concept of freedom.
2.2 FREEDOM TO ACT
Let us begin by looking in more detail at how, for Sartre, 
the human being acts freely at any particular moment. We 
shall deal later on with the issue of how it would be 
possible to study, in any coherent fashion, the life-history 
of a human being with such a freedom.
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We examined above Sartre's view that we experience the 
conditions of the world rather than that we are 
mechanistically controlled by them. This entails, for 
Sartre, that there is not anything in a given situation which 
can determine the human being in his or her actions.
Whatever the identifiable "cause" or "motive" of my action - 
be it a state of the world or even a previous decision I have 
made - I am a for-itself separate from it and it only 
receives its force as a cause or motive through me. E.g. a 
previous decision can be the "cause" of my action only in so 
far as I choose to abide by that decision. This is the point 
Sartre is making when he says that a "nothing" always "slips 
in" between the for-itself and its motive.21 For Sartre, 
then, human action is the expression of freedom. Sartre goes 
on to outline in detail how human action expresses freedom.
To act, says Sartre, is: to modify the shape of the world;
arrange means in view of an end; and produce an organised 
instrumental complex such that an anticipated result is 
attained.22 The most important aspect here, for Sartre, is 
that the act is intentional (in the ordinary English usage 
sense of purposive ). I act on the world in order to bring 
about some desired but as yet non-existent state of affairs. 
According to Sartre's analysis, this entails that the for- 
itself has been able to withdraw itself from being to 
approach non-being. That is, he or she has not concerned him 
or herself merely with what is but has posited an as yet 
unachieved goal in relation to which the current situation is 
"lacking" or missing something and which he or she is going 
to attempt to realize. The situation, in Sartre's
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terminology, appears as an "objective lack" or "negatite."23 
This recognition of a negatite is, for Sartre, the condition 
of action. It is this purposiveness which distinguishes the 
concept of an act from that of a mere happening.
Sartre illustrates this point with the example of a worker 
engaging in revolutionary action to change the oppressive 
conditions of his c l a s s .24 The mere fact of the terrible 
conditions of his life is not sufficient to cause his 
revolutionary acts. Indeed, the worker may at first accept 
his lot, taking it as natural. If he now views his situation 
as intolerable and as a motive for action, this can only be 
because he has in a sense withdrawn from it. That is, he is 
no longer immersed in it as a purely positive natural state 
but views it in the light of a project of changing it into a 
situation of better conditions for all. It is in this new 
light that the current situation appears as intolerable and 
as a motive for action.
To engage in such action, according to Sartre, the worker 
enacts a double nihilation. He conceives of an as yet non­
existent desired new state of affairs or, in Sartre's 
terminology, he is aware of the nothingness of the new state. 
He then negates the present situation, as the undesired state 
to be transformed into the new one. The present situation is 
now being viewed as a nothingness, it is the undesirable 
negation of the projected new situation. To conduct his 
action, then, says Sartre, the worker must "posit an ideal 
state of affairs as a pure present nothingness," and "posit
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the actual situation as nothingness in relation to this state 
of affairs."25
Sartre makes the inference from this that "the indispensable 
and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the 
acting b e i n g . "26 if action involves positing nothingness 
then there is not anything outside me which can determine me 
to act. A positive factor can produce only another positive 
factor and both are in themselves lost in the 
undifferentiation of the in-itself. No state of the world 
can force us to act; only the for-itself, by freely negating 
being through a negatite, can act. Thus Sartre declares 
that:
"no factual state whatever it may be (... 
political ... economic... psychological 
... ) is capable by itself of motivating 
any act whatsoever. For an act is a 
projection of the for-itself toward what 
is not and what is can in no way 
determine by itself what is not ... no 
factual state can determine consciousness 
to apprehend it as a negatite or as a 
lack ... no factual state can determine 
consciousness to define it and to 
circumscribe it since ... Spinoza's 
statement 'omnis determinatio est 
negatio,' remains profoundly true."27
This, however, is not to say that the act has no cause 
whatsoever. We have just heard that Sartre distinguishes the 
act as having an intention or purpose. I act because I want 
to change a situation I find unsatisfactory in the light of a 
conception of a better situation. The act, then, must refer 
to causes or motives, for an act without a cause would be an 
act lacking the intentional structure of an act, an 
absurdity. But the cause has no life of its own, it has no
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deterministic force. The for-itself must confer on the cause 
its value as a cause. For example, the "cause" of the 
worker's act of revolt is the intolerable situation in which 
he lives but this situation only is such a cause through the 
worker's conception of a better situation. So for Sartre 
there is no motive/act/end separation: the three form one
movement or "upsurge." This upsurge "as the pure 
temporalizing nihilation of the in-itself is one with 
freedom," Sartre tells us. "It is the act which decides its 
ends and its motives and the act is the expression of 
freedom."28
We must note, however, that Sartre does not mean by this that 
freedom necessarily involves a reflective deliberation on the 
part of the for-itself regarding his or her actions. In the 
previous chapter, we looked at Sartre's view of the for- 
itself as primarily non-reflective but nevertheless 
inherently conscious of himself or herself. The for-itself 
in his or her everyday activities is not consumed with 
reflecting on himself or herself but is conscious of the 
world. However, the for-itself is not unconscious of himself 
or herself. He or she is a thetic consciousness of the world 
and a non-thetic consciousness of himself or herself as the 
one to whom a world can appear. To put it in plainer 
language, the human being in his or her everyday activities 
deals concretely with things and events in the world and does 
not primarily reflect on himself or herself. However, the 
things and events of the world are meaningful to the human 
being and he or she has the ability to stop and reflect on
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his or her activities. The for-itself is conscious of 
himself or herself in this non-contemplative way.
In his or her everyday activities, the for-itself in this 
non-contemplative way gives himself or herself the cause or 
motive of his or her action. Here Sartre makes use of a 
distinction in the French language which is not made quite so 
strictly in the English language, though it is possible, I 
believe, to understand the point he is trying to put across. 
Sartre distinguishes between the French words "motif" and 
"mobile." "Motif" refers to the objective set of 
circumstances or situation perceived as the rationale for a 
particular act and is translated as "cause" (though not in a 
deterministic sense) by Hazel Barnes in her rendition of 
B N .29 "Mobile" refers more to the subjective attitude of the 
actor, and its meaning is considered by the translator as 
adequately conveyed by the English word "motive."30 
According to Sartre's analysis, it is through the motive one 
gives oneself that a situation appears as a cause for action.
To use the example of the revolutionary worker again, let us 
suppose that he engages in a particular action, taking part 
in a demonstration. His motive is the desire for the 
betterment of the conditions of his class. The rationale 
behind his act, or its "cause," is the perception that 
demonstrating is a means of pursuing this end. It is, then, 
only in the light of his end or motive that the worker sees 
the cause as a cause. Positing an end or motive is, for 
Sartre, as we have heard, the positing of a negatite by a 
freedom, so according to Sartre it is the for-itself by
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freely giving himself or herself a motive who makes the cause 
of his or her act a cause.
However, in our normal everyday activities, we do not 
immediately reflect on our motives. I simply see an action 
to be carried out, a task to be performed. But the task is 
my task, it is meaningful to me and it only appears to me as 
"needing to be done" through my holding of a motive in this 
non-contemplative way, in which I express it immediately 
through my acting on a cause. Just as we said that when we 
are conscious of the things and events of the world we are at 
the same time conscious of ourselves in a non-reflective way, 
so when we are conscious of a cause for action we are at the 
same time conscious in a non-reflective way of our motive for 
acting. To express this point in Sartre's terminology,
"cause and motive are correlative, exactly as the non-thetic 
self-consciousness is the ontological correlate of the thetic 
consciousness of the object."31 By our actions we express 
our outlook, our wishes and aspirations, even if we are not 
reflecting on them at the time.
According to Sartre, this positing of our motives and acting 
in accordance with them is the profound area of freedom.
That is, we are this freedom whether we act reflectively or 
not. We have just explored the way in which when we act 
spontaneously we nevertheless act in accordance with the 
goals we have given ourselves. When, according to Sartre, we 
act reflectively, i.e. on the level of the will, what we are 
doing is simply to decide on the reflective level the best 
means to attain our end. It is not possible to coldly reflect
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on the world and decide what our motives will be so that they 
would be the result of an objective deliberation. In being 
conscious or "free," in living as an existent for whom the 
things and events of the world "mean" something, our 
perception of the world is already a taking up of an attitude 
towards it. This means that any search I carry out in the 
world for objective reasons to act hinge on my subjectivity 
as a consciousness directing itself towards ends. Or in 
Sartre’s words, "the world gives counsel only if one 
questions it and one can question it only for a well 
determined end."32
One point to note, though, is that Sartre does not mean by 
all this that there is a prior freedom which is then given 
subsequent expression in either a non-reflective act or a 
voluntary one. The freedom is contemporaneous or immediately 
expressed in the act. But in the case of the voluntary act, 
the will is not a special power of determining our motives, 
it is just a reflective way of expressing them. It is 
limited to "making the announcement."33
For Sartre, the bench-mark of freedom applies even to acts we 
commit under conditions of extreme pressure. His ontological 
notion of freedom even applies, for example, to a victim in 
the clutches of a torturer. The latter makes his or her 
demands and attempts through torture to force the victim to 
submit to them. If the victim gives in and submits, he or 
she does so freely. With Sartre, the excuse that the pain 
was unbearable and finally forced submission cuts no ice.
The victim could have held out for a second, a minute, an
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hour or more, as long as life endured. He or she freely 
chooses the moment to give in.34
We will discuss later the extent of significance to be 
attached to such a "freedom" even in the face of a torturer, 
given the weight of history and the organisation of society 
upon us. But for the moment, we can make two points summing 
up the freedom Sartre attributes to the for-itself. Firstly, 
the for-itself is not pre-programmed to commit such and such 
acts in such and such situations. He or she finds his or her 
own motives and commits his or her own acts. He or she 
cannot just "be" someone who gives into torture the way a 
rock just "is" a rock. The for-itself "makes itself be" 
through its own free acts. Sartre expresses this point in 
his dictum that "freedom has no essence ... in it existence 
precedes and commands e s s e n c e ."35 The second point is that 
this freedom is our mode of existence and is something we 
cannot avoid even if we wish to. Every situation, as in the 
example of the tortured person, demands our free reaction to 
it. Sartre puts this idea across succinctly when he declares 
that "I am condemned to be free ... no limits to my freedom 
can be found except freedom itself ... we are not free to 
cease being f r e e ."36
2 ^  FACING FREEDOM:__ANGUISH AND BAD FAITH
We have been discussing how, for Sartre, the conscious for- 
itself in his or her being is a freedom. If Sartre is 
correct, a critic might demand, then we should be able to 
describe how the for-itself is conscious of being free. Here 
Sartre introduces what could be described as a kind of
Page - 134
"anguish cogito." That is, he points to the feeling of 
anguish as a distinct conscious experience in which the for- 
itself comes face to face with his or her own freedom.
From his reflections on human life, Sartre points to anguish 
as a distinct type of experience which can only have meaning 
within a perspective of freedom. Sartre distinguishes 
between, on the one hand, fear in which I am scared of an 
external object or circumstances which may harm me; and, on 
the other hand, anguish which involves being troubled by my 
own self, by what I myself will do with my own freedom.
Sartre takes the example of vertigo.37 i am walking along a 
narrow path without a guard rail above a precipice. Vertigo, 
here, could take two distinct forms. It could be fear that 
some natural occurrence - subsidence of earth, an obstacle in 
my way - might cause me to fall to my death. To overcome 
this vertigo, I act reflectively, carefully watching each 
step I take. Alternatively, vertigo could take the form of 
anguish. Viewing the precipice, I use my eyes to play with 
the possibility of jumping off the path. I realize that 
nothing can force me to walk to safety, I could at whim jump 
off. However, nothing can make me up jump off either. I 
eventually make a decision, in this case to walk on, and I am 
cured of my vertigo.
Another example Sartre gives is that of a soldier at war who 
knows he is about to come under shell bombardment.38 The 
soldier can be afraid of the danger to his safety. But he can 
also feel anguish at what he will do in reaction to the 
bombardment. Will he hold up? His future action cannot be
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determined to be resolute. It will be up to him whether he 
acts cowardly or resolutely. It is this freedom that 
troubles him.
To take one last example, Sartre describes the case of a 
gambler trying to give up his habit.39 This is perhaps the 
most illustrative example and the easiest to identify with. 
The gambler yesterday made a resolution not to gamble any 
more. It is as if he has drawn a "magic circle"40 stretching 
out to the future, claiming it for non-gambling. But today 
at this moment, he faces the gaming table. The past 
resolution has been made but it cannot deterministically 
cause him to keep it. The gambler must again give value to 
his reasons for stopping: the danger of financial ruin, the
misery of his family etc. He is troubled because it is 
entirely up to him whether he will keep his resolution or 
not. Only he can decide; his past resolution cannot bind 
him.
I spoke above of Sartre introducing what I called a sort of 
"anguish cogito." Descartes' cogito gave him the personal 
assurance of the existence of his own mind but it has always 
been a matter of debate whether this is a "proof" of 
anything. For his part, Sartre does not claim that his 
description of anguish is a "proof" of freedom in the sense 
of an external hypothesis about an external object.41 Sartre 
has been reflecting on human experience. In the course of 
this, he has encountered human activities (questioning, 
action etc.) which involve positing nothingness (lack of 
knowledge, unachieved goals etc.) He identifies this power
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of negation with freedom and has now described anguish as the 
consciousness of freedom. Sartre accepts that this still 
theoretically leaves it open to us to put forward determinist 
views. For example, we could object that anguish in actuality 
is ignorance of the underlying psychological determinism.42 
But Sartre attacks this objection from his base of reflecting 
on human experience. His "anguish cogito" attempts to show 
that determinism cannot get beyond the level of hypothesis so 
that we remain with our consciousness of freedom.
The idea of anguish as concealing an underlying determinism, 
says Sartre, could mean either of two things. Firstly, it 
could mean that the anguished person suffers from an 
unrealized ignorance this determinism.43 in that case, 
concentrating on anguish itself, anguish would still 
apprehend itself as freedom. That is, if I did not know that 
I was determined then I would remain anguished at myself 
about what I was going to do. At a deeper level, of course, 
in the Sartrean framework if one were determined then one 
would be lost in undifferentiation and the anguish could not 
appear as such.
The second possibility is that anguish is "consciousness of 
being ignorant of the real causes of our acts."44 But in 
such a case anguish would lose its distinctiveness as 
anguish. I would appear to myself as a thing in the world 
and I would be afraid of what might occur with it. Again, at 
a deeper level, in the Sartrean framework such a determined 
being would not even be capable of a consciousness of fear.
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The point is that we have this experience of ourselves as 
anguished freedom and that even if we try to formulate a 
determinist theory telling us we are not free, we still 
continue to experience anguish. Determinism, says Sartre, 
"avails nothing against the evidence of freedom," it is a 
"faith to take refuge i n . "45 Faced with a theory of 
determinism denying our freedom and submerging us in the 
undifferentiated in-itself while we at the same time continue 
to experience ourselves as conscious and outwith an 
undifferentiated determinism, Sartre opts for continuing 
with his study of the human being as a freedom.
However, if the conscious human being in its being is a 
freedom, our critic might next ask why we are not permanently 
in an anguished condition. If the human being is a conscious 
freedom and anguish is a consciousness of freedom, then we 
should be continually a n g u i s h e d .46 Here we return to 
Sartre's view of the for-itself as primarily engaged in a 
non-thetically self-conscious way in its everyday concrete 
activities. Here we do not ponder on the possibilities of 
action but put them into operation in action immediately.
E.g. I jump out of bed in the morning at the sound of the 
alarm clock, not stopping to consider the possibility of 
refusal.47 or to take another example, I am in the middle of 
writing a book and not at this moment considering the worth 
of the enterprise.48
In these everyday activities, we also encounter values which 
we may submit to without paying explicit attention to them. 
Sartre takes the example of "[t]he bourgeois who call
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themselves 'respectable citizens.'"49 Born into a bourgeois 
environment, they act according to a respectable pattern of 
behaviour without having first contemplated moral values.
Our everyday activities involve us in acceding to values 
without reflectively examining them. "Values," says Sartre, 
"are thrown on my path as thousands of little real demands, 
like the signs which order us to keep off the grass."50
However, it is nevertheless the human being as a (non-
thetically) self-conscious freedom or for-itself who is
responsible for his or her actions and who gives values their
force. It is also possible for us - just as in the case of
the revolutionary worker - to step back from our activities.
Moving to the reflective plane, I look explicitly at my
responsibility. Then:
"I discover myself suddenly as the one 
who gives its meaning to the alarm clock 
... who by a sign-board forbids himself 
to walk ... on the lawn, the one from 
whom the boss's order borrows its 
urgency, the one who decides the interest 
of the book he is writing, the one
finally who makes the values exist in
order to determine his action by their 
demands."51
The activity that "needs to be done" or the value that "must
be respected" only acquires its force through me. I could
stop and question my desire to write and I could refuse to
accede to a particular value. "Value," says Sartre, "derives
its being from its exigency and not its exigency from its
being."52 That is, value receives its force as value from my
treating it as value. "My freedom," Sartre declares:
"is the unique foundation of values 
and...nothing, absolutely nothing 
justifies me in adopting this or that 
particular scale of values. As a being
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by whom value exists, I am 
unjustifiable. " 5 3
The for-itself freely acts and posits value, and anguish is a
reflective apprehension of this freedom.
Sartre contrasts the feeling of anguish with the "serious 
mood"54 (or "the spirit of seriousness"55 as he later terms 
it) in which one attempts to hide from the anguish of 
freedom. As a freedom, I am not determined to undertake the 
activities I engage in nor to accede to the values I 
encounter. However, this entails that I cannot set myself in 
concrete as having a solid being. As we looked at in the 
previous chapter, the for-itself cannot be solidly identified 
with any of its activities. This is the "unjustifiability" 
we talked of above. My present activities, style of life, 
character, values etc. can always be brought into question by 
my freedom. In the serious attitude, I treat my values as if 
they had a solid being of their own and as if it was of 
necessity that I follow them rather than from contingent free 
choice. For Sartre, this is an example of a phenomenon he 
calls "bad faith"56 where I try to hide my anguished freedom 
from myself while at the same time being conscious that I am 
free and that I am trying to hide it. Bad faith is another 
human experience Sartre points to in which, like in anguish, 
we face our freedom - even though in this case in the course 
of an attempt not to face it.
Sartre distinguishes bad faith from the lie in that the 
former is an attempt to lie to oneself. In the normal lie, 
to another person, I make use of the fact that I am a 
separate consciousness from the other so that he or she
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cannot enter into my consciousness with its deceitful 
intentions but only hears my words. In bad faith, however, I 
am attempting to hide something from myself so that there is 
no duality of deceiver and deceived to help me. I know the 
truth which I am trying to hide, I am thinking of something 
in order not to think of it. I achieve this by a sort of 
volatile "doublethink" which Sartre describes as "a certain 
art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in 
themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea."57 
This is a precarious condition I have to maintain myself in, 
even though it is possible to live this way for a long time. 
In Sartre's terminology, it is "metastable."58
Sartre takes the example of a woman who has gone out with a 
particular man for the first time.59 she is enjoying the 
charm of the occasion but does not want to make any hasty 
decision in response to the advances of her suitor. She 
treats his remarks as respectful, attempting to be unaware of 
the sexual development of the situation. Then he takes her 
hand. Facing up to the advance would mean making a decision: 
to either take her hand away and thus break the charm of the 
occasion or leave it there and consent to flirtation. Rather 
than make the decision, she "does not notice" her hand.60 
She pretends to herself that it is not there.
For Sartre, as we heard in the previous chapter, the for- 
itself "is what it is not and is not what it is." As a for- 
itself conscious through negation, I can never be in a 
relation of solid identity with anything, not even my self.
I am my self but also not my self. I cannot solidly be my
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self since this would return me to the in-itself. I both am 
and am not it. I am it in the mode of not being it and I am 
not it in the mode of being it. Whether we are talking of 
the activity I am engaged in at the moment, my present 
consciousness of this, my past or future, my body, I am in a 
relation of negation with it. To concentrate on one of these 
examples, my body is me but at the same time, as a conscious 
for-itself, I am not solidly a body. In my actions, I 
transcend it towards my goals.
In the doublespeak of bad faith, the for-itself distorts the 
idea of being what I am not and not being what I am, holding 
contradictory beliefs at the same time to suit himself or 
herself. The woman in Sartre's example distorts the fact 
that she is both a facticity and a transcendence. She is her 
body, that facticity is her. However, she is not it in that, 
as a transcendence or for-itself that surpasses the given 
towards ends, she is not her body. She is her body in the 
mode of not being it. In her bad faith, however, the woman 
thinks of herself as not being her body in any way at all.
She does not notice her hand, pretending to herself that she 
is in no way a body but is solidly a transcendence. She 
imbues her transcendence with facticity, pretending that she 
is a transcendence in the mode of being of a thing.
Another example Sartre gives is that of a waiter who 
ceremoniously performs his duties, striving to be the perfect 
waiter.61 He tries to see himself as having a ready 
justification for his life in being the essence of a waiter, 
rather than freely and contingently taking up this
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occupation. This is to be in bad faith. The human being, as 
a negating for-itself or transcendence, cannot solidly be a 
waiter or, for that matter, a tailor or a soldier or any 
other occupation. The waiter can only be a waiter in the 
mode of not being one. He is not determined to undertake the 
waiting activities and it is he who gives the work its value. 
But this waiter attempts to use his transcendence or negating 
power of surpassing towards goals to solidly be the perfect 
waiter, to be a waiter in the mode of the in-itself. This 
cannot succeed for it would be to cease being a transcendence 
and hence not to be able any longer even to form the project 
of taking up an appointment as waiter. He can only "play" at 
"being a waiter."62 The facticity of his situation entails 
that we can say that in a sense he ia a waiter - that is his 
occupation, he is not a diplomat or a reporter. But as a 
conscious for-itself, he cannot find refuge in it, he is 
beyond it.
Bad faith is something we can fall into in the course of any 
of our enterprises. We are in bad faith when we try to make 
excuses to ourselves for our own actions. For example, 
everyday phrases such as "I can't help it, that's the way I 
am" are in bad faith. We are conscious that our actions are 
ours and we do not want to lose this meaningfulness but, at 
the same time, we try to pretend to ourselves that they can 
be given a solid justification as the effect of our 
"character" or situation or whatever. We are consciously 
deluding ourselves and this self-delusion can always collapse 
in anguish. The for-itself, for Sartre, is unavoidably free.
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Sartre's concepts of anguish and bad faith do appear to 
highlight important aspects of human experience which are of 
relevance to the question of whether or not the human being 
is "free." His descriptions of how we can feel troubled in 
the face of responsibility for decisions we have to make and 
of how we sometimes attempt to "kid ourselves on" about 
aspects of our life would, I believe, be readily recognized 
by most human beings. Sartre would also seem to be quite 
correct in pointing out that these aspects of experience only 
have meaning within a perspective of freedom. Anguish and 
bad faith are types of experience we, as human beings living 
in what I termed earlier as a "realm of meaning," have. Any 
theory of complete determinism of the human being, whether by 
physical, social, psychological or any other type of factors, 
is over-ruling one side of the evidence.
We looked earlier at how Sartre, with his balanced approach, 
quite readily accepts that the conditions of the world 
present the human being with a side of his or her situation 
which he or she did not create and which can interfere in the 
pursuit of his or her goals. Sartre has also pointed to the 
human experiences of acting in pursuit of goals, feeling 
troubled about what to do and trying to evade that feeling.
In doing so, Sartre does seem at least to show that there is 
as much justification for trying to formulate a theory of 
what the human being is which does not view him or her as 
mechanistically determined by a series of causes but, 
instead, sees the human being as an experiencing agent 
interacting with the "causes." This type of view also has 
the added advantage over determinism that it can "fit in"
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with our experience rather than branding it as illusory and 
having to find some device to explain it away.
Again, however, a point of discussion must be how significant 
the area of freedom is that Sartre attributes to us, given 
the weight of history and society upon us. This is 
particularly relevant when talking, as Sartre has, of 
"values" which society throws on our path in various 
situations. This is an issue we will discuss in more detail 
later in this chapter.
2.4 FREEDOM AND TIME
We have been talking of the for-itself as a freedom which to 
act must surpass the given towards a future end. We also saw 
earlier that Sartre describes the act as the "temporalizing 
nihilation of the in-itself."63 Sartre is, then, linking the 
freedom of the human being with his or her temporality. 
Indeed, it is clear from a reading of BN that Sartre sees 
temporality as an integral aspect of how the for-itself 
operates. A look at Sartre's view of temporality, then, will 
shed some further light on some of the points made in the 
preceding chapter. It is also very much in relation to time, 
for Sartre, that the for-itself is free. It will be useful, 
therefore, to study this area of Sartre's scheme before we 
move on to consider some of the broader issues concerning the 
subject of freedom.
Sartre makes five main points regarding temporality.
Firstly, outside the human being there is only the 
undifferentiation of being-in-itself where there can be no
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"time" as such. Secondly, time appears through the for- 
itself with the letter's leaving behind a past and projecting 
a future. The for-itself is responsible for time. To take 
the third point, time seen as an outside temporality of the 
world is a projection of the for-itself's own temporality.
The fourth point is that the for-itself, being responsible 
for time, is free in relation to it; we can be determined 
neither by our past nor by a planned future. Finally, the 
fifth point is that since the for-itself is in its being a 
free temporal existent, it cannot fully step outside of 
itself to view itself as an external object. It can only 
truly get a reflective grip on itself in a "pure" reflection 
which overflows itself and has no proper vantage point. Let 
us now look at how Sartre develops this view of time, 
beginning with the first point.
A common way of thinking of time is to picture it as a kind 
of temporal plane running in a straight line from the Past, 
through the Present, and on to the Future. This plane is an 
independently existing environment which possesses its 
temporal form in its own right and in which we happen to be
placed. This easily gives rise to the science fiction
fantasy of travelling in a time machine to the various points 
on the line. Sartre cannot accept such a conception of time.
Independently of the human being, there exists only the
undifferentiated being-in-itself where no distinguishing 
features such as division into Past, Present and Future can 
arise.
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Sartre believes that the inadequacy of such a "realist" view 
of time, if I may call it that, can be demonstrated if we try 
to focus on the separate points on the line. Let us first 
attempt to focus on the Present. If we try to home in on a 
pure present instant, we find that it is an impossible task; 
the moment we try to pin down an instant, it slips away from 
us. Thus, in measuring time, it is impossible to reach an 
indivisible unit of time; the second can be split up into 
hundredths of a second, these into millionths of a second and 
these into further divisions ad infinitum. By dividing time 
in the search for a pure present instant, we end up with an 
infinite division whose limit would in fact be nothing.64 
This means, for Sartre, that it is not good enough to point 
to "the Present" as if to an independent dot on a line. 
Independently of the human being, there is only being-in- 
itself which has no present as such. We have to investigate 
how the human being can distinguish his or her present, 
giving himself or herself a present as such.
We also run into difficulties if we try to focus on the Past. 
If time is an independent line, then the present point on 
which we are placed does not of itself refer to any other.
It would not of itself refer to a past. Outside of the human 
being, there is only being-in-itself which does not set out a 
past. It is no use here, according to Sartre, resorting to 
the device of viewing the Past as a residue in the Present. 
This would dissolve it in the Present, robbing it of its 
distinctiveness as past.65 Alternatively allowing that the 
Past has being but being that it is "in retirement" is no 
solution either. This takes us away from the independent
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line to the for-itself referring to the past or "retired" 
time, making it appear as s u c h . 6 6  Outside the for-itself 
there is only the undifferentiated being-in-itself which is 
beyond reference to particular features such as a retired 
time.
There are similar problems in conceiving of the Future. If 
time is an independent line, then the present point on which 
we are placed does not of itself refer to a future. E.g. the 
crescent moon does not of itself conceive of its future 
completion in a full m o o n .67 By itself it is submerged in 
the undifferentiation of the in-itself. A future state of 
the moon again refers to the human being directing himself or 
herself to the future, allowing a future to appear as such.
The point Sartre is trying to put across here is that any 
view of time which treats it as a ready-formed independent 
field fails to provide us with the theoretical base from 
which to move in any temporal direction. Sartre instead, 
moving on to the second point, sees time as the product of 
the for-itself’s relating to the world. For Sartre, as we 
have seen, the for-itself is conscious of itself as not being 
the in-itself and this negation takes the form of the for- 
itself 's concrete activities in the world. We have also 
heard from Sartre that these activities involve the for- 
itself surpassing the given towards a future goal. According 
to Sartre, this means that the for-itself's negation of the 
in-itself is already a temporal one. In conducting its 
activities, the for-itself sees a present state of affairs as 
to be made past and to be replaced by an alternative state in
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the future. Time appears through the negating activity of 
the for-itself.
Sartre has said that the for-itself is a nothingness of the 
in-itself. Another way he puts it is that the for-itself is 
a "presence to being-in-in-itself. " 6 8  Sartre is here using 
the word "presence" somewhat in the sense of a verb. Being- 
in-itself in anonymity simply is but the for-itself, in 
negating the in-itself, makes itself present to (itself as 
not being) the in-itself. In so doing, the for-itself 
surpasses the in-itself. For Sartre, this is the original 
moment of "making-past," the original case of leaving 
something behind as a past.69 Through my negating the in- 
itself, this latter becomes what I have passed from in order 
to be conscious of myself. The undifferentiation of the in- 
itself which held sway before I arose as a conscious for- 
itself (and in which that initial unconscious foetus that was 
me was engulfed)70 is my past. According to Sartre's 
ontological proof, this making-past of the in-itself is the 
only way the for-itself can be a consciousness. On this 
view, then, the for-itself comes into the world already with 
a past.71 As a negation or surpassing of the in-itself, the 
for-itself can never appear, even at its very first arising, 
without a past.
What Sartre is trying to establish here is that the for- 
itself is responsible for there being a present and a past. 
The for-itself makes itself present to itself as not being 
the in-itself and thereby leaves behind the undifferentiated 
in-itself as its past. We have already said that this
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negation takes the form of our everyday activities. This 
entails that surpassing the in-itself is a continual making- 
past I carry out. In the context of our everyday activities 
this means two things. Firstly, I leave behind an object- 
past which is mine.72 in presently carrying out an action to 
change the state of affairs, I make my previous condition 
past. My past, then, is not just the in-itself in general 
but also my previous concrete surpassings of it. My past is 
the actions I carried out five minutes ago, a week ago, a 
year ago etc. Secondly, I continually carry this past along 
behind me. My present action always involves a reference to 
the past in some way without any need to explicitly reflect 
on it. My present action involves sustaining a project begun 
in the past, moving forward from a past position etc.73
The for-itself also simultaneously directs itself to the 
future, again without any need to explicitly posit it.
Sartre illustrates this with the example of the tennis 
p l a y e r .74 The player immediately takes up his or her present 
position on the court with reference to the future. The 
player runs toward the net or retreats a little in 
expectation of where the ball will go and in a project of 
returning the ball over the net. We could add, of course, 
from what has already been said about the past, that the 
player's present position also involves his or her previous 
positions on the court. The tennis player, then, like the 
for-itself in general, directs himself or herself towards the 
past, the present and the future all at once. Time, for 
Sartre, comes into the world through this directing activity.
Page - 150
By making itself present to a given which it surpasses 
towards a future, the for-itself makes itself temporal.
However, according to Sartre, this projecting of the for- 
itself in three temporal dimensions causes division in the 
being of the for-itself. It leaves behind itself a past and 
ahead of itself a future with which it has a problematical 
relationship. I freely carry out my activities but on 
completion they solidify behind me. That is, my past 
activities were freely undertaken when I was in the process 
of carrying them out but, now that they are past, they are 
in-itself events.75 i can no longer enter into them in their 
dynamic as they occur. Similarly, that future me I project 
who will have achieved some goal (e.g. he will have finished 
his thesis) has not yet arrived. It is not yet me, it is an 
ideal.76
But, for Sartre, this division cannot be complete. If it 
were complete, the past and future would no longer be 
directed to and would be lost in anonymity with no-one to be 
the past or future of. In fact, the divided parts are 
reintegrated under a wider unity. I was that boy who went to 
primary school, that past is me. That person who will have 
finished his thesis is will be me, I am that future. In a 
unity encompassing division, the for-itself must 
simultaneously be the Past, the Present and the Future. This 
is the "diasporatic form of Temporality."77 Just as the 
ancient Jews were dispersed across different lands yet 
remained a unified people, so the for-itself exists as one, 
even though dispersed across the three temporal dimensions.
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According to Sartre, it is only the for-itself which can 
exist in this diasporatic mode. Outside the human being, 
there is only the solidity of being-in-itself and no 
differentiation of various dimensions within a temporal unity 
could arise. For Sartre, then, temporality is the 
responsibility of the human being; it only appears through 
the directing activity of the for-itself.
The third main point Sartre puts forward is that when in our 
everyday activities we operate with a view of time as an 
independent external temporality, we are only receiving back 
a reflection of our own temporal directing. Earlier, we 
heard how, for Sartre, the for-itself's consciousness of 
something as being a reason for an action reflects its 
positing of an end in the light of which the action appears 
as a means towards it. Similarly, according to Sartre, the 
for-itself in its non-reflective everyday activities sees 
time as outside on being, but this is only a projection of 
the for-itself's own temporal directing.
Sartre labels time as seen from the unreflective perspective 
"universal time"78 or "external temporality."79 From this 
perspective, objects such as my pen, for example, appear as 
themselves temporal. The pen was here a moment earlier and 
will still be here a moment later, it has its own past and 
future. From this perspective too, time appears as a general 
independent temporal field in which the present moment by 
itself slips into the past and gives way to a future moment 
so that this universal "Time" encompasses a series of
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objective or "in-itself" past moments and an abstract future 
in which "something will happen."
However, this temporality, according to Sartre, is only a 
projection of the for-itself's own temporal activity of 
leaving behind a past and positing a future. The past moment 
is a previous presence of myself to the world that I have 
surpassed towards new goals, and the generalized future of 
universal time is an abstraction from the fact that I have a 
future. The future world is a future world I will be present 
to. The pen receives its temporality from me as the pen I 
was present to in the past and will be present to in the 
future. The pen itself is completely exterior to this 
temporality, it is beyond concern with it. Something comes 
from the in-itself in that the appearance and disappearance 
of objects before me - "apparitions" and "abolitions" in 
Sartre's terminologyBO - is not something I can control at 
will or invent. But only with the for-itself are these 
plucked from the undifferentiation of the in-itself to be 
viewed temporally. External time in the Sartrean scheme, 
then, is a reflection of the for-itself's own temporal 
existence. Time comes into the world through the human 
being.
Sartre's fourth main point is that the for-itself, being 
responsible for time, is free in relation to it so that we 
cannot be determined by our past nor by a planned future. 
Earlier, we heard Sartre say that the for-itself, in a unity 
encompassing division, is the Past, the Present and the 
Future all at once. According to Sartre, this is only
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possible because the for-itself is a nothingness and it is 
through this negative being that the for-itself is free in 
relation to time.
Sartre, as we noted in the previous chapter, distinguishes 
between the undifferentiated being-in-itself which simply is 
what it is and the for-itself which, by contrast, as the 
negation of whatever it is conscious of, can never be solidly 
identified with anything. This has consequences for the way 
the for-itself is its past and future.
The for-itself, we heard Sartre say, freely carries out its 
own activities but on completion they solidify behind it as 
an object-past whose content it cannot change. For example, 
my actions at school in 1976 are an objective and unalterable 
set of events which did happen. In this sense, the past is 
an "in-itself," a thing which simply is, and of itself it 
would be lost in the undifferentiation of being-in-itself.
The past is only brought out of this undifferentiation by the 
for-itself relating to it. The past is the past of someone. 
The for-itself is its past. E.g. I was that schoolboy of
1976, that past is me. The "was," according to Sartre,
indicates the relation by which the for-itself makes itself 
be its past.81
However, we cannot rest there. For Sartre, the for-itself is 
a nothingness, it cannot be solidly identified with anything. 
This entails that the for-itself is in a relation of being 
and non-being with its past. The for-itself makes the past
its past but it negates it at the very same time. The for-
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itself is its past in the mode of not being it. It is not 
the past which it is. The schoolboy of 1976 is me but, at 
the same time, I negate this past, it cannot determine any of 
my actions; I must confer on it the meaning it has for me, 
whether I am proud of it or embarrassed by it, and decide how 
I will react to it. The for-itself is free in relation to 
its past.
Similarly, the for-itself is in a relation of being and non- 
being with its future. The for-itself gives itself a future 
by projecting towards a desired but as yet non-existent new 
state of affairs. It sees itself as at present lacking 
something it desires. It projects achieving its goal so that 
it will be in the future that fulfilled self which it is not 
yet. This future, then, is an ideal, something the for- 
itself does not yet coincide with. However, only the for- 
itself can posit a future - a perceived negation of the 
present - as such. It is the for-itself who projects this 
future, making it its future. The for-itself, then, is the 
future which it is not. The for-itself, being responsible in 
this way for its future, remains free in relation to it. It 
is an ideal I myself project and nothing can force me to 
continue to carry on with my project of it. Even when I have 
reached my projected future, I still cannot coincide with it 
or solidly be it. I freely have to relate to and cope with 
my new condition.
The for-itself is a nothingness and has projected being its 
future. But even when it reaches its goal it cannot find 
full satisfaction. E.g. I project gaining a degree, to
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become the very model of a knowledgeable person. However, on 
graduating, I do not feel vastly different. I find myself 
unable to rest at this point. I have my degree but there are 
still gaps in my knowledge and I have to work at new 
projects. This is the experience of what Sartre calls 
"ontological d i s i l l u s i o n ."82 i reach my goal and say "is it 
only this?" I can never solidly be the future I project.
The present nothingness which is the for-itself, then, has to 
be and not be its past and future. Sartre sums this up when 
he says that the for-itself as temporal "can and must ... (1 ) 
... not-be what it is, (2) ... be what it is not" and "(3) be 
what it is not and ... not-be what it is - within the unity 
of a perpetual referring."83 i cannot solidly be my past or 
future but must remain a present freedom in relation to them.
Sartre's qualifying phrase, within the unity...," is 
important here. If the for-itself is always a present 
freedom in relation to its past and future, then it could be 
seen as shattered into multiple separate temporal selves.
The present for-itself becomes past and a new present for- 
itself, free from the old one, takes its place. The new 
present for-itself becomes past in its turn and gives way to 
another new free present for-itself and so it goes on. 
However, Sartre's qualification entails that temporality in 
this way gives rise only to a "quasi-multiplicity."84 it is 
not a matter of a completely new existent springing up in 
place of an old one. Rather, it is the for-itself, as one 
unified existent, which multiplies itself. The for-itself is
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responsible for its activities. It is also responsible for 
seeing those activities as not yet fully satisfying and for 
surpassing them towards other activities, thus leaving them 
behind as its solidified "in-itself" past. Sartre tries to 
express what he means here by means of a pictorial 
description. We must visualize the for-itself as a moving 
hole travelling through being. As it moves forward, being 
solidifies behind it again. At its new place, it remains 
still a hole in being. "Everything happens," Sartre tells 
us:
"as if the Present were a perpetual hole 
in being - immediately filled up and 
perpetually reborn - as if the Present 
were a perpetual flight away from the 
snare of the in-itself which threatens it 
until that final victory of the in- 
itself...death ..."85
At death, according to Sartre, the whole life of the for- 
itself becomes an in-itself past. That is, the for-itself's 
whole life is now past and the for-itself is no longer there 
to relate to this past, to actively make it its own past.
Only an outside witness can now preserve the dead one's past. 
This means, says Sartre, that at death one is reduced to a 
"for-others. " 8 6  At my death, the only perspective from which 
my life will be able to be looked at is that of other people. 
But that will be their concern alone. As long as my life 
endures, I must continue to exist as a free temporal moving 
"hole in being."
The image of a hole in being perpetually filled up and 
perpetually re-born fits very well the continual freedom 
Sartre attributes to the for-itself in relation to time. As
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I move forward to new activities, a new present, I leave 
behind my former present as a past. This former present had 
its own projected future. That is, I was at that time 
pursuing a particular goal. If I have now achieved that goal 
and thus reached the projected future, I still, as we said 
earlier, cannot be solidly identified with it. If I have not 
yet achieved it, then - like the gambler who has to decide 
whether or not to fulfil his vow never again to gamble - only 
I can decide whether or not that project will be continued. 
E.g. that boy I was in 1976 had a certain ambition. That 
projected future has no force of its own. If I now reject 
it, it is behind me as a former future which is no longer my 
project. If I still strive for that future, then it is me, 
by presently continuing to pursue it, who gives it its force. 
In the field of temporality too, according to Sartre, we are 
"condemned to be free."87
Earlier, we looked at Sartre's view of the for-itself as 
primarily conscious of itself in a non-thetic way but capable 
secondarily of reflecting on itself. However, Sartre's 
argument that the for-itself is responsible for temporality 
and is free in relation to it entails that such reflection is 
only possible in a limited sense. This brings us to our 
fifth and final point on temporality.
For Sartre, as we have seen, the for-itself only perceives 
time through its being a continual present surpassing of the 
for-itself towards a future. On this view, then, to be a 
for-itself is precisely to be the kind of existent which is 
continuously engaged in such an activity of surpassing.
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Consequently, the for-itself cannot, as it were, "step 
outside" of its own surpassing to achieve a reflective view 
of itself completely as an external object. The for-itself 
is a consciousness or point of view on the world and it 
cannot step outside of this viewpoint to see itself the way 
it sees other people or objects outside itself. The for- 
itself can only view itself from its own viewpoint.
The for-itself, therefore, according to Sartre, can only 
genuinely achieve a reflection which is a diffused immediate 
knowledge of itself as a free for-itself. Sartre denotes 
this as "pure reflection. " 8 8  Pure reflection is directed to 
"original temporality."89 That is, it is a reflective 
awareness of oneself in one's actual living as a for-itself 
freely conducting its activities, going beyond the past and 
projecting a future. Sartre denotes the attempt to achieve 
more than this as "impure reflection"90 which is directed to 
"psychic temporality."91 That is, impure reflection occurs 
when one attempts to reach a really external view of oneself, 
leading instead to a distorted picture of oneself as a solid 
"psyche"92 whose actions, character and so on can be seen to 
have solid past causes. Let us now look in a little more 
detail at how Sartre reaches this view of temporality and 
reflection.
Reflection on oneself, for Sartre, is an explicitly posited 
form of the consciousness of self that one already is. As we 
saw earlier, the unreflective for-itself is already a (non- 
thetic) consciousness of self. Sartre even described it as a 
"reflection-reflecting." This is not in the sense of mental
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or introspective reflection (which in French is denoted by 
the word "reflexion") but, again as we saw earlier, in the 
sense of the reflection of an image as in a game of mirrors 
(denoted by the separate French word "reflet").93 This 
"reflection" entails that the for-itself is a non-thetic 
consciousness of itself simultaneously with its consciousness 
of the world. Reflection in the sense of "reflexion," for 
Sartre, is an explicitly posited form of this consciousness 
of self.
Sartre has talked throughout of the for-itself as a 
nothingness which cannot be tied down to a solid identity.
By explicit reflection, according to Sartre's interpretation, 
the for-itself attempts to step outside itself to view itself 
from an outside perspective and thus at last get a firm grip 
on its being. To accomplish such a feat, Sartre argues, the 
for-itself carrying out the reflection (the reflective for- 
itself) must both be and not be its own self upon which it is 
reflecting (the reflected-on). The reflective for-itself 
must be one and the same as the reflected on for-itself 
otherwise it would not be a case of reflection but of one 
for-itself viewing a completely independent other for-itself. 
Reflection is a self-modification of the one for-itself, it 
is an "interiorization."94 But the reflective for-itself 
must also not be the reflected-on. Consciousness, Sartre has 
stated, is conscious of something by negating it as the 
object consciousness is not. If, then, the reflective for- 
itself is to be an external view of the reflected-on, the 
former must negate the latter as the object it is not or, in 
Sartre's terminology, be an "objectivation" of it.95
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According to Sartre, however, the goal of reflection cannot 
be fully attained. The problem is that the for-itself cannot 
completely achieve an objectivation of itself. The for- 
itself is a centre of conscious experience, a viewpoint on 
the world. Even when it reflects on itself it has to do so 
as a centre of experience from its own viewpoint. A 
viewpoint reflecting on itself cannot thereby escape that 
viewpoint. The for-itself remains a nothingness unable to 
attain a solid being. I cannot fully step outside myself to 
view myself the way I view an external object. I cannot 
complete an affirmation/negation of myself as an object.
Reflection, for Sartre, ia this failure to achieve full 
objectivation. That is, reflection for the human being is 
precisely that kind of view of oneself that one achieves but 
which somehow does not quite make the mark. In reflection, I 
get a view of myself but not a truly external one. The for- 
itself even in reflection cannot step outside the centre of 
experience which it is. An outside view of myself can only 
be achieved by someone else. One can (and indeed can only) 
view someone else from a perspective external to that person 
but one cannot do the same for oneself.
This entails, for Sartre, that the only genuine reflection 
one can reach is pure reflection. Here the for-itself knows 
itself as free and observes itself in its original 
temporality as a continuing free pursuer of goals. But 
because one cannot observe oneself from a truly external 
perspective, one is only reflecting on a " q u a s i - o b j e c t."96
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Pure reflection is a diffused knowledge of oneself all at 
once without a vantage point. It is an explicitly posited 
form of what one is already: a consciousness of self. Pure
reflection, then, is a revelation of the already revealed, a 
knowledge that does not surprise me. It is a self-knowledge 
over-flowing itself.
In impure reflection, however, the for-itself attempts to 
push the reflective project finally towards the goal of an 
external objective view of itself. Sartre, as we saw 
earlier, has stated that my activities, on being finished and 
left in the past, become in-itself events, although they had 
to be actively pursued by me at the time. In impure 
reflection, the for-itself, in the attempt to get a fully 
external view of itself, treats itself as if it were an in- 
itself in its entirety. The for-itself, in consequence, 
directs itself to a false projected psychic temporality.
That is, the for-itself reflects on itself with a distorted 
view projecting itself to be a consciousness in a degraded, 
solidified way, to be a ready-made " p s y c h e "97 rather than an 
active free temporally directing for-itself.
Here, one regards oneself in a very object-like way. One 
looks at one’s activities as if they were determined by 
independently effective causes and as if one’s character was 
a ready-made mixture of given aspects. For example, I 
reflect on my state of anger the other night which was caused 
by the annoying remarks of another person. Or, I reflect on 
my personality as comprising of various traits (cheerfulness, 
insecurity, ambition etc.) as if these were solid qualities I
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as an object have. This stultified picture of myself does 
not match what the actual experience is like of actively 
living my life, choosing how to act and developing my 
personality. Pure reflection, in contrast, operates within 
the recognition of this experience.
Impure reflection, according to Sartre, is in bad faith.98 
The for-itself deems itself to be getting an external 
perspective on itself as a solid psyche but this latter is a 
projected object which the for-itself is not. Impure 
reflection, says Sartre, is the first moment of reflection 
but pure reflection is the original form.99 That is, impure 
reflection would not be possible unless it was a pure 
reflection pushed further into impurity. My distorted 
projection of myself into a solid object to be observed from 
the outside presupposes an original reflective knowledge of 
myself at its base. It is by an effort of katharsis, Sartre
declares, that one can return to this original pure
reflection. 1 0 0
This division of reflection into "pure" and "impure" seems 
puzzling. Most human beings reflect on their lives from time 
to time and see this scrutiny as valuable. However, Sartre 
states that the only genuine reflection, pure reflection, is 
a diffuse awareness of oneself as a free consciousness. Such 
an awareness would not seem to be detailed enough to allow 
for that type of self scrutiny we value. Yet it would seem, 
furthermore, that such scrutiny, under Sartre’s view, would
fall into the realm of impure reflection and would be in bad
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faith. Is Sartre, then, condemning and devaluing a normal 
and useful human capacity?
I do not believe that this is Sartre's intention. Sartre 
does seem to accurately pinpoint an integral aspect of the 
human being's experience of trying to reflect on himself or 
herself when he states that we can never get a truly external 
picture of ourselves. Indeed, we could say that he is 
expressing in a philosophical way what Rabble Burns expressed 
in poetic form when he wished that "God could gie us the gift 
tae see ourselves as others see us." It is this inability to 
get an external grip on ourselves that leads to the feeling 
of ontological disillusion when we have reached our goal but 
do not feel totally satisfied. To go back to the phrase I 
used in the preceding chapter, we are "switched on." Any 
attempt I, in the process of being conscious, make to reflect 
on myself is itself part of that process and so cannot get 
outside of it to give me a truly external view of myself.
"Pure reflection" is when I make myself explicitly aware of
my "switched-onness." However, even if we cannot get a truly
external view of ourselves, we do need, in our everyday
lives, to look at past events, things we have done and to
make decisions on this basis. Sartre does recognize this.
He describes the object of impure reflection as a "virtual
presence" and as my "shadow" revealed to me when I wish to
see myself. But he also states that:
"In addition this phantom world exists as 
a real situation of the for-itself, for 
it can be that in terms of which the for- 
itself determines itself to be what it 
has to be. For example, I shall not go
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to this or that person's house 'because 
o f  the antipathy I feel toward him. Or 
I decide on this or that action by taking 
into consideration my hate or my love.
Or I refuse to discuss politics because I 
know my quick temper and I cannot risk 
becoming irritated. " 1 0 1
It would seem, then, that Sartre allows for the kind of self­
scrutiny I have been talking about but sees pure reflection 
as making us realize that we are ourselves responsible for 
any characteristics we discover in ourselves through such 
scrutiny. This is particularly important given that Sartre 
later on advocates an "existential psychoanalysis" in which 
one must objectively probe one's own life but with the goal 
of discovering and recognizing a free "original project," 
one's own mode of living centred round a deep personal 
concern. We will discuss this issue in more detail in the 
next section of this chapter.
2.5 THE LIFE OF A FREE FOR-ITSELF
What I have done so far in this chapter is to give an outline 
of what Sartre's view of the human being as a freedom 
basically entails, namely that the human being is an existent 
whose acts can never be determined by given causes since it 
forms its own ends for action. Now we can proceed to tackle 
the two broader issues I raised earlier. Firstly, what 
significance is to be accorded to the type of freedom Sartre 
attributes to us; to what extent can such a freedom be said 
to counterbalance the weight of the given in our situation? 
Secondly, how can we study the life of the human being on the 
basis of Sartre's view of freedom without thereby ending up 
simply recording a series of randomly chosen acts? In
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relation to this latter question, Sartre insists that it is 
possible to study the coherent "personality" and "life story" 
of an individual human being while maintaining the 
perspective of freedom. By studying first how Sartre sees 
the life of a free for-itself unfold, I hope to be in a 
better position to deal with the former question regarding 
the significance of freedom.
XA) BALANCE
I have throughout been stressing that Sartre proceeds from 
the basis of reflection on meaningful human experience and 
that this leads him to his view of the human being as free. 
However, it could be pointed out to Sartre that, from 
reflection on experience, we can see that in life one 
develops a personality with its own fairly constant features 
which one cannot simply change at the drop of a hat as if it 
was of no consequence to one. Further, one can examine one’s 
own "life story," see the particular shape it has taken and 
pin-point important events which one feels can be seen as 
reasons for the way one is today and for the course one's 
life has taken. In this light, it might seem that the notion 
of continual freedom does not do justice to our experience 
and that a deterministic approach would be more appropriate 
to the study of human life. Sartre himself concedes that in 
examining our acts determinism "does at least give the reason 
for each of them. " 1 0 2
Sartre nonetheless does not feel compelled to resort to 
determinism in order to study the life and personality of the 
human being. I have tried to demonstrate throughout that
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Sartre's conception of freedom is a balanced one. In the 
first chapter, we looked at Sartre's view of what, in a basic 
sense, the human being is. I presented this view as a 
balanced picture of the human being as neither a purely 
physical nor purely "ghostly" entity but a unified conscious 
bodily existent. The human being, seen from this perspective 
I outlined, cannot be conscious without its physicality but 
nevertheless its consciousness cannot be reduced to that 
physicality. Its consciousness is the unity by which the 
existent is a "lived" experiencing physicality. Now in this 
chapter, we have heard how Sartre describes such an existent 
as a "freedom." The balance presented here is that, on the 
one hand, the human being cannot be determined to commit any 
particular act but, rather, decides on his or her own acts 
for his or her own motives and causes (thereby projecting his 
or her own future and giving his or her own reaction to his 
or her past) while, on the other hand, he or she acts in 
relation to a given world which "resists" the human being.
Sartre also puts forward, I will attempt to show, a balanced 
view of how we can study the personality and life story of a 
human being. For Sartre, the human being is neither pre­
programmed with a specific personality and herded by fate 
along a particular path in life nor haphazardly conducting a 
series of random acts without any profound connections. For 
Sartre, the human being is a free for-itself which by its 
actions develops its own personality and decides its own 
course in life. On the one hand, the for-itself can change 
its personality and alter the course of its life but, on the 
other hand, these constitute a profound decision it has made
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pre-reflectively and through which it sees the world. This 
is the for-itself's "way of life" and thus to change it, 
while being possible, is not a trifling matter but one of 
great consequence. Let us now explore in more detail this 
Sartrean view of the life of the human being.
(B) THE EXAMPLE OF THE FATIGUED HIKER
Sartre employs an interesting example in trying to show how 
we can view an individual human being as free but also place 
his or her acts within a broader pattern. He takes the case 
of a man on a hike with friends who is suffering from 
fatigue.103 At first he tries to resist his fatigue and 
struggle on with his friends to the common resting place.
But then suddenly he gives up and drops his knapsack down at 
the side of the road, letting himself fall down beside it.
One of his friends might reproach him for this, meaning that 
he was free and could have chosen to do otherwise. Our 
erstwhile hiker, however, excuses himself by saying that he 
was just "too tired" to continue.
Sartre sides with neither protagonist here. He views the 
human being as free so he agrees that the hiker could have 
done otherwise. However, he sees the human being as free not 
just at each moment in isolation but as a total person. The 
individual freely makes himself or herself in the over all 
kind of person he or she is. The problem, then, according to 
Sartre, is not to decide whether or not the hiker was free at 
the moment he stopped. It is to decide whether or not he 
could have done otherwise without radically changing himself 
in his total person, such a change being a possibility for a
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free human being. In this way, Sartre believes, he can study 
the hiker's act in relation to broader aspects of the person 
without denying his or her freedom.
According to Sartre, such an interest in the broader aspects 
of a person is one we already exercise in our every day 
lives. We can see from reflection on human experience,
Sartre believes, that grasping the totality of a person is 
something we all do spontaneously.104 The particular acts 
and gestures of a person seem to tell us something of the 
wider concerns he or she has, of his or her "character," if 
we want to use that term, or of "what makes him or her tick." 
We spontaneously take a general impression of the person from 
his or her acts. Sartre terms this type of understanding 
"comprehension."105 a particular act, here, is seen as 
"comprehensive," it engages the person as a whole, and it is 
"comprehensible," it can be understood as part of a whole.106 
Sartre wishes to show how this comprehension can be practised 
in a more systematic fashion.
Here Sartre issues a note of warning. It can be easy to spot 
the pattern of a person's behaviour, find general labels for 
it and then stop there as if one now had the full explanation 
of that person's acts. E.g. we might say that the faltering 
hiker gave in to fatigue because "he is a sissy."107 o r  we 
might say that a person who engages in acts of conquest is 
spurred on by "ambition."108 For Sartre, however, such 
labels are not sufficient.
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We heard in the previous chapter how Sartre accepts that 
there is not any special mental substance or "ghost" within 
the human being. He thus agrees with behaviourism that all 
we have to go on in studying a person is his or her 
behaviour. From this point of view, the labels may be seen 
as only describing the behaviour. If there is no mental 
thing within us containing "sissyishness" or "ambition" then 
these labels only refer to the fact that a person behaves in 
such and such a way. Thus Sartre says that for the human 
being "to be is to act"109 or "being is reduced to doing. "HO 
The human being's existence takes the form of acting in the 
world.
However, we also heard in the preceding chapter how Sartre, 
while discounting the notion of a separate mental substance, 
allows for one's own experience of oneself as "living" one's 
body and how in accordance with this he views the human being 
as a unified conscious bodily existent. Following on from 
this, we have in this chapter seen how Sartre allows for our 
experience of our acts as intentional or pursued for ends we 
posit ourselves. The behaviour of a person, then, on this 
view, is immediately conscious behaviour and Sartre wishes to 
attempt to comprehend it in relation to the totality of the 
person as consciousness. Here, to say that a person is a 
"sissy" or is "ambitious" is only a preliminary stage of 
describing the pattern of his or her behaviour. It is here 
that "comprehensiveness" comes in. Following his notion of 
the person as a whole, Sartre points to the reasons for an 
individual's behaviour as lying not only in the immediate 
goals of a particular act (e.g. the hiker stopping to relieve
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his fatigue) but also in the broader concerns of that person 
in his or her totality.
Here, in this attempt to find a systematic form of 
comprehension, Sartre finds inspiration in the psychoanalytic 
school of thought begun by Freud. Sartre credits Freud with 
refusing to interpret the act in terms of a simple cause in 
the preceding moment but seeing it, rather, in relation to 
more profound structures of the person.Ill An act, for 
Freud, is not committed in isolation and for one simple 
mundane purpose but symbolically expresses at the same time a 
deeper desire which itself is a manifestation of the 
"complex" at the heart of the person.H2 "Psychoanalysis" is 
the method whereby these deeper structures can be brought to 
light.113
According to Sartre's reading of Freud, however, the letter's 
psychoanalytic thought is overloaded by a determinism which 
distorts the comprehension involved. In Freudian thought, 
Sartre says, it is what happens in the external environment, 
or our history, which determines the complex we have and this 
complex in turn is seen as the pre-existing cause of the acts 
which manifest it.114
This deterministic slant to Freudian thought, Sartre 
believes, leads to certain incongruities with experience. 
Against my experience of my act as precisely mine and as an 
attempt to create a future, Freudian thought views it as 
determined by the past.115 Also, Freudian psychoanalysis 
involves someone from the outside uncovering the
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"unconscious" deeper structures of the subject. For Sartre, 
this does not take account of our own implicit sense of the 
deeper structures of our acts.116 witness, he says, how the 
patient undergoing psychoanalysis, on having his or her 
complex revealed to him or her, not only accepts the 
revelation as an objective truth but personally recognizes 
the complex.117
Sartre, then, wishes to learn from Freud’s procedure of 
analysing an act in terms of deeper structures but not from 
his determinist principles. He wants to show how such 
analysis can be carried out while accepting the human being 
as a free conscious existent.
Accordingly, Sartre attempts to set out the principles for an 
"existential psychoanalysis"118 which will retain the idea of 
the particular act as expressive of deeper structures but 
which will see both the act and its structures in terms of a 
free choice. In Sartrean psychoanalytic thought, we view a 
particular act as immediately a project towards a freely 
chosen end. E.g. the hiker who stops does so in order to 
achieve relief from fatigue. But we also study it to see if 
it can be explained as part of a wider project. We must 
explain a particular choice, Sartre says, "to see whether it 
is not explained within the perspective of a larger choice in 
which it would be integrated as a secondary structure."119 
We must then examine this choice too to see if it itself is 
part of a yet more profound choice and then examine this 
latter choice in its turn. We proceed in this way to conduct 
a "regressive analysis " 1 2 0  taking us further and further back
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until we reach a project which cannot be further interpreted 
and which is at the heart of the person being studied.
What Sartre means here is that by continually regressing from 
the particular acts of a person towards broader and broader 
projects in which they are integrated we can eventually 
discover a project or choice which is that of the person in 
his or her totality and which therefore can be broadened no 
further. For Sartre, the human being does not only have ends 
within the confines of each particular act. In his or 
totality, the human being is a for-itself conscious of itself 
in the world of objects and other people. Each for-itself 
has its own perception of this situation of its existence in 
the world and in relation to that situation the for-itself 
has its own desired way of finding completion or 
satisfaction. This is what makes up the for-itself’s way of 
living.
This project of the human being in his or her totality is 
what Sartre terms the "original" project or c h o i c e .121 it is 
"original" in that our particular desires, actions, projects 
etc. find their most profound meaning in it and constitute 
the concrete way this fundamental project is expressed. It 
is this project we sense when we form a wider impression of 
what a person is like.
Having conducted a regression back to the original project, 
one can then in a "progression" 1 2 2  place any particular act 
in its context within the totality of the person in question. 
It is in this way that Sartre attempts to allow for the lines
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of consistency in a person without denying his or her 
freedom. He still insists that the human being can never be 
mechanically caused to commit a particular act. However, the 
occasion can arise when, on being confronted with a choice of 
action to be made, to choose to act in a particular way would 
not simply be to pick one of either insignificant options but 
would be to "go against the grain" of one's own approach to 
life, to behave differently in one's total person or, in 
other words, to change one's original project. As a free 
for-itself, one has the ability to choose this new type of 
act but only at the price of a self-conversion rather than as 
an idle whim.
These are the principles Sartre would employ in examining the 
case of the hiker who stopped and that of his critical 
companion who carried on. Both had the same training and 
both were fatigued yet one gave up and the other continued.
To explain why, according to Sartre, we must trace their acts 
back to their original projects and look at the difference 
between these latter.
To take the case of the hiker who continued,^23 he might say, 
Sartre supposes, that he loves his fatigue. He enjoys 
maintaining the struggle against fatigue and encountering 
nature in this way. His particular choice of pressing on 
with the hike, then, refers to broader aspects of the person, 
i.e. his individual style of being an embodied person and his 
relation to nature. He likes to abandon himself to his 
bodily existence, to feel totally body and through this 
effort to conquer the mountains. This is how he attempts to
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achieve completion, as if he had appropriated the being of 
the world itself in this way and united himself with it.
The wheezing hiker who refused to go any further, however, 
has a different way of living or a different original project 
and hence a different way of relating to his body and to 
nature.124 He distrusts the world of being. He seeks 
satisfaction and completion through his relations with 
others. Let us suppose, for example, that he is a writer and 
strives to feel a complete person through the respect of his 
readers. Having such a project, the prospect of abandon to 
nature horrifies him. He does not want to lose himself and 
his completion by submersion in the natural world. It is 
through this project that he appears as a "sissy" unable to 
resist fatigue.
Sartre accepts the critic's strictures that the erstwhile 
hiker could have chosen to do otherwise than he did. However, 
to understand the person, following Sartre's principles, the 
revealing question to add is "but at what price?" That is, 
could he have done otherwise without a major transformation 
of his whole way of living or original project? In this 
case, Sartre says, the hiker's particular act of dropping to 
the ground
"had to be interpreted in terms of an 
original project of which it formed an 
original part ... we cannot suppose that 
the act could have been modified without 
at the same time supposing a fundamental 
modification of [that] original choice 
..."125
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Sartre adds that such a modification "is moreover always 
p o s s i b l e ."126 it is in this way that he allows for the 
coherent aspects of a person without denying his or her 
freedom. The human being acts in accordance with a broader 
pattern but this pattern is itself freely chosen.
i£à CHOICE OF ONESELF AS A WHOLE IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE
Here, however, a questioning person might seek to pin Sartre 
down and ask him how such a perspective of choice can be 
maintained in examining the life of an individual. For, as I 
noted earlier, we can see from experience how we sometimes 
act spontaneously according to personality without an, at any 
rate explicit, awareness of it at the time. E.g. the errant 
hiker, we could reasonably suppose, was not deliberating as 
to how he should relate to his body and to nature - he simply 
"felt like a rest."
A reading of BN, in my view, shows that Sartre himself is 
well aware of this possible objection. He responds to it by 
reiterating that he is operating with a view of consciousness 
as not a continual deliberative process but as originally 
non-thetic. He views the original project as something we 
are pre-reflectively conscious o f .127 To this, one might 
object that the concept of "pre-reflective" consciousness is 
an all too convenient one pressed into service by Sartre 
whenever his notion of continual freedom appears to conflict 
with the evidence of experience. I hope to show that, on the 
contrary, his use of such a concept is the means whereby he 
reaches a balanced approach under which he takes account both 
of how our acts of striving towards our personal desires
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appear to us as our acts as experiencing individuals and of 
how we do not always nor even primarily contemplate 
explicitly on the deep meaning of these acts.
As we looked at earlier, in the first chapter, according to 
Sartre, the for-itself is pre-reflectively conscious of 
itself. Whatever particular thing I am explicitly conscious 
of at any moment, I am at the same time and in the very 
process of being conscious of the thing conscious of myself 
in a non-positional way. That is, I do not have to 
analytically think about myself or take up a position in 
relation to myself as an object in order to be conscious of 
myself. Rather, I am already "switched on" as an 
experiencing individual. My consciousness of the particular 
thing is already my experience. It is only given this 
condition that one has the ability to reflect on oneself. It 
is only if one is already pre-reflectively conscious that one 
can perform the cogito.
For Sartre, this notion of pre-reflective consciousness can 
be applied to our normal everyday activities. When we engage 
in particular concrete actions, Sartre notes, there are, in a 
very basic ordinary way, broader aspects of them which, 
though I am not specifically thinking about them at that 
moment, would not normally be thought of as "buried in the 
unconscious." Sartre takes the example of his own act of 
writing at that moment.128 Although he is specifically aware 
of the sentence and paragraph he is writing now, he writes 
within a wider plan of the book he is producing and within 
the broader project of his philosophical activity in general.
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He is not explicitly analysing these aspects at the moment 
but neither is he cut off from them. Without having to be 
explicitly pointed out they are integral to Sartre's very 
consciousness of writing a sentence. He is pre-reflectively 
conscious of them.
According to Sartre, the original project too fits into this 
type of scheme. For Sartre, there can be no generalized 
"personality" or "character" in the sense of a necessarily 
constant and steadfast pattern governing an individual's 
behaviour. To stress this, Sartre avoids the terms 
completely. I used them earlier in a cautious, provisional 
way. But for Sartre any human phenomenon, even what we call 
"personality," is an activity of a conscious existent, a 
project towards ends. For example, "having an inferiority 
complex" involves how I perceive myself in relation to 
others, how I will act in their presence and so on.129 "Even 
assertions," says Sartre, "such as 'I am ugly,' 'I am stupid' 
etc. are by nature anticipations."130 i project myself now 
and in the future as inferior in my activities in relation to 
other people. What is normally referred to, then, as one's 
"personality" is described by Sartre as a choice or project 
of oneself, the original project.
However, just as in his example Sartre simply wrote a 
paragraph without explicitly thinking of the role of 
philosophy in his life, so one does not ponder over one's 
original project. I am pre-reflectively conscious of it and 
it is expressed in the concrete activities I carry out. E.g.
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my embarrassed and nervous speech before others expresses my 
sense of inferiority.
Sartre, then, does not attempt to claim that the original 
choice is a deliberate one expressly declared by the for- 
itself. However, as against the charge that he is using an 
escape clause, Sartre argues that the pre-reflective nature 
of the original choice is an integral aspect of how 
consciousness operates and that the pre-reflective awareness 
of the choice is nonetheless a very real and full 
consciousness of it.
For Sartre, consciousness is primarily pre-reflective and any
deliberation must presuppose a pre-reflective choice. To make
a reflective deliberate choice involves weighing up causes
and motives and on that basis making a decision. However, as
we heard Sartre say earlier, causes and motives can only be
such in relation to some end and can only appear in relation
to that end. Or as Sartre puts it himself:
"It is necessary to defend oneself 
against the illusion which would make of 
original freedom a positing of causes and 
motives as objects, then a decision from 
[their] standpoint ... Quite the 
contrary, as soon as there are cause and 
motive (that is, an appreciation of 
things and of the structures of the 
world) there is already a positing of 
ends and consequently a choice. " 1 3 1
Thus, Sartre reasons, consciousness cannot engage in a pure 
deliberation. All deliberation presupposes a choice prior to 
deliberation, one that can only be made on the level of non- 
thetic consciousness.
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What Sartre is saying here is, I believe, correct. It should 
be obvious to any student of human life that we do not spring 
up in the world as detached and neutral observers passively 
receiving data from it and then after consideration 
conducting the appropriate action. Rather, my very 
perception of the world is coloured through and through with 
my interests and concerns, it is already the perception of 
the kind of person I am. One's very involvement in the world 
already entails an original end or choice which is prior to 
deliberation or pre-reflective. Otherwise we would not be 
dealing with consciousness, which is of something and at the 
same time consciousness of self, but with a simple 
registering of data which would not even know itself as such 
and consequently could not even reach the stage of 
deliberation. To use Sartre's own expression, "one must be 
conscious in order to choose and one must choose in order to
be conscious."132
Sartre is here portraying the original choice as bound up 
with one's very existence as an entity fundamentally 
conscious of itself (i.e. even before reflection) or, in 
other words, with one's very existence as a "switched on" 
centre of experience. Indeed, as Sartre phrases it, the 
original choice is "one with the consciousness which we have 
of ourselves. "133 it is the form my consciousness of self as 
a for-itself in the world takes. This entails, for Sartre, 
that the original choice is not "unconscious." I am fully 
conscious of it but in the same pre-reflective or non-thetic 
way that I am a consciousness of self; it is completely and
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overflowingly present to me, it is what I live, not an 
outside object I can grab hold of.
It is because the original project is "one" with our 
consciousness of self that it is the project in which all our 
particular projects are integrated. Just as the world only 
is properly the "world" through our perception of it, so too 
it only appears through the pre-reflective choice I have made 
of myself. "I choose myself," says Sartre, "as a whole in 
the world which is a whole. "134 And just as when I perceive 
a particular object, I do so on the ground of the world as a 
whole, so too when I conduct a particular act or individual 
project, I do so on the ground of the total project which I 
as a consciousness of self am.
If we follow this idea through, the original project and the 
world appear as "correlative"135 to each other and there is a 
sense in which our original project stares back at us in the 
face from outside. Neither the enthusiastic hiker nor the 
lazy hiker could create or abolish the hill but by their 
projects, it appears to one as exciting and challenging and 
to the other as tiresome and irritating. "We choose the 
world, " says Sartre, "not in its contexture as in-itself but 
in its meaning by choosing ourselves" and the world refers 
back to us "exactly the image of what we are."136 we do not 
engage in a continuous reflection on our original choice but 
we live it and confront it outside ourselves in object form. 
"Thus," Sartre tells us, "we are fully conscious of the 
choice which we are."137
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If, however, we demand evidence of how we feel within 
ourselves a full consciousness of actually freely choosing, 
Sartre again points to the distinctive experience of 
anguish.138 When we discussed anguish earlier, we noted how 
for Sartre it is a distinctive experience separate from 
simple fear of an external harmful object. Anguish is the 
feeling of being troubled about oneself and one's actions 
irrespective of whether or not one's personal safety is at 
risk and thus, according to Sartre, is the preserve of a free 
existent. On this view, then, it is only through his or her
freedom that the human being can experience anguish.
"Anguish, abandonment, responsibility," Sartre now adds, 
"whether muted or full strength, constitute the quality of
our consciousness in so far as this is pure and simple
freedom."139 what Sartre is saying here is that one is 
constantly (non-thetically) conscious of choosing one's 
original project and by the same token conscious of one's 
ability to choose differently. One constantly has the 
"trouble" of choosing. The feeling of anguish is a concrete 
form the consciousness of this trouble takes. To feel 
anguished, to be troubled about one's choice is, under 
Sartre's analysis, to be aware of the "contingency" of one's 
c h o i c e .140 it is to be aware that one is freely making a 
choice and that therefore one need not continue to choose 
that way. It is to be aware that as a freedom I live my 
choice without any solid external guarantee that it is 
necessary. Or, as Sartre phrases it, in anguish "we 
apprehend ourselves as unjustifiable."141 We are aware that
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"we ourselves can abruptly invert this choice and reverse 
steam."142
As further evidence of how we consciously and freely make an 
original choice, Sartre also points to the experience of what 
he terms the "instant."143 instants, for Sartre, are those 
moments when someone actually puts into operation the 
possibility of choosing differently and overthrows his or her 
original project in favour of another, e.g. an atheist who 
converts to a r e l i g i o n .144
In the section on time, we noted how it is impossible to pin 
time down to an absolutely indivisible instant. Neither, 
says Sartre, can we perceive ourselves engaged in an activity 
in an absolute instant. Everything we do involves projecting 
a future to become present and leaving behind a past. 
Similarly, we are not conscious of thetically making an 
original choice in one absolute instant and then reaffirming 
it in the next instant and then in the next instant again and 
so on. Rather, I am non-thetically conscious of choosing a 
continuous project which perpetually places a certain goal 
ahead of me. The long-running project which I live is the 
immediate expression of my continuous choice. "The 
recovery," Sartre says, "is so narrowly joined to the 
ensemble of the process that it has no instantaneous meaning 
and cannot have a n y ."145
The only identifiable moment Sartre can see that merits being 
singled out as a distinct "instant" is the point at which 
someone overturns his or her original project and makes a new
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choice. Even this instant could not be narrowed down to an 
absolutely indivisible unit of time but it is distinct as a 
point which is the end of an old project and the beginning of 
a new one. The person identifies the present as the 
beginning of a new project in relation to the new future he 
or she sets out and by the same effort marks it out as the 
moment the old choice becomes past.146
Sartre sees these moments when a person makes a radical 
transformation of his or her life as a dramatic demonstration 
of the freedom he or she already was. I carry out a project 
freely and continuously but I am non-thetically conscious of 
it and so it is not directly before me as a matter for 
consideration. But because I am free, it is always possible 
that I will turn on the immediate past that I was simply 
living, make an object of it and make a new choice of 
project. "The spectre of the instant," Sartre declares, 
perpetually haunts our choice.147 "These extraordinary and
marvellous instants," Sartre notes, "...have often appeared 
to furnish the clearest and most moving image of our 
freedom," though "they are only one among others of its many 
manifestations."148
We have now seen how Sartre presents and defends his concept 
of the original choice. In introducing it, I portrayed it as 
a balanced tool for studying the personality of the human 
being. I view it this way because what we have discussed 
about it already shows, I believe, that it avoids two 
opposite extreme points from which to view the personality of 
the human being and instead represents a third position which
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fits in with our own human experience which itself suggests 
the inappropriateness of the two extremes.
One of these extreme approaches, which we saw earlier that 
Sartre rejects, is to view the human being as "programmed" in 
his or her behaviour with a given personality. No matter how 
complex the process of programming is said to be, this type 
of approach entails that we find ourselves spontaneously 
operating in our actions, emotions, tastes, etc. in 
accordance with a program which we do not even understand.
Now certainly we do act according to a broader pattern which 
we do not sit down and deliberately design as in an 
intellectual exercise. And to be sure, we do not always nor 
even primarily go through an intellectual exercise to decide 
what our next act will be. However, Sartre's objections to 
this type of position have pointed to aspects of human 
experience which tell against adopting this extreme. Our 
acts, in our experience, appear to us as our acts towards 
ends. And our particular acts do have in some, even if non­
intellectual, way meaning for us as part of a wider way of 
living which we are responsible for carrying out. The example 
of the feeling of anguish, which we can all relate to, rather 
strikingly bears witness to that. A positivist, causal 
"programming" approach, then, does not, looked at this way, 
properly account for human personality.
However, it would also jar with our experience if we were to 
jump to the opposite extreme and treat consciousness as if it 
operated at only one level, the reflective, deliberate one 
and view the human individual as freely choosing his or her
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personality at that level. As against this view, we have 
already discussed how we often spontaneously act in 
accordance with our "character" without going through a 
deliberative process. Sartre has also rightly pointed out 
that world on which we deliberate is already the world as we 
perceive it so that any deliberation already presupposes pre- 
deliberative interests, concerns and attitudes.
In rejecting the first extreme and defending "freedom," 
Sartre avoids this other extreme. Instead, his view of the 
free non-thetic original choice is a balanced position which 
proceeds from reflection on human life and tries to give an 
account of it which we can see fits in with that experience 
of ours. Sartre, then, does not mean by "freedom" that the 
human individual sits down as a neutral intellect and after 
deliberation picks an "off the peg" personality. But he is 
pointing out that the "personality" we display is a broader 
pattern of acts we carry out which mean something for us and 
which we desire to engage in. Even though not in a 
deliberate intellectual way, it is we who produce our 
"personality" and it is only because of this responsibility 
that we can feel anguish about it. To account for this 
experience, Sartre puts forward his view of the human 
individual as free at the level of non-thetic consciousness 
in making an original choice - his or her own way of looking 
at the world and his or her place within it - which is 
expressed through his or her acts.
(D) THE "INFERIORITY COMPLEX” EXAMPLE
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We can, I believe, gain a clearer picture of the balance of 
Sartre's position and its usefulness by looking at his 
discussion of the "inferiority c o m p l e x ."149 in traditional 
psychoanalytic thought, this complex involves a deep feeling 
of inferiority and ill balanced attempts to offset or hide 
this feeling. Sartre accepts this. However, traditional 
psychoanalysis also views the feeling as locked in the 
"unconscious" and thus as the cause - unknown to him or her - 
of some of the individual's acts in his or her conscious 
life. For Sartre, this is an unacceptable dismembering of 
the unity of the human being. As the so-called "un­
conscious" is credited with feelings and desires and so on, 
it is really a form of consciousness and so the dichotomy 
amounts to supposing two separate consciousnesses one of 
which mysteriously acts on the other. But in keeping with 
the balance we have been talking about, Sartre does not 
attempt to claim that a person with an inferiority complex 
produces and maintains it as a deliberate intellectual 
exercise. He tries to show how an individual as a unified 
consciousness can spontaneously exhibit such a complex or, in 
Sartre's terminology, engage in the project of inferiority.
Sartre takes the example of a man who remains in an 
occupation where he is inferior even though he would be as 
good as anyone else in some other field of w o r k .150 He does 
this because he prefers to be last rather than be lost in the 
crowd. Sartre tries to show how this case can be seen in 
terms of his conception of consciousness as unitary but 
primarily non-thetic while being able, secondarily and within 
the unity, to operate at a thetic or reflective level.
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The person's feeling that he can only achieve distinction 
from the mass through inferiority is not an intellectual 
hypothesis but a spontaneous attitude he as a non-thetic 
consciousness assumes. Sartre, then, is not saying that the 
person reflectively decides to have an inferiority complex, 
but he is saying that our deep attitudes about ourselves, 
even when they make us suffer, are enacted by ourselves as 
consciousness. Hence Sartre's statement that the original 
choice "is not necessarily nor even frequently made in 
joy."151 So rather than reflectively choosing a complex, the 
person as a full over-flowing consciousness of self prior to 
any secondary reflection "produce[s] and ... assume[s] the 
rebellion and despair which constitute the revelation of this 
inferiority."152
To assume this inferiority, the person has to make use of his
or her unity as a non-thetic consciousness of self capable of
operating secondarily as a thetic consciousness. He
reflectively wills to be a great artist so that when he
inevitably fails, his pre-reflective project of inferiority
is realized. His thetic will to be superior is a tool of his
non-thetic project of inferiority. It is, for Sartre,
another piece of bad faith. "Thus," Sartre says:
"the man who suffers from Mindwertigkeit 
has chosen to be his own tormentor. He 
has chosen shame and suffering, which 
does not mean, however, that he is to
experience any joy when they are most
forcefully realized."153
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This example, in my view, is a good illustration of how 
Sartre has reached a balanced position whereby he sees our 
fundamental attitudes about ourselves and our place in the 
world as our product freely made by us but spontaneously and 
non-reflectively. This fits our experience of not 
immediately having a verbalized set-out knowledge of 
ourselves but yet implicitly having the feel of what we are 
about and living a life that is meaningful to us and which we 
can be anguished about rather than operating according to an 
unknown program. We can note here again Sartre's point about 
how the psychoanalytic patient who is cured, personally 
recognizes the "complex" revealed to him or her by the 
analyst.
What we have discussed about Sartre's concept of the original 
choice can now be seen in conjunction with what we looked at 
in the first chapter regarding the existence of the human 
being as a unified conscious bodily existent in the world.
Our picture of that existence is enriched by the concept. We 
now have a broader view of the human being as a unified 
conscious bodily existent conscious of the world and who, by 
that same consciousness, is conscious of itself and makes a 
choice of its way of life in the world. The for-itself, by 
its consciousness of the in-itself, is conscious of itself 
and makes the in-itself a world as such. By the very same 
process, the for-itself assumes its own outlook on the world 
and its own way of living in the world.
(E) EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE COURSE OF HUMAN LIFE
We were introduced to the concept of the original choice in
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the course of our discussion of the principles Sartre sets 
out for an "existential psychoanalysis." This is the method 
and procedure by which Sartre believes we should study the 
"personality" and "life story" of any particular individual. 
Its central principle is the one we have in fact just been 
looking at, i.e. to view the human individual as a for-itself 
making its own choice of life in the world. Let us now 
briefly look at some of the details of the guidelines Sartre 
lays down for carrying out an existential psychoanalytic 
investigation of an individual. From this we will see how, 
from the base of this concept of the choosing for-itself, 
Sartre envisages the way that the course of life of a human 
individual runs.
In keeping with what we said earlier about the regressive 
search for the broadest possible project, when studying an 
individual under existential psychoanalysis, we must compare 
the particular projects of the person to see what links can 
be found between them that will lead us back to his or her 
original project through which we will then interpret the 
particular activities.154 However, Sartre's emphasis on the 
original project as being a choice has important consequences 
for how we are to employ this concept of the relation of the 
broad to the particular.
First of all, because of this status of the original project 
as freely chosen and therefore contingent, Sartre stresses 
that we must not see it as an absolute blueprint from which 
our every particular act in every detail logically ensues. 
There is no universally applicable scheme by which we can
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solidly identify an individual as of a certain type from 
which we can then deduce all his or her particular acts. The 
individual chooses the original project and also the 
secondary projects by which he or she expresses it. The 
secondary projects too, then, are contingent. The attempt to 
understand a particular project in terms of a broader 
project, Sartre tells us, "is the interpretation of a factual 
connection and not the apprehension of a necessity."155
There are also instances, Sartre notes, where the original 
project is compatible with various options of detail in an 
action which differ from each other but remain within the 
bounds of the project. For example, he says, the reluctant 
hiker could, within the bounds of his original project, 
either stop at the side of the road or, alternatively, 
abandon the hike by dropping in to the inn a little further 
on.156 Sartre, borrowing from the Stoics, terms these 
options "indifférents."157 Either option will express the 
original project and it is up to the person to decide which 
it will be. "In relation to these indifférents," Sartre 
declares, "our freedom is entire and unconditioned."158
On Sartre's view, of course, it is always possible for the 
individual to cause an instant to arise by overturning the 
original project and choosing another. An existential 
psychoanalytic investigation, then, has to be flexible so as 
to allow for the individual's own peculiar way of expressing 
his or her original project and also for "instantaneous" 
aspects of change. Under existential psychoanalytic 
investigation, then, we do not see the individual as just any
Page - 191
individual who is possessed of certain random psychological 
givens, e.g. "ambition," which cause certain acts in keeping 
with these categories. We see the individual as choosing his 
or her own project of life and investigate why he or she 
chooses to express it in the particular way he or she does.
We trace how he or she maintains and develops the original 
project through the secondary projects or, alternatively, 
transforms it. We trace an individual personal journey 
whose route is the continual responsibility of the traveller 
in question.
In common with Freud, Sartre looks at the early stages of the 
journey in childhood. Following its Freudian counterpart, 
existential psychoanalysis searches for "the crucial event of 
infancy and the psychic crystallisation around this 
event."159 But for Sartre, this constitutes the coming into 
focus of a contingent choice rather than a solid complex and 
the subsequent course of the individual's life reflects this.
By his or her particular acts, we have heard, the individual 
develops his or her original project, maintaining it in this 
process or transforming it. These acts slip into the past 
and, as we noted earlier, some of them can be pin-pointed by 
us as important landmarks in our personal "life story" which 
we might say "made us what we are today. " But for Sartre, 
these past acts were our own responsibility in the first 
place and although the past cannot be undone it remains the 
responsibility of the human individual to commit the further 
acts that will confirm the past acts as landmarks or show 
them to be unimportant isolated aberrations. We decide the
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meaning of the past by our subsequent actions. For example, 
Sartre says, if I had a "mystic crisis" at the age of 
fifteen, it is up to me to decide by my future actions what 
its significance is in the course of my life. If I choose to 
remain unconverted then I leave it as a "pure accident of 
puberty. " If, on the other hand, I choose to be converted at 
the age of twenty or thirty then I can reassign it new 
meaning as the first sign of a future c o n v e r s i o n .160 "it is
I always I" who must decide how the course of my life 
develops.161
The course of any human individual's life, then, under 
Sartre's approach, is one in which that individual 
continually makes a free contingent choice of original 
project and similarly chooses the particular acts by which he 
or she expresses it. By his or her acts the individual can 
maintain and develop the project or radically alter it but 
there is no necessity at any point; it is always down to the 
free contingent choice of the person what is to happen. If 
the person does change his project, there is still an element 
of continuity in that the new choice does not mean a new 
existence totally separate from the person in his former 
choice. For the new choice is also the rejection of the old 
one so that the previous choice is part of the situation in 
relation to which the new one is made. The human individual 
in the course of his or her life is a mixture of constancy 
and changeability; as a unitary existent unfolding one 
personal life story, he or she expresses a broad primary 
project which becomes part of his or her situation in
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relation to which he or she will remain "true to form," 
develop, or change.
This continual freedom entails, for Sartre, that the meaning 
of an individual's life remains constantly open until it gets 
contingently and accidentally closed at the moment of 
death.162 The human individual writes his or her own script, 
improvising as he or she goes along. He or she is still 
writing it until the moment of death strikes, leaving the 
script stopped where it is. The story is over but the end is 
an arbitrary one. The person just so happened to have died 
at that point. Had the person lived on, there might have 
been further developments or changes. But an arbitrary end 
has been reached. The arbitrariness of the end is purely the 
corollary of the freedom of the individual. If the 
individual freely shapes his or her own life, the final shape 
left after death is only final by dint of the contingent 
event of death. It was not a pre-destined fate ; the person 
freely chose it and could have gone on to make further 
choices.
We will return to the subject of death later but for the 
moment we can see that under Sartre's approach, the course of 
life of a human individual is one in which the latter freely 
chooses his or her own original project and freely expresses 
it in his or her own way at any given stage, maintaining and 
developing it or radically transforming it. The task of 
existential psychoanalysis is to find out the individual's 
original project and investigate why he or she expressed it 
in the particular ways he or she did.
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This investigation, Sartre stresses, must be carried out 
objectively - even if the person one is studying is 
o n e s e l f .163 Sartre distinguishes between the non-thetic 
self-consciousness I have which entails the total 
apprehension of oneself all at once without an outside focus 
and in which I can never be mistaken and reflective attempts 
at gaining objective knowledge of oneself where the 
possibility of error a r i s e s .164
Sartre notes that a psychoanalytic patient undergoing 
treatment can make such errors. Sartre takes the example of 
a man with an inferiority complex who, having reflected on 
his situation, wills to have his stuttering cured for the 
purpose of an improved social appearance. However, he does 
not in this way touch his original project of inferiority of 
which the stuttering was an expression. So the stuttering is 
cured but he then expresses his project with a new symptom. 
"Partial medications," says Sartre, "only succeed in 
displacing the manifestations."165
For Sartre, then, existential psychoanalysis requires 
something outside of our un-focused all-encompassing non- 
thetic self-consciousness but at the same time something 
deeper than a superficial reflection. What is required is an 
objective probing search for the original project. Even if 
the subject is oneself one must examine oneself in this 
objective way, as if one was studying another person.166
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In balance to this, however, Sartre also holds that the 
reflections of the subject (if access to them is possible) 
form part of the evidence to be studied and that the 
investigation should contribute to the subject's own self­
recognition of his or her own project of self. "It is 
existential psychoanalysis," Sartre says, "which claims the 
final intuition of the subject as d e c i s i v e ."167
(F) THE DESIRE TO BE IN-ITSELF-FQR-ITSELF
It has not been my intention here to enter into a detailed 
discussion of the whole complex field of psychiatry and 
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s .168 i have been looking at Sartre's 
existential psychoanalysis because it reveals another aspect 
of his concept of what the human being is. We had seen 
earlier that, for Sartre, the human being is a conscious 
bodily for-itself conscious of the world and of itself and 
which freely conducts its own acts. Now, after our look at 
existential psychoanalysis, we see that Sartre adds that the 
human being, in the very same process, makes his or her own 
individual choice of his or way of life in the world and is 
responsible for the development of his or her own "life 
story" on this basis.
However, we cannot leave our consideration of Sartre's 
existential psychoanalysis here. For there is another aspect 
of it which is of crucial importance in his view of what the 
human being is. Sartre does not simply leave us to get on 
with investigating the original choices of individuals. 
Although he denies that there is any "human nature" in the 
sense of a pre-determined blueprint which we slavishly
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follow, he nevertheless places the original choice of any 
individual within a common theoretical framework regarding 
what the choice at a deep level means for us. This framework 
is central to Sartre's interpretation of human life so let us 
examine it now.
According to Sartre, the original project of every for-itself 
is fundamentally a desire "to be."169 in the previous 
chapter, we saw how, for Sartre, the existence of the for- 
itself is "like" an attempt of the in-itself to found itself. 
It is "as if" the solid being-in-itself which just happens to 
exist attempts to gain control of itself and escape its 
contingency by achieving consciousness of itself. It would 
then be a solid totality of being-in-itself but at the same 
time conscious of itself. Or in Sartre's terminology, it 
would be "in-itself-for-itself."170
However, we saw that, for Sartre, this totality is not 
achieved because the resultant for-itself, by being conscious 
of itself, separates itself from the in-itself as not being 
it. Under Sartre's analysis, as we discussed earlier, this 
has the consequence that the for-itself can never be 
identified with anything, not even its own self. Any 
activity I carry out, even my most cherished project, any 
desire or emotion of mine is not what I solidly am, the way a 
rock just is a rock. Everything the for-itself does is 
infected with negativity.
Sartre sees the original project in the context of this 
negative existence. He portrays the for-itself as
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fundamentally desiring solidity of being. However, it is as 
a negating consciousness or for-itself that it has this 
desire. It wishes to have the solidity of being of the in- 
itself in its existence as a for-itself. It wants in its 
turn to be "in-itself-for-itself, " to be a conscious existent 
which yet is totally complete and has solidity of being.
This is the ideal which, Sartre notes, religion normally 
attributes to "God."171 "[M]an," he declares, "fundamentally
is the desire to be G o d ."172 Our own original project or 
choice of way of life in the world - which we express in our 
particular activities - is, then, according to Sartre, our 
own way of reaching towards this goal.
Two questions immediately spring to mind on reading this.
The first question - to which Sartre turns straight away - 
is: after all he has been saying about freedom, has not
Sartre finally told against it by portraying the human being 
as following a pre-set nature, that of the desire to be 
G o d ? 1 7 3  Secondly, do we take it from Sartre's view of the 
fundamental project that the human condition is utterly 
futile, bleak and depressing? After all, he has said that 
the human being fundamentally is a project which is doomed to 
failure. The human being, he says, is a failed project of 
being God and he drives this point home quite mercilessly 
when he declares that "[m]an is a useless p a s s i o n . "174
By taking a closer look at how Sartre arrives at this view of 
the fundamental project, I hope to show that he is not 
positing a "human nature" but is saying something important
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about life as consciousness and that we do not necessarily 
have to see this in bleak terms.
First of all, in portraying the human being as fundamentally 
a project of being God, Sartre is not arbitrarily imposing 
some pet theory of human nature on all humanity, as if 
choosing from the outside some set formula which would then 
be applied to any human individual. Rather, this view of the 
human being arises from Sartre's investigation of human 
consciousness and points out what is, for him, an integral 
aspect of what it is to be a conscious existent.
We heard earlier how Sartre argues that a pure consciousness 
on its own would not be possible since it would have nothing 
to be conscious of. The world, he says, is a realm of 
independent being-in-itself as it appears through our 
consciousness of it and the for-itself is conscious by being 
conscious of itself as not being this in-itself. For Sartre, 
then, that the fundamental project of the human being is 
concerned with "being" flows from human existence itself. 
Since the human being as a conscious for-itself is 
fundamentally a (negative) relation to being, his or her 
original project is fundamentally a concern for this 
relation. Hence Sartre's statement that "the original 
project of a for-itself can aim only at its b e i n g ."175
For Sartre, as we have heard, what makes the for-itself a 
conscious experiencing existent is its negating of being-in- 
itself as that which it is not. Integral to the for-itself's 
"not being" the in-itself is that it is not "like" the in-
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itself, i.e. it has a different mode of existence. Being-in- 
itself, according to Sartre, as we have heard, simply is what 
it is. It simply exists solidly and in anonymity as what it 
is. The for-itself, in contrast, cannot have a solid 
existence, it can never fully be what it is, not even its own 
self. The for-itself is "for-itself," is a conscious 
experiencing existent, by being conscious of itself at the 
same time as and through being conscious of itself as not 
being the in-itself. Concomitantly, it is conscious of not 
being anything in the mode of the in-itself. Since it 
achieves consciousness by and through separating itself off 
from the in-itself, neither can it be solidly identified with 
any of its own activities or characteristics.
So far, then, Sartre has put forward two main points: that
the for-itself is such by not being being-in-itself and that 
this entails not being like being-in-itself. However, there 
is a third position we can draw from Sartre's position and 
this takes us to the heart of the matter. This is that the 
for-itself accomplishes this negation through a continual 
desire to be in the mode of the in-itself and through the 
continual realization of its failure to achieve this goal.
The for-itself is conscious of its particular projects and 
activities in ideal form. It has to be consciousness of 
something, so it is not first of all a reflective knowledge 
that it is a negation of its own projects. Rather, the for- 
itself puts forward its particular project as what it what it 
wants "to be" in full solid form. Let us suppose, for 
example, that I decide to spend an afternoon studying. I
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want to be in ideal form a person who is studying, as if 
studying were my total nature. However,when I actually do 
the studying, I find it just cannot match up to the ideal.
At first, I find difficulty getting focused on the subject 
matter and I get distracted. Then I discipline myself to 
concentrate and I study. I succeed in getting a piece of 
work done but yet my studying just did not match up to the 
ideal. It was an effort I sustained, it was not something I 
could be solidly identified with. It was not my total being.
According to Sartre's understanding, this type of experience 
is repeated continually in human life. Feelings, ambitions 
achieved, even something as simple as drinking a glass of 
water to quench one's thirst,176 never fully match up to the 
ideal. Sartre terms this experience "ontological 
disillusion."177 i do what I wanted to do, I achieve the 
goal I set out to achieve but I ask myself "is it only 
this?"178 Something still feels missing.
For Sartre, this type of experience is a concrete particular 
expression of what we heard him describe as the for-itself's 
desire to be "in-itself-for-itself," to remain a conscious 
existent yet achieve solidity of being. This is Sartre's 
ontological description of the endless human quest for "self- 
fulfilment" or to "find oneself." The for-itself wants to be 
"complete." It wants to be its character, carry out its 
activities, feel and think as a grand complete totality. 
However, as we heard Sartre say earlier, to achieve this 
state of being in-itself-for-itself is impossible. To 
achieve completeness, to achieve the "in-itself" part of the
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equation would be to cancel out the "for-itself" part. 
Consciousness, for Sartre, depends on negation and 
incompleteness. Once the for-itself became in-itself, once 
it had solid being, it would no longer be a negation of being 
or a consciousness to be able to appreciate its completeness. 
It would be a mute plenitude of being, plain "in-itself" 
rather than "in-itself-for-itself." Yet the for-itself 
continually strives for the latter and is continually 
thwarted. This is the Sartrean version of the "unhappy 
consciousness." The human being, says Sartre, "is by nature 
an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing 
its unhappy state."179 The idea of God is a projection 
outside the world of an existent which has achieved the
impossible completeness.180
However, according to Sartre, it is through striving for the 
in-itself-for-itself and realizing its failure to achieve 
this that the for-itself is a conscious existent conscious of 
itself as not being anything that it is conscious of, even 
its own projects. It is by being conscious of myself as 
studying but yet feeling that I am not matching up to the 
ideal of a studying being that I can have the experience of 
studying rather than be an automaton going through the 
motions. The for-itself is conscious by negating the in- 
itself as that which it is not and as that from which it has 
a different mode of existence. And it has a different mode 
of existence precisely through its continual realization that 
it has failed to be in the mode of the in-itself, to be in- 
itself-for-itself. Or in Sartre's own words:
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"The for-itself in its being is failure 
... this failure is its very being, but 
it has meaning only if the for-itself 
apprehends itself as failure in the 
presence of the being which it has failed 
to be ..."181
When we look at it this way, Sartre is not imposing from the 
outside a set nature on humanity but, rather, explaining the 
fundamentals of how consciousness is possible and how it 
operates. Each human individual lives this "structure of 
existence," if we can call it that, in his or her own way 
with his or her own particular desires and choice of way of 
life which give expression to the abstract notion that the 
human being is an attempt to be in-itself-for-itself. In 
Sartre’s terminology, he is setting out the general "truth" 
about the human type of existence, "freedom," rather than a 
traditional theory of human nature.182 He has set out in 
general terms what human existence as free consciousness is 
like but it is from individuals freely carrying on with their 
own projects that this generality can be extracted. Sartre, 
then, is not telling against freedom but simply exploring 
what it is.
One might still feel, however, that we could continue to 
insist that Sartre is telling against the freedom he attempts 
to attribute to us. For, the objection could be made, the 
human being's ability to freely act, under Sartre's analysis, 
presupposes a prior determinism, that he or she is a deluded 
attempt to become in-itself-for-itself.
I do not believe that this objection is justified. Sartre is 
again, I believe, putting forward a balanced position which
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fits in with human experience. What Sartre terms the "desire 
to be in-itself-for-itself" should be easily recognized by 
most people as something we are well aware of from our own 
experience: the normal human striving for self-fulfilment or 
happiness. Most people will also readily recognize the 
experience of "ontological disillusionment" that Sartre 
speaks of. We achieve goals we have set ourselves in our 
project of self-fulfilment but still cannot feel totally 
satisfied and complete. Even when one achieves a cherished 
goal and is ecstatic about it, one still cannot help feeling 
that slight air of detachment from the situation. One then 
has to go on living and pursuing one's next projects.
Sartre conceptualizes this situation as the for-itself 
striving to be in-itself-for-itself but always coming up 
against the fact that it is still simply for-itself. I do 
not believe that this is tantamount to Sartre setting out his 
own version of a prior determinism. He is, rather, after a 
study grounded in human experience, identifying an aspect of 
how consciousness operates. Just as we cannot be conscious 
without the independent world of outside being to relate to, 
neither can we be conscious of ourselves without being aware 
that we are not completely identified and at rest with the 
ideal self we projected becoming.
An important point here, also, is that Sartre regards the 
attempt to become in-itself-for-itself as a self-delusion 
rather than a plain delusion. In the conclusion to BN Sartre 
states that, through existential psychoanalysis, we can come 
to explicit knowledge of our quest for the in-itself-for-
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itself.183 Having reached that stage, Sartre then raises the 
prospect of an individual renouncing the ideal of in-itself- 
for-itself and placing value in freedom for its own sake.184 
Under such an attitude, the for-itself would still in its 
various projects see before himself or herself their ideal in 
the in-itself-for-itself but freely accept that the ideal 
would never be attained. He or she would place value in this 
"failure" that allowed him or her to remain a free conscious 
human being and freely accept the responsibility of living 
this situation and carrying on with his or her projects.185
The idea that we have the ability to struggle with the desire 
to be in-itself-for-itself and that we can attempt in some 
way to overcome it is itself a demonstration that Sartre is 
not proceeding along his own deterministic lines. However, 
paradoxically, this issue does show a tension in Sartre's 
thought. On the one hand, Sartre believes that we are free 
and that any attempts to avoid our freedom or seek refuge in 
a deluded attempt to reach ideal completion are themselves 
free actions of the for-itself freely putting itself in bad 
faith. On the other hand, Sartre portrays the human being 
acting spontaneously and non-thetically in this bad faith and 
having to work at seeing through it and overcoming it. We 
have seen that he even sees the spontaneous consciousness of 
a project in ideal form as an aspect of how consciousness 
operates.
However, I would argue that this is a tension which does not 
require to be resolved. It is a tension which reflects human 
experience and is part of Sartre's balanced approach to the
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human being. Sartre is not saying that the human being is a 
pure intellectual force, reflectively aware of itself at all 
times and deliberately planning its every move. What he is 
saying is that the human being is not the kind of entity that 
can be studied in simple cause and effect terms. The human 
being is an integrated conscious bodily existent. In a 
spontaneous, non-reflective yet conscious fashion, every 
human being has his or her own approach to life and self- 
fulfilment. But simply because the human being is such an 
experiencing and striving existent, we can never reach total 
self-fulfilment. In experiencing a situation rather than 
being submerged in it, we are always subject to that element 
of detachment which prevents us from being totally complete 
like a statue or a character in a story. This aspect of our 
experience is something we are aware of all at once without 
reflection as we get on with living. But we also have the 
ability to stop and reflect on it and in doing so we can 
place value in our failure ever to reach total completion and 
the freedom that this entails.
Now we can turn to the question of whether Sartre ' s picture 
of the for-itself as a failed attempt to be God means that 
his view of the human situation is "bleak." As I have said, 
Sartre's philosophy is about exploring what the human type of 
existence, freedom, is like. Sartre has concluded that the 
human being contingently exists as the negation of the 
contingent being-in-itself and in this way exists as a free 
conscious for-itself. Sartre has simply explored what it is 
like to live as a freedom. There is then in his philosophy 
no commandment carved in stone to guarantee either pessimism
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or optimism about human life. If we keep in line with what 
Sartre has said about how one chooses one's way of life or, 
loosely, "personality," then we must say that in the Sartrean 
scheme it is up to the individual human being to choose a 
pessimistic, optimistic or other attitude.
One could look at life from the angle of its deficiencies, 
feeling depressed that one can never reach completeness and 
that one will eventually die. Or one could be glad to be 
alive in the first place and relish the responsibility of 
deciding on one's own projects. It is up to the individual 
to take his or her own perspective, though for Sartre, of 
course, to shelter behind either would be self-delusion or 
bad faith and still fail to result in completeness. There is 
nothing in Sartre's philosophy to compel us to either view.
What we can say, I believe is that Sartre personally does not 
intend to advocate a bleak attitude. His notion of the human 
being as a failure to be God is placed within the context of 
allowing human freedom to be possible. With his view that we 
can never reach total completeness and always feel an element 
of dissatisfaction, Sartre is not a wild eyed optimist in a 
state of continual happy delirium. But neither is he 
suicidal! The constant dissatisfaction is again an aspect of 
freedom and, as I said earlier, Sartre holds also that we can 
reach self-knowledge about our type of existence. The 
constant dissatisfaction is again an aspect of freedom and, 
as I said earlier, Sartre holds also that we can reach self- 
knowledge about our type of existence, place value on it and 
live freely on this basis.
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2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE FOR-ITSELF
Now that we have examined what the life of the free for- 
itself is like, we can, as I promised earlier, consider the 
question of what significance should be attached to the 
freedom Sartre attributes to the human being. In my view, 
this freedom is of immense significance. From reflecting on 
human experience, Sartre has highlighted the freedom which is 
the foundation which allows us to have a meaningful life in 
the first place. The freedom Sartre attributes to us is the 
original and very basic freedom of not being trapped as a 
mere thing submerged in the indifferent being-in-itself. It 
is the freedom of being a conscious existent who, in relation 
to the given world, must carry out his or her own projects.
However, there are two main areas I wish to explore of 
possible concern regarding the significance of Sartrean 
freedom. The first relates to Sartre's view of death (which 
we discussed briefly earlier) and the effect this could have 
on the level of significance we attach to Sartrean freedom. 
The second relates to the human being's place within wider 
society and what it means for the significance of Sartrean 
freedom. Let us begin with the first area.
I have throughout been talking of Sartre's philosophy as 
placing the human being in a "realm of meaning" in that he or 
she is not seen as a mere thing but as a for-itself who is 
conscious of things or for whom things have meaning.
However, Sartre states that death robs an individual's life
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of all meaning and renders it absurd. If that is so, does 
that not leave Sartrean "freedom" with no significance 
whatsoever?
If we have a proper understanding of Sartre's view of death 
then, I believe, we do not reach such a conclusion. Sartre 
is here referring to "meaning" in a very specific sense. He 
is talking of meaning in the sense in which we talk of the 
meaning of a tune or a book.186 The composer or author 
intentionally produces a piece of work. The work has its 
structure. It has a deliberately produced beginning and is 
brought to a planned end. The result is a complete work with 
an external "justification" in a sense, from its creator.
Human life, on the other hand, according to Sartre, has no 
such prior justification. We just happen to be born and we 
just happen to die. We did not ask to be born, we just find 
ourselves in existence. Similarly, our death is a contingent 
event. It is not like the last chapter of a novel or the 
last note of a melody which are intended to complete a piece 
of work, giving it a "proper ending." We die, says Sartre, 
"in the bargain."187 Sartre is here being quite logical. He 
does not go through the pretence of making a virtue out of a 
necessity. Human life without death would still be 
finite.188 Our actions would still become past and 
unalterable. Death is contingent. It just so happens that 
human beings die. There is no mystical reason for death as 
the necessary means to "complete" our life. Death simply 
cuts off one's life arbitrarily at that point, in contrast 
with the last note of a melody intended to complete the work.
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It is in that sense, for Sartre, that death makes life 
meaningless. One’s life eventually meets the accident of 
death and is cut off where it is. If, then, for example, a 
man ends his life as a drunk then being a drunk is the 
arbitrary end of the course of his life. Had he lived 
longer, he may have continued the same way or reformed; we 
will never know. His life has just come to an absurd end. 
There was no prior script giving him the character of a drunk 
and supplying him with a final drunk's death scene.
Life, then, for Sartre, is meaningless in the specific sense 
that it has no prior "destiny" to allow us to feel that our 
life can become a neatly completed story with a necessary 
end. We just happen to die, leaving our life rudely cut off 
and showing ragged edges. However, the meaninglessness of 
death is not something we will ever actively experience for 
ourselves. The moment one is dead, one is not there to 
experience it. While we live we continue with the 
responsibility of giving our own meaning to our life, however 
contingent and non-definitive that meaning is.
The ultimate meaninglessness of life is again, for Sartre, 
part of what being free entails. Sartre holds that if God 
existed, created us and could choose the moment of our 
demise, then that would give him the power to determine an 
ultimate meaning of our lives. Sartre illustrates the point 
by recounting the story of two brothers who appear at the 
divine tribunal on the day of judgement. The first asks God 
why he made him die so young. God replies that had he lived
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longer he would have committed a crime like his brother. The 
other brother then asks God why he made him die so o l d . 189
We might then ask if normal incidental death does not 
similarly leave us with a given meaning to our life (e.g. in 
the case of the man we considered earlier, he was a drunk) 
and just as surely deprive our freedom of significance. My 
answer would be "no." Incidental death does not provide 
meaning as in a tune or a book but simply ends life at that 
point without any particular "sense" to it or, in Sartre's 
terminology, " a b s u r d l y ."190 This leaves it the 
responsibility of the individual for-itself at all times to 
make its own sense out of his or her life, with none provided 
at the outset and none the for-itself creates allowed to 
become a necessary definitive one beneath which shelter could 
be found.
Let us now consider the second area of concern. I spoke 
above of Sartrean freedom as the freedom of "not being 
trapped as a mere thing submerged in the indifferent being- 
in-itself" and of "being a conscious existent who, in 
relation to the given world, must carry out his or her own 
projects." What is distinctive about Sartre's position here 
is his identification of freedom with consciousness. Much 
hinges on this identification but I believe it can be shown 
that a strong case can be put forward to justify it.
I discussed in the first chapter how the human being - at the 
same time as existing as a physical body in the physical 
world - has the feeling of being an "experiencing centre."
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As an experiencing centre, the things and events of the world 
"mean" something to me and I engage in meaningful thoughts, 
feelings and actions in relation to them. It has been my 
argument that this conscious experience is as much part of 
the evidence to be considered as is the physicality of the 
human being. If we view our consciousness as being identical 
with or being "in reality only" a complicated physical 
process, we paradoxically render the very statement of that 
view reduced to a purely physical happening. There are only 
physical happenings and no experiencing centre to lift them 
out of anonymity. Yet in the face of this theoretical 
consequence, we still have the evidence of our conscious 
experience.
I have argued that it is therefore better to accept 
consciousness as such rather than to view it as being 
explained away as an illusion behind which lies the reality 
of a different process. Sartre's model allows us to do 
precisely that. It is important to point out here - in 
contrast, perhaps, to the popular image of Sartre - that his 
position is a very considered and balanced one. He neither 
implausibly posits a new spiritual entity inhabiting the body 
nor does he devalue our conscious experience by identifying 
it with a physical process. His concept of the human being 
as a "for-itself," a conscious existent "living" the body or 
a "body-for-itself" entails a view of consciousness as 
arising from the body but in so arising existing as 
consciousness. It is to say that we must take a holistic 
approach to the human being based on our unified experience 
as integrated conscious physical existants.
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Sartre's balanced holistic approach, then, does not, in my 
view, have to entail a disregard for discoveries in other 
academic fields, e.g. those of neurology in finding out more 
details of how the brain works or those of psychology in 
studying how thought processes work. But it does entail that 
these discoveries have to be seen as showing us some of the 
detail of how consciousness is possible, rather than 
debunking the evidence of our own conscious experience.
I have put a lot of stress on what I see as the balance in 
Sartre's position. Sartre sees the human being as being 
conscious as such but primarily in non-thetic mode and in the 
process of living as a bodily existent in the physical world. 
However, the question could then be asked: why, with all
these caveats thrown into the balance, does Sartre identify 
consciousness with "freedom"? Sartre fully accepts that 
consciousness arises as an aspect of the biological human 
being in the physical world and that the world is such that 
we cannot always achieve what we want. Has he not, then, 
overstated his case by identifying consciousness with 
freedom?
I do not believe so. Not to be a thing engulfed in the 
natural world but to be a centre of experience of the world 
can, I believe, appropriately be described as a form of 
freedom. In being conscious, I am aware of myself 
experiencing the world in my own right. If we accept that 
experience as such then this - whatever the conditions that 
had to be in place for such experience to arise - is a break
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in the normal causal chain of physical happenings. It is a 
freedom from being engulfed in the physical world as an 
anonymous thing. Such a basic freedom is the prerequisite 
for us to be able to give any meaning to the term in the 
first place or indeed give meaning to anything. Also, 
specific situations of empirical "freedom" or "non-freedom" 
can only have meaning on the supposition of this more basic 
freedom. E.g. it is only in relation to a conscious 
experiencing centre that oppression or freedom from 
oppression can have any meaning. Things simply "happen to" a 
determined physical object: the concepts of freedom or
oppression simply do not apply to it.
If we accept the idea of the human being as an experiencing 
centre, a qualitatively different type of existent from 
objects in the natural world, then we cannot at the same time 
view the human being as emitting responses determined by 
psychological or social factors or factors of any other type. 
This would again be positing one happening causing another 
happening and no centre of experience consciously feeling, 
thinking and acting etc.
But perhaps I am being unfair here. I would concede that it 
is logically conceivable that we have the experience of our 
feelings, thoughts and actions etc. as ours but that this 
experience is giving us a false impression behind which the 
truth is that my thoughts, feelings and actions are the 
result of a determined psychological or sociological process. 
However, such a theory would be a very unwieldy one proposing 
that our thoughts, feelings and actions etc. are the results
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of a deterministic process but also that for some strange 
reason we have a consciousness of them but one which gives us 
the illusory experience of being responsible for them.
This would be a very "uneconomic" theory leaving the 
"experience" piece of the puzzle in an ill-fitting position. 
In the experience of thinking or acting, I feel that it is me 
who is creatively engaging in the process. And I can very 
often feel trouble or anguish in deciding what to do. Even a 
deep emotional feeling is mine, something I do not 
deliberately set out like an intellectual proposition but 
something that comes from me and my deep concerns.
Even a "softer" determinist theory, then, allowing for 
consciousness as such but one which is deluded that it is 
creative, has the disadvantage of jarring with our experience 
and leaving the role of that experience unexplained. And 
despite it, we go on with the experience of actively living 
as creative rather than determined existents.
It would seem to me, then, that it is preferable to take, 
like Sartre, a holistic approach to the human being. This 
does not mean that psychology cannot uncover generalities 
about how humans behave or that sociology cannot investigate 
the structures of society under which human beings live. But 
it does mean that the relationship between the human being 
and psychological generalities or social structures is of a 
different mode from that of the kind of relationships to be 
found in the realm of the physical sciences.
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So I believe that Sartre's notion of the original freedom of 
being a conscious existent rather than being a thing 
submerged in the world highlights an important, indeed the 
fundamental, aspect of human experience and provides the best 
theoretical way of dealing with it. This is a significant 
freedom. It is the freedom from being an automaton, the 
freedom of being a conscious existent who experiences the 
world and who in response forms its own desires, projects, 
feelings and so on. This is not total freedom to achieve 
whatever we want but it is the freedom without which we could 
not be meaningfully said to want anything. Without this 
freedom, our being blocked in our actions would be of the 
same order as one snooker ball being blocked in its path by 
another.
However, even if we accept the Sartrean scheme, it has to be 
pointed out that there are issues to be considered which 
could be said in a sense to limit the significance of the 
fundamental freedom Sartre attributes to us. We have seen 
that Sartre views the human being as conscious primarily in 
non-reflective mode. It is in this mode that the original 
choice is said to be made. We also saw earlier that in 
searching for the original choice, Sartre looks for the 
crucial event of infancy and the psychic crystallisation 
around that event. Sartre, then, does not see the human 
being as mechanistically caused to do things by outside 
events but he is accepting that one's "personality," if we 
can call it that, is not something we can control at will.
It is a non-reflectively conscious formation of a profound 
project of one's life. But if this project is non-reflective
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and if it begins in infancy, then this places our freedom of 
original choice in a context of particular limitations in the 
sense that we are saddled with a given "input" in relation to 
which to make a choice. At a tender age when we are not at 
the height of our rational powers, we find ourselves, without 
having had any choice in the matter, in the middle of a 
family which has its own particular characteristics and 
problems, and in the middle of a given social and historical 
context.
Let us take for example the case of a boy born into a problem 
family and who has suffered abuse from an early age. Coping 
with abuse is going to be a central part of that child's life 
and would obviously be something he would have to deal with 
in forming his original project. He did not choose to be 
born into those circumstances but they will remain with him 
forever. Even if he eventually gets out of the situation of 
abuse, learns to cope with his past and moves on to new 
projects, that unchosen situation is with him forever as part 
of where he comes from, something he has to deal with in one 
way or another.
As a further example, let us take the case of a woman slave 
in ancient Rome who is compelled to live a life of servitude 
to her noble master. She has few rights and opportunities, 
will never get an education and so on. She has to make her 
choices and conduct her projects within this restricted 
context.
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These points do not in themselves, I believe, amount to a 
justifiable criticism of Sartre's approach, though he does, 
in my view, fail - at least within the pages of BN - to 
properly pursue the social dimension of humanity. Let us 
consider first why the evidence of particular constraining 
social circumstances does not of itself undermine Sartre's 
approach and we will then look at the further direction in 
which I believe Sartre would need to go in order to 
adequately cope with the social dimension.
Sartre, in my view, could fully accept our two examples 
without contradicting his position. He would quite readily 
accept that the abused child and the woman slave had lived 
through family and social circumstances which as a matter of 
empirical fact - and without them having had any choice in 
the matter - left them with a traumatic emotional situation 
to deal with and materially restricted their opportunities in 
the world.
Sartre can accept this without contradiction because, as I 
have pointed out, his is a balanced position. The freedom he 
speaks of is not that of some divine being which can create 
its own universe to its own specifications but that of an 
integrated conscious bodily existent who just happens to be 
born into the world with the circumstances prevailing at the 
time but who experiences the world rather than is determined 
by it. Facticity entails that we have to respond to the world 
we are in, not the world we would like to be in and the 
response we give - being that of an integrated conscious 
bodily existent who naturally operates primarily in a
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spontaneous rather than a reflective manner - will not 
necessarily bring us happiness.
The importance of Sartre's balance becomes apparent when we 
look at our two examples. It is only on the assumption that 
the child and the woman slave are experiencing existents in 
their own right that we can feel scandalized by their plight. 
If the child and the woman are only complicated "things" then 
such feelings have no application.
Mindful of this, we could opt to simply use a different 
phraseology, rather than taking a Sartrean approach. We 
could say that the child and the woman are potentially useful 
parts of society and that their placings are inappropriate. 
Society could be viewed - as in some functionalist sociology 
- as a wider complicated "thing" and we could view the 
society which corrected such faults as being similar to those 
types of computerised machinery which monitor and correct 
their own faults.
However, we human beings do feel ourselves to be experiencing 
existents and we dQ spontaneously feel empathy with the 
oppressed person as an experiencing existent having his or 
her empirical freedom constrained. Alternative views, like 
the one I just outlined, clash with our experience and are 
thus "uneconomic." It is part of human experience that we 
feel ourselves to be experiencing existents and that we treat 
other human beings as being experiencing existents. It is 
only on the basis of that fundamental freedom of being an 
experiencing existent that the constraints of society have
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any meaning. This is something which Karl Marx - one who 
certainly appreciated the constraints of society upon the 
individual - recognized early on when he stated in his 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that man’s creative 
nature or "species-being" was "alienated" by the drudgery of 
wage labour in industrial society.191 it was only in the 
light of their creative species-being that Marx could 
identify social conditions that alienated human beings.
Identifying particular sets of materially constraining 
circumstances under which human beings live or have lived 
does not of itself, then, undermine Sartre's approach. 
However, consideration of the social dimension of humanity 
leads me to criticize Sartre not so much for what he has done 
but for what he has not done.
The examples I quoted of the abused child and the woman slave 
make us aware of the fact that we come to life in a world 
where other human beings have passed what we could call 
"public meanings" to us; ready-made meaningful structures 
such as our family, the political structures of the country 
in which we live, nationality, language and even mundane 
things like traffic regulations and buildings with pre­
determined uses such as libraries. We touched on this issue 
earlier in this chapter when we heard Sartre say that these 
things are part of facticity and have to be transcended by 
us. Like the crag which is only known as such through the 
human being's attempt to climb it, language, for example, has 
to be used by him or her for his or her ends of expression.
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However, the problem is that Sartre at this stage - at any 
rate in so far as what he has put down on paper in BN - does 
not offer any consideration of how it is that human beings 
can create public meanings and how they relate to the pre­
existing public meanings they are born into. This is a more 
complex issue than simply transcending the given as in 
Sartre's example of the crag since we are talking of givens 
which are themselves human products.
For example, Sartre states that war is my war by my attitude 
towards it and that if I accept the call-up rather than 
resist, even if the cost would be death, then I take 
responsibility for that w a r .192 Sartre, I believe, is 
correct in pointing out to us our experience as conscious 
human beings for whom things mean something and in relation 
to which we form our own ends. Without our being 
experiencing beings in this way, war would simply be the 
inconsequential destruction of some things by others. In 
fact, it would not even attain that description since the 
whole process would be engulfed in the undifferentiation of 
the in-itself.
Sartre is correct, then, to say that a war has to be known 
through my attitude towards it and ends in relation to it and 
that this gives me a personal responsibility. We could not 
therefore see the human being as a thing propelled along by 
"history" since this would leave us with a history engulfed 
in the undifferentiation of the in-itself or no history at 
all. At the same time, however, we could say to Sartre that 
we need also to learn how it is that human beings as a
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collective can end up with a public meaning such as a war and 
how and to what extent they can use their freedom to effect 
change at that level. There is a gap in the BN coverage of
human life in that we need also to study this social
dimension of humanity which entails that human beings in 
their inter-relations create public meanings which then 
become given features of the background in which they live.
This social aspect of the human being is of such major
importance that, in our study of what the human being is, we 
cannot simply gloss over it by treating public meanings in 
the same way as Sartre views the crag.
In this light, we might want to re-examine some of the 
examples Sartre has used earlier such as that of the waiter 
who is in bad faith in trying to be a waiter. What if he 
personally detests the occupation of waiter but does the job 
and plays the part to the full because he is required to do 
so by his employer and needs the money to support himself and 
his family? It is still the waiter who gives life to his 
role and who makes the economic necessity such by his 
interest in supporting himself and his family but, at the 
same time, this type of situation alerts us to an issue not 
simply of one person taking up his or her own attitude to a 
given - since, unlike the crag, society and economics etc. 
are human products - but of how human beings in their 
interaction produce such public meanings which they then have 
to act in relation to.
A proper study of the human being, then, requires a more 
detailed consideration of the social dimension. At the same
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time, the human being must not be erased from the equation by 
a deterministic view of how society affects us. We are thus 
pointed in the direction of maintaining but extending 
Sartre's holistic approach. This would involve retaining the 
idea of the human being as a free conscious bodily existent 
but trying to show how he or she remains so while operating 
in a social and historical context. This, in fact, is 
precisely what Sartre himself did in his later work. Search 
for a Method.193 This extension of Sartre's thought will be 
examined in the third part of this thesis. But for the 
moment, I believe we can see the importance of what Sartre 
has done up to this point in drawing from experience to 
present a picture of what the human being in a basic sense is 
- a unified conscious bodily existent - to give us the 
foundation from which to be able to study the human being in 
a meaningful way.
At the close of this chapter, we have been looking at the 
question of other people and we earlier heard Sartre talk of 
a general "truth" about humanity. This raises the question 
of how an individual for-itself can recognize another human 
being as a for-itself like himself or herself rather than as 
a determined machine since, after all, I do not feel the 
other person's experiencing.
If Sartre were unable to tackle this question, then what I 
have viewed as the foundation he has laid for the meaningful 
study of the human being would crumble since Sartre or the 
user of his philosophy could never know whether it really 
applied to humanity in general or only to himself or herself.
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It is to how Sartre deals with this question that we turn in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3; THE FOR-ITSELF AND OTHER PEOPLE
3.1 THE ISSUE OF OTHER PEOPLE
So far, I have been using Sartre's philosophy in an attempt 
to gain a picture of what the human being is which fits our 
experience and which is thus non-determinist. However, I 
could very well be asked the question, what do I mean by our 
experience? Anything I do or anything which happens to me is 
part of my experience - even my relations with "other 
people." Therefore, no matter how confident I am that X am a 
conscious bodily existent or for-itself, how can I be sure 
that the other people I come into contact with are likewise 
conscious? Perhaps they are determined in all they do, 
perhaps in their case the mind equals the physical central 
nervous system. What right do Sartre or the user of his 
philosophy have to generalize about "human experience"? If I 
cannot rise to this solipsistic challenge then the carpet is 
swept from under my feet in my enterprise of forming a non- 
determinist approach to the study of "the human being." 
Instead of "the human being" in general, I could end up in 
the frustrating position of having only myself to study.
Sartre does tackle this issue in his own distinctive way. He 
starts with the question of how one can be sure that other 
people are conscious like oneself and his answer leads him to 
another important facet of what the human being is. That is, 
he sees that the free conscious bodily human being or for- 
itself has another aspect of his or her self, that aspect 
which only other people can perceive. This is to say, in 
Sartre's terminology, that the for-itself has a "being-for- 
others." In consequence, the for-itself has to relate to
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these other people who have that privileged view on itself. 
This relating to other people, then, is also part of this new 
facet of the human being which has to be studied.
In keeping with the notion of "being-for-others," it is for 
we others to judge how successful Sartre has been in dealing 
with the issue of other people. In this regard, Sartre has 
often been harshly judged. In the previous chapter, I 
remarked that Sartre had not sufficiently dealt with the 
issue of wider society, of how human beings in their inter­
relations give rise to a wider society which then imposes 
human-made givens on the individual who then has to respond 
to them. (I shall further develop this point in this 
chapter.) I argued that Sartre had still given us a valuable 
insight into what the human being is and that this view of 
the human being could be preserved while extending outwards 
to take on board this issue of wider society. I looked 
forward to Sartre's later work. Search for a Methodl 
(hereafter referred to as SM) - in which he adopts a Marxist 
and more socially concerned outlook - as providing this 
extension.
In her introduction to SM, Hazel Barnes notes that critics 
from a Marxist outlook derided the for-itself of BN as 
existing in splendid isolation. "The individual 
consciousness," in Sartre's system, they thought, "was 
splendidly independent and alone."2 in Part 3, I attempt to 
show how in his later work Sartre preserves the outlook of 
freedom while extending his thought to take in the issue of 
wider society.
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However, I would argue that we should not see BN itself as 
devoid of any social context. In BN, the human being or for- 
itself is not gloriously alone. True, the for-itself cannot 
get out of its own experiencing and it has to freely conduct 
its own acts. And in so far as this free for-itself relates 
to other people, Sartre sees the relation as one primarily of 
conflict.
But we must be careful here. Sartre's concept of conflict 
with others presupposes a fundamental type of connection with 
others. Sartre does something distinctive and useful in that 
he examines human experience and tries to trace the roots of 
our relating to other people back to the beginnings of how 
one comes to relate to another person as. a conscious person 
like oneself in the first place. From this he then sees the 
human being as permanently having to deal with the fact of 
being related to other people whether he or she likes it or 
not. In some senses, then, Sartre's view in BN is in fact 
deeply social.
Sartre again takes a balanced approach in which he cannot 
accept any grandiose notion of a common consciousness 
encompassing a group of people - since at the end of the day 
I have access only to how X experience things - but in which 
he proceeds from the basis of our fundamental experience of 
other human beings as other conscious experiencing centres 
with their own view of us.
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Let us examine these issues in more detail now beginning, as 
logic dictates, with the question of how one can be sure in 
the first place that another human being is conscious like 
oneself.
3.2 THE EXPERIENCE OF ENCOUNTERING OTHER PEOPLE
Descartes, it could be argued, does not treat this issue in 
any really fundamental way. His "cogito" gives him certainty 
only of his own existence as a thinking thing. The certainty 
of the existence of other people (along with that of the 
external world) is only guaranteed through the "sleight of 
hand" exercise by which Descartes "proves" the existence of a 
non-deceptive G o d . 3 Sartre, in contrast, tackles this 
question by initially looking at our everyday experiences of 
other people and then trying to regress to the fundamental 
type of experience which, if I can put it this way, starts 
one off on the track of treating other people as conscious 
like oneself.
Sartre starts off with the simple experience of watching a 
man passing b y .4 in everyday life when one sees such a 
passer-by one views him as "infinitely probable" to be a 
conscious person like oneself. That is, I spontaneously 
regard him as a conscious human being. There is always the 
theoretical possibility that if I get close to him I will 
discover that he is in fact a mechanical robot or a scarecrow 
on wheels but if I meet him and see that he is a man, I will 
treat him as a conscious person.
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But what is the difference between viewing a human being as a
conscious existent and viewing him or her in the same way as
any other object? Sartre marks this out by using another
example, that of observing another man in the public park
through which I am strolling.5 At first I saw the park, now
I see another man in the park. These two objects, the park
and the man, are not, as I experience the situation, of the
same type. The park is a simple passive object seen by me
but I view the man, on the other hand, as having his own view
of the public park. He is not simply a passive object under
my gaze. He looks at the park and the objects in it from his
own vantage point. There is an appearance of the park to him
which I do not control. I look at him looking at the park.
Within this scene, the park in a sense "escapes" me in having
this appearance to another. The world "drains away" from me.
But it is an "internal leak" only, if I can call it that,
since I am the overall observer of the man looking at the
park. Or in Sartre's words:
"it appears that the world has a kind of 
drain hole in the middle of its being and 
that it is perpetually flowing off 
through this hole."6
Sartre considers carefully this type of experience where one 
encounters another human being as an object of our perception 
and where one spontaneously regards him or her as a conscious 
existent like oneself. Sartre reasons that if one's 
experience of other human beings was confined to that of 
encountering an object then it would only be by conjecture 
that one proposed that he or she was a conscious existent 
like oneself. But this is not the case in our experience.
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We spontaneously treat other people as other conscious 
existents rather than reflectively consider them so by 
conjecture. Therefore, Sartre reasons, there must be a more 
fundamental experience in which I encounter another human 
being as an object of my view but directly as the subject who 
views me as the object which is "infinitely probable" to be a 
conscious existent.
According to Sartre, we can readily identify from reflection 
on our everyday lives, a specific type of experience which 
gives one immediate certainty of the existence of another 
conscious existent. There are, he claims, "certain peculiar 
consciousnesses" which "bear indubitable witness to the 
cogito both of themselves and of the existence of the 
Other."7
The fundamental type of experience Sartre is referring to is
that of what he dramatically terms "the look."8 In this kind
of experience, I am going about my business when I suddenly 
realize that I am being looked at by another person. Sartre 
takes the example of spying on someone through a keyhole.9 
Moved by jealousy, I am bent over the keyhole and am 
surreptitiously observing the scene. I am not in a 
reflective mode, I am simply getting on with viewing the 
scene behind the door. But suddenly I hear footsteps. Still 
in non-reflective mode, I immediately with horror and shame 
realize that someone is looking at me.
In this type of experience, the other person is not an object
for me. Nor do I make a conjecture that he or she is
Page - 230
conscious like me. Still in my normal non-reflective mode, I 
spontaneously feel myself being looked at as an object by the 
other person. In Sartre's terminology, "I experience the 
distanceless presence of the Other to me."10
To convince us of this, Sartre asks us to consider that
experience of shame when we are caught, as in the keyhole
example, in a compromising position. I have been caught by
surprise so I have had no time to ready myself. I simply
suddenly realize that another person is looking at me.
Sartre notes that:
"Shame is an immediate shudder which runs 
through me from head to foot without any 
discursive preparation."H
Sartre points out that there are infinite varieties of the 
experience of the look. There does not even have to be a 
pair of eyes in my immediate vicinity for me to experience 
the look. When someone looks at me, his or her "look" goes 
in front of their eyes to mel2 in the sense that I do not 
specifically observe their eyes as objects. I am taken up in 
the experience of being looked at as an object. But even 
when I cannot see the organic eyes, I can still experience 
the look. Sartre gives the example of men crawling through 
the brush during a wartime attack who are attempting to avoid 
a "look" from a farmhouse outlined against the sky at the top 
of a hill.13
These experiences of the look which bear witness to the 
"cogito of the existence of the Other" are, for Sartre, what
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explain "that unshakeable resistance which common sense has 
always opposed to the solipsistic argument."14
An appeal to experience, then, is Sartre's basic way of 
dealing with the issue of the existence of other people. How 
adequate is this approach? First of all, I believe Sartre 
has helped clarify the issue by regressing to the original 
type of experience which is the foundation of treating other 
people as conscious like oneself. His description of the 
feeling of shame before another as an immediate shudder 
running through me is one which we can readily recognize from 
our experience. Sartre is at least correct in adequately 
reporting that in human experience there are occasions when 
one feels oneself viewed by others and it does seem logical 
to say that it is on this foundation that one spontaneously 
regards other human beings as conscious like oneself.
However, I would have to conclude that ultimately Sartre's 
appeal to experience cannot provide a logical 100% "proof" 
that the other human beings with whom one deals are conscious 
like oneself. It is always a theoretical possibility that 
the other human being I encounter has an "automated" nature 
such that he or she appears to act like an experiencing 
centre but is in fact only emitting a set response in 
accordance with a deterministic causal chain and is in no way 
conscious at all. As I can never get out of my own 
"experiencing" and can never actually feel the other person's 
experiencing, there is no way I can ever "prove" that another 
person is conscious like myself. My treating another person 
spontaneously as a conscious existent could in a sense be
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described as a spontaneous "conjecture in action." That is, 
my treating another person as a conscious existent entails, 
although as an integral aspect of my actions and not in 
reflective mode, a conjectural element. Dissolved in my 
actions is the judgement that the other person is a conscious 
existent like myself. And logically it is possible that this 
judgement is wrong.
However, Sartre himself states that a valid theory of the 
existence of "the Other," to use his general term, will not 
provide a "proof" but, rather, bring out our "pre-ontological 
comprehension" of the Other’s existence which we have within 
our own experience,15 as in the phenomenon of the look. As I 
interpret this, what Sartre is saying is that one can 
logically doubt that other people exist in the same conscious 
mode as oneself but that such a doubt is a purely academic 
one which one does not in one’s practical experience remotely 
entertain. In the light of that experience, I would conclude 
that it is a more "economical" theory to accept that other
people exist as conscious like oneself.
But Sartre also notes that there are in human experience
incidents in which we realize that we have made a mistake
about the presence of another conscious existent. "I can
indeed," Sartre says:
"believe that it is a man who is watching 
me in the half light and discover that it
is a trunk of a tree which I took for a
human being."16
Or, to take the keyhole example again, I may be peering
through the keyhole, hear a noise which I take to be a
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footstep and immediately feel the shudder of shame but then 
turn round and discover that I have made a mistake and no-one 
is there. It was a "false alarm."17 Sartre asks whether or 
not this type of experience debunks the "pre-ontological 
comprehension" of the existence of other conscious existents 
he was describing.
I believe Sartre’s answer here again provides some insightful 
reflections on human experience and also shows a useful 
social dimension. However, we also, in my view, have to be 
honest about the limits of such insights in that I do not 
believe Sartre can "prove" even that there is any other 
conscious existent.
Sartre’s answer, basically, is that any experience of the
look gives us the certainty, if not in every case of actually
having been looked at (since, as we have seen, there are
times when we are mistaken), but of at least the fact that
some other consciousness or consciousnesses exist for whom I
can be an object. What can be in doubt in any individual
case, according to Sartre, is only whether or not a
particular object is the occasion of my being looked at. If
I make a mistake, as in the case of the false alarm at the
keyhole, I am no less certain (than if I had discovered
someone there) that I have an aspect of my existence as seen
by others. Thus, even if I realize I am mistaken, I may
still feel embarrassed and ashamed. As Sartre puts it:
"The Other’s existence is so far from
being placed in doubt that this false
alarm can very well result in making me 
give up my enterprise. If, on the other
hand, I persevere in it, I shall feel my
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heart beat fast, and I shall detect the 
slightest noise, the slightest creaking 
of the stairs. Far from disappearing 
with my first alarm, the Other is present 
everywhere, below me, above me, in the 
neighbouring rooms, and I continue to 
feel profoundly my being-for-others. It 
is even possible that my shame may not 
disappear; it is my red face as I bend 
over the keyhole. I do not cease to 
experience my being-for-others..."18
If, then, on discovering a mistake and realizing that "the
Other is absent"19 or that no other conscious existent is
there, this is an absence which can only be so on the prior
ground of the ever possible presence to me (in the active
verb sense of "presence" we saw earlier) of any and all other
human beings. Thus Sartre declares that:
"it is in relation to every living man 
that every human reality is present or 
absent on the ground of an original 
presence...Being-for-others is a constant 
fact of my human reality, and I grasp it 
with its factual necessity in every 
thought, however slight, which I form 
concerning myself."20
Sartre, I believe, is correctly reflecting human experience 
when he says that even when I mistake some simple object for 
another conscious existent, I am still certain of the fact of 
other people in general for whom I can be a seen object. The 
case of the person who realizes he or she was mistaken but 
who still has a red face as he looks through the keyhole is a 
rather telling example.
However, Sartre's answer here is still restricted to an 
appeal to experience. The fact that one feels that one 
constantly has an aspect of oneself as seen by or capable of 
being seen by another conscious existent in no way "proves"
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that such another conscious existent exists. For Sartre, it 
is only because the Other-as-subject has looked at me as an 
object, and thus immediately given me certainty of another 
conscious existent, that I can treat other people 
spontaneously as other conscious existents. But it is 
logically possible that in every experience of the look, 
there is in fact no conscious other looking at me but a 
determined automaton simulating an experiencing centre. In 
such a scenario, even my general certainty of being looked at 
by others would be mistaken. The fact of my feeling my 
being-for-others can in no way prove that there is even one 
other conscious existent.
But again I would argue that the more economic theory is to 
accept - on the basis of my own experience of myself as a 
conscious existent and of encounters with other people I 
spontaneously regard as conscious like myself - that other 
human beings are indeed conscious like myself.
Sartre has introduced a useful social aspect to his thinking 
here in that he has drawn from our general certainty of the 
existence of others who can look at us the inference that 
each for-itself is socially situated in relation to all 
humanity. My cousin who is absent from me and is in Morocco 
is not thereby non-existent. His absence is a human relation 
based upon the fact that, despite the huge physical distance 
between us, I can be "present to" him, i.e. make him the 
object of my thoughts, or that he can be present to me in the 
same way. The distance between us, then, is an objective one 
in the world, although it depends on us for its relation to
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us. The route between myself and Morocco thus serves to
"situate" me in relation to my cousin. Sartre then adds that
this can be generalized. I am not only related to individual
people I know for;
"I am situated also as a European in 
relation to Asiatics, or to Negroes, as 
an old man in relation to the young, as a 
judge in relation to delinquents, as a 
bourgeois in relation to workers etc." 21
I have described Sartre's notion of the human being as in 
this way connected to the rest of humanity as a useful social 
element of his thought at the stage of BN. In Chapter Two, I 
stated how I thought Sartre did not pursue the issue of wider 
society far enough. Aspects of common society such as 
language, nationality etc. were treated by him as givens to 
be transcended by the individual for-itself towards its own 
goals. He did not pursue the issue of how individual human 
beings in their complex inter-relations give rise to common 
social "meanings" which then become the context in which the 
individual for-itselfs live. He did not show enough 
appreciation of the great prior weight of social context on 
the individual.
In SM, Sartre does deal with how individuals are part of a 
wider society in which one's individual actions in 
conjunction with those of others contribute to make up a 
society not controlled by any one of the individuals. He 
deals with how any individual is a conscious existent living 
his or her situation but at the same time is living in the 
particular the wider social situation. Sartre's notion in BN 
of how the for-itself is situated in relation to all humanity
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is far from this complex awareness of the social aspect of 
humanity but it does at least show that, even at the stage of 
BN, Sartre accepts that any individual is unavoidably 
connected to the rest of human society. This embryonic 
social context of BN makes all the more viable my approach of 
treating Sartre's later work as a more socially concerned 
extension and not a replacement of Sartre's earlier thought 
with which it can be integrated.
Indeed, one could argue that without some conception of human 
beings as conscious existents who can relate to each other, 
the concept of society implodes in on itself as an inert mass 
witnessed by no-one. Sartre's enterprise of reflecting on 
human experience and trying to reach the fundamentals of how 
we become aware of "other people" and come to relate to them 
is appropriate even from a context of a concern with wider 
society.
Let us return, then, to Sartre's regression to the 
fundamental experience of "the Other." I stated that Sartre 
views the experience of the look as making us aware of the 
distance-less presence of the Other. I also discussed how 
Sartre points out that the experience of the look makes one 
realize that one has an aspect of oneself as seen by other 
people or, in Sartre's terminology, a "being-for-others. "
Let us examine this being-for-others in a little more detail.
3.3 BEING FOR OTHER PEOPLE
In the phenomenon of the look, Sartre has told us, one 
experiences the immediate presence of another conscious
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existent. Sartre identifies three "terms" of this relation.
X experience myself as looked at by the other conscious 
existent.22 This experiencing one’s self as seen by another 
is, for Sartre, a distinct aspect of human experience 
introducing us to a new structure of our existence. When I 
was spying on someone through a keyhole, we saw earlier, I 
was concentrating on the task in hand of observing the scene. 
I was not reflecting on myself. But when someone looked at 
me, I immediately felt myself as looked at by another 
conscious existent. This entails, for Sartre, that, still in 
an unreflective mode, I become aware of my "self" as an 
object in the world seen by others.23 i am immediately aware 
of that aspect of myself as seen by the other person. And I 
recognize in my shame or pride that that seen object is me.
I am that "Ego" seen by the other person.24
In being seen in this way, I am totally alienated from myself
and the world. In the example of observing another man in
the public park, the world flowed away from me only into an
"internal leak" since I was the overall observer of the man
looking at the park. But in this case, the other person is
looking at me as an object in the world as only he or she can
see it from his or her perspective. My self and the world in
this case are outside my field of control for they are my
self and the world as seen by another. Here, then:
"the flight is without limit; it is lost 
externally; the world flows out of the 
world and I flow outside myself."25
The fact of having an aspect of oneself beyond one's control 
as seen by other people is what Sartre terms our "being-for-
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others." The nature of this "being" or aspect of myself is 
unpredictable. This is because it is other people, other 
free conscious existents, who determine it.26 it is entirely 
in the hands of the other experiencing person how he or she 
will "take me." In this sense, I am "enslaved" by other 
people.27 Yet I recognize that this being is me. I accept 
that how other people see me is the external aspect of 
myself.
From the perspective of the other person, I am this being as 
in an "in-itself" form. That is, I am viewed as a conscious 
existent or "transcendence" but unavoidably in object form 
since I am the object of the other consciousness. I am a 
transcendence which is transcended by another 
transcendence.28 This is what Sartre terms our "original 
fall."29 In having an aspect of myself seen in object form 
by others, I have fallen into an in-itself form of existence. 
As a for-itself I can never fully identify myself with 
anything. E.g. I cannot really grasp my "personality." I am 
an experiencing centre getting on with life. But other 
people can see me as having a nature.
This is another example of how the in-itself continually 
closes in on the for-itself. We saw in the last chapter how 
our actions in becoming past unalterable events become part 
of the in-itself. The for-itself becomes in-itself too in 
becoming viewed by others. But just as the for-itself leaves 
behind its past and continues to exist as for-itself, here 
too it is only for other people that I exist this way. I 
must continue to exist as for-itself.
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In looking at me in object form, the other person also 
alienates me from my own possibilities. In going about my 
normal business, I am, without having to reflect on them, 
aware of the possible actions I can take in relation to the 
objects of the world. E.g. I am aware of the possibility of 
hiding in the dark corner I see. However, other people see 
me, together with the probable actions I could take, in 
object form. They can treat me as an object to be surpassed 
by their possible actions. E.g. another person with a 
flashlight could search me out or even light up the corner 
before I get there.30 in my everyday unreflective mode, I am 
aware that other people can treat me as and my possible 
actions as an object which they can surpass towards their own 
intentions.
For Sartre, if it is the case that other people view me in 
object form, then the reverse also applies. When I observe 
other people, I observe them as objects. I still view them 
as conscious existents but in degraded form since I cannot 
experience their experiencing. When I see another person 
performing an action, it is the unified object of "a person 
acting in the world" that I see. But as distinct from the 
Behaviourist view, Sartre insists that there is a world of 
difference from the unavoidably objective perspective I have 
of other conscious existents and treating them as objects 
pure and simple. The Behaviourists, Sartre argues, forget 
that it is a transcendence-transcended we are dealing with.31 
Indeed, it is always possible that this other person who is
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an object of my view will turn the tables on me and make me 
an object of his v i e w .32
We have seen that Sartre places great importance on the human 
being's "being-for-others." We are unavoidably "for-others" 
and we are in this way connected to all humanity. However, 
there is a sense in which Sartre strictly limits the status 
of being-for-others.
First of all, Sartre stresses that "being-for-others" is not 
an ontological structure of the for-itself."33 That is, it 
is not essential to being a conscious existent that there be 
other conscious existents. It would be logically conceivable 
that a for-itself could exist which had never encountered 
another like itself and thus had no conception of having an 
aspect of itself for others. Such a for-itself would not be 
the human being but it is conceivable. It just so happens as 
a matter of fact that the human being exists in a world where 
other human beings exist. Our fundamental connection to 
other people who can look at us is dependent on the 
contingent fact of the existence of other people.
Secondly, I negate the Other as that which is not me.34 
This creates problems for Sartre in that he has already 
stated that when the Other looks at me as a subject, I cannot 
see him as an object. I feel his or her distanceless 
presence to me. If I look at the Other, he or she becomes my 
object and is lost as subject. Sartre argues that I 
indirectly negate the Other looking at me.35 i become aware 
of the Other through my sudden awareness of my self as looked
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at by that Other. The Other negates that self as that which 
he or she is not but I too negate it. I negate it in viewing 
it as my outside, not the self I am for me. This negation 
can then motivate me to turn the tables on the Other and view 
him or her as an object.
Sartre also considers the question of why there are other 
people.36 He has already said that it is a matter of 
contingent fact. But he now considers whether one can view 
oneself as united with other people in a grander totality 
comprising us all, as in the sense of the Hegelian Spirit.37 
Sartre, rightly in my view, does not allow for the completion 
of such a totality. He again inserts an "as if" clause. The 
existence of the for-itself, Sartre said earlier, arises "as 
if" in a failed attempt of the in-itself to found itself and 
reach the completeness of the in-itself-for-itself.
Reflection takes place "as if" in a second failed attempt at 
the in-itself-for-itself. Sartre says that in the case of 
being-for-others, everything happens "as if" in a failed 
attempt of the totality of for-itself to reach in-itself-for- 
itself by being able to get hold of itself as an outside 
object, splitting itself even further than in reflection.38 
This "attempt" fails in that the other for-itself is 
precisely that - another separate for-itself whose view of me 
as an object is not the way I experience myself for myself. 
The Other’s making an object of me, then, fails to deliver 
the totality of a for-itself founding its own being.
According to Sartre, as I and the Other both negate each 
other as not being each other, it simply is not possible for
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us to get outside the totality of the for-itself - Other 
relation to test the idea that this relation is part of an 
overall directing Spirit.39
I believe Sartre is correct in this judgement. One can only 
feel one's own experiencing and another conscious existent 
can only feel his or her own experiencing. Neither of us can 
reach out to any "super-consciousness" comprising us both (a 
concept which in any case creates new difficulties).
3.4 RELATING TO OTHER PEOPLE
Sartre next attempts to study some of the fundamental ways 
human beings relate to each other on the basis of his 
insights into being-for-others. Sartre has viewed the human 
being as fundamentally desiring to be complete or to be "in- 
itself-for-itself, " a state it is impossible to reach. For 
Sartre, the fact that other conscious existents have the 
objective, external view of oneself of which one is oneself 
incapable deeply affects the for-itself. The other conscious 
existent is in possession of that which, if I could get hold 
of it, would allow me to found myself or to be "in-itself- 
for-itself." The for-itself, in consequence, takes up 
various attitudes towards others^O in which it attempts to 
relate to another person in such a way as to take control of 
his or her view of itself to allow it the completion it 
seeks. Needles to say, these attempts continually fail.
The various types of attitude towards the Other break down 
into two main types:41 trying to use one's being an object 
in order to take control of his or her freedom, or turning
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the tables on the other person and making him or her an 
object in an attempt to symbolically take hold of the other 
person’s freedom through possessing him or her as an object. 
Each of these two attitudes fails and collapses into the 
other.
Sartre takes some fundamental attitudes in sexual relations 
between people as variations on these two types and as 
fundamental attitudes present in varied form in our "non- 
sexual" relations with others.42 He regards love, desire and 
hate as the fundamental sexual attitudes43 and he also 
studies various "off-shoots" from them, if I can call them 
that, such as masochism and sadism. I will concentrate on a 
brief look at the three fundamental attitudes of love, desire 
and hate.
Sartre sees these relations very much in terms of conflict 
but we must remember that this "conflict" is being used very 
much in a broad sense such that the very fact of people 
having views of each other necessarily as external objects is 
a type of conflict in that other people have control over an 
aspect of our lives. It is also a broad sense of conflict 
which can include even superficially harmless acts towards 
others or even acts of generosity. Even being generous to 
someone involves fixing that person as an object of one's 
consciousness and "using" him or her in one's goal of being 
generous to him or her.
The stress on conflict should not mean Sartre should be seen 
as some sort of misanthrope. On the contrary, if all our
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relations with others involve an element of conflict, it 
could be regarded as taking full cognisance of one's 
responsibility to develop a full awareness of this and 
alertness to it. Sartre, here, in my view, is being
"realistic," in the everyday sense of the word, rather than
misanthropic. The value of Sartre's insights into the 
implicit conflict with others is readily seen if we translate 
it to the social plane. For example, throughout history, 
colonialists have seen themselves as "helping" the colonized 
by bringing them "civilization" and "true religion." Let us 
bear these points in mind, then, in looking at Sartre's 
discussions of love, desire and hate.
In l o v e , 44 according to Sartre, I use my object-state for the
other person to try and ensnare his or her freedom so that, 
in controlling this free person's view of me as an object, I 
am founding myself. I try to make myself the fascinating and 
seductive beloved object round which the other person will 
freely want to centre his or her life.
However, the project of love fails because in order to get 
the other to see me as a beloved object rather than merely 
fascinating, the other person has to want me to love him or 
her. Both parties, in being "beloved" objects, are thus 
saved from the full harshness of the other person's 
subjectivity. But this is an imperiled condition. At any 
time, either of the parties can revert to viewing the other 
as a simple, non-beloved object. And even if this does not 
happen, it only suffices for a third person to come along and 
look at us to transform us back into a simple object-state.
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I have not succeeded through love in taking control of myself 
as seen by the Other.
In sexual d e s i r e ,45 according to Sartre, I attempt to take 
possession of the other person's body as an object with a 
vague sense that this object is conscious or, in Sartre's 
words, is "a living body with consciousness at the 
h o r i z o n . "46 i enjoy the other's body as pure flesh and 
thereby also enjoy my own body as pure flesh. However, 
desire fails in that my consciousness of my pleasure and my 
eventual reflective consciousness of it make me lose track of 
the goal of making the other flesh and thereby capturing his 
or her consciousness at the horizon.
Hate,47 for Sartre, is the last desperate resort. As all 
relations have failed, I wish that the other person (and, 
symbolically, all other people) were dead. But this too is a 
failure for even once all others were dead, it would still be 
a fact that they had existed and affected me. I would still 
be "for-others," it would still occur to me what others would 
have thought of me. I would still be aware of my outside 
aspect.
Sartre does not, of course, advocate that we should wallow in 
despair or give up. Even a laisser-faire attitude towards 
others, he says, is an imposition of one's approach to others 
on them.48 Sartre in a footnote mentions "the possibility of 
an ethics of deliverance and salvation" achievable "after a 
radical conversion. "49 He does not give us any more details 
of this possible deliverance but I believe we can identify
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its basics by treating it in parallel to the kind of 
conversion we looked at in the previous chapter in relation 
to the for-itself's fundamental project of becoming in- 
itself-for-itself. This conversion entailed accepting one’s 
failure to reach the in-itself-for-itself and valuing the 
freedom one retains through this failure.
Similarly, then, with regard to the present issue under 
consideration, one would accept that one can never reach the 
in-itself-for-itself through one's relations with other 
people. One would still pursue relations with other people 
but take responsibility for how one acts towards others and 
value the freedom that one maintains in not being swallowed 
up as founded by another conscious existent.
Sartre, I believe, is correct not to accept experiences of 
"being-with" other peopleSO (as in Heidegger's example of the 
crew of a ship being with each other in a mute existence in 
common to the rhythm of the oarsSl ) as contradicting his view 
of relations with others as conflict. Sartre's basic point 
here is, if I can put it this way, that there is no actual 
merging of the individual consciousnesses into one common 
experiencer. A group of people are either pursuing a common 
goal of action or are watching a common spectacle, as in the 
case of spectators at a theatrical performance. What is in 
common is the goal of action or the object of perception. I 
am still a separate individual consciousness. This can be 
made painfully clear to me on occasions when I attempt to 
speak for the whole group using the term "we." "We think
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such and such," I say but am quickly told to "speak for 
yourself."
Once again, however, I would argue that Sartre's thought here 
suffers from his lack of a detailed concern with wider 
society. I have already stated that he does not consider how 
people in their inter-actions give rise to a wider society 
and culture which then imposes a context upon the individual. 
In consequence, Sartre does not consider either how or 
whether people can freely act to influence society whether as 
an individual or in combination with others.
I would still maintain, though, at the end of Part 1 of this 
thesis, that Sartre has provided us with the basis of a 
viable view of what the human being basically is, namely a 
free conscious bodily existent or for-itself who encounters 
other such existents and relates to them. Without such a 
basis, concern for society would be of no consequence since 
it would be an inert mass with no-one to witness it. I 
attempt in Part 3 to show how Sartre maintains this 
perspective while extending his thought further into the 
social dimension in his later work, SM.
Before this, however, I attempt in Part 2 to show, by a brief 
look at Sartre's work on the imagination and the emotions, 
how Sartre's basic approach of viewing the human being as a 
conscious bodily existent can be put to practical use in 
studying aspects of human life.
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PftRT 2; THE FOR-ITSELF APPLIED
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CHAPTER 4; SARTRE'S "PSYCHOLOGY OF THE IMAGINATION" AS AN 
APPLICATION OF THE BEING AND NOTHINGNESS APPROACH
What I have been attempting to show in Part 1 is that there 
is at least a case for not viewing the human being as a 
purely determined thing and that such a case can be set out 
without reverting to a "ghost in the machine" type position.
I have tried to demonstrate how Sartre ' s approach in BN to 
the human being as a unified conscious bodily existent or 
for-itself allows us to do this.
So far, we have been looking at the human being in his or her 
entirety. In order to test the usefulness of Sartre's 
approach, it might be helpful to examine how it could be 
applied to a particular area of controversy regarding how the 
human being operates. Here we can turn to another of 
Sartre's works. The Psychology of Imagination! (hereafter 
referred to as EX).
EX was, of course, published before BN. However, EX was a 
stage in the development of the Sartrean approach to the 
human being which culminated in BN. Although he has not at 
this stage devised the term "for-itself" to describe the 
human being, Sartre makes ready use in EX of the concepts of 
"nothingness" and "negation" which are so prevalent in BN and 
he opens EX with a short declaration on "The Intentional 
Structure of the Image"2 which could fit easily within the 
pages of BN. He emphasises that his approach entails, if I 
can put it this way, following the dynamics of consciousness 
rather than studying the human being statically from the 
outside and implying an "inertia or passivity of the mental
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structures."3 I believe, therefore, that it is a reasonable 
proposition - and hopefully a useful exercise - to study EX 
as a practical application of the BN approach to 
consciousness to a particular area, the imagination.
To help us assess how useful Sartre's approach is, we could 
also compare it with a piece of work on the same subject, the 
imagination, by a philosopher from a different tradition.
Here Daniel C. Dennett has provided us with a tailor-made 
essay. Two Approaches to Mental Images, from his book. 
Brainstorms.4 First of all, however, let us take a brief 
overview of what Sartre says in EX. I will then examine 
Dennett's essay, pointing out what I see as its deficiencies. 
I will then hopefully be in a position to take a more 
detailed look at Sartre's EX and show how his approach allows 
us to overcome such deficiencies.
In EX, Sartre centres his investigation around the problem of 
what the mental image is and how it is produced. This 
exploration of the mental image also leads him to look at its 
relationship to other forms of imagination (such as reading a 
novel and watching an impersonator at a music hall) and 
ultimately to examine the significance of the imagination for 
human consciousness as a whole. For the moment, let us 
concentrate on what Sartre says about the mental image.
Sartre starts from the basis of reflecting on the actual 
experience of producing mental images and trying to describe 
that experience. He then applies explanatory analysis to it 
but in such a way that the explanation is integrated with the
Page — 252
description rather than presenting us with a scenario in 
which our experience is branded as an illusion behind which 
lies the "real" scientific explanation. When I form a mental 
image - e.g. of an absent loved one - I do have the 
experience of mentally "viewing" that person. Sartre starts 
from this base of accepting the experience as such but allows 
for open examination of how it is accomplished.
Sartre concludes that there is not any actual physical or 
mystical picture which is "in" the head. The experience is 
nonetheless not to be denied. Drawing on the work of 
psychologists, Sartre's view is that the experience is 
accomplished by a synthesis of one's knowledge of the 
imagined object, the affective sense one has of it, the 
kinaesthetic movement by which one mimes it and one's acting 
towards all this as if it were the object present. For 
Sartre, then, the body is also part of the process. Sartre 
gives his own experience as an example; he was imagining a 
swing swinging and found that his eyes swung to and fro. 5 
The body's movement is used in the synthesis of the image.
Sartre in this way openly uses analytic detective work but at 
the same time places his discoveries back within the unity of 
the experience of imagining rather than using them to debunk 
our experience. Whatever way we accomplish the experience, 
it "does the trick" and delivers to us an imaginary view of 
our intended object.
It is this attitude towards human experience which is central 
to Sartre's thought in both BN and EX. In BN, Sartre accepts
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and tries to describe our experience as conscious existents. 
He realizes that we are embodied creatures who live in the 
world and he does not see any evidence for our being 
"inhabited" by some kind of spiritual entity or "soul." But 
neither does our existence as bodily beings in the world have 
to entail the debunking of our own awareness of ourselves as 
conscious existents or experiencing centres. It does not 
have to entail that consciousness is "in reality" simply a 
physical process of the body. Rather, our existence as 
bodily creatures in the world is the ground or condition on 
which we arise as conscious and our consciousness can be 
treated as such.
EX can serve as a practical application in a more specific 
area of this kind of approach. Sartre accepts and tries to 
describe our experience of reaching imaginary "views" of 
objects. He investigates how we accomplish this. He does 
not believe that in such experiences there is an actual 
picture in one's head. His findings are that we reach the 
imaginary view of an object through an encapsulating attitude 
in which one's knowledge and affective sense of the object 
together with mimicking movement are treated as if they were 
the object present. Sartre does not thereby mean that there 
is no such thing as a mental image or that it equals 
information stored in the brain plus physical movement.
Rather, our treatment of our knowledge, affectivity and 
movement is the way we accomplish an imaginary view of 
objects and this type of viewing is a perfectly valid 
experience upon which we can reflect.
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That, in summary, then, is how I see EX as a fruitful 
application to a specific problem of the kind of approach 
Sartre sets out in BN. Before examining EX in more detail, 
let us take a look at the problem from the rather different 
perspective of Dennett. This will help us in highlighting 
what it is in Sartre's approach that is distinctive and 
useful.
Dennett attempts to bring clarity to what he sees as a 
misconceived debate over the nature and even the existence of 
the mental image. He notes that there is a division between 
what he terms the "iconophobes" and the "iconophiles."6 The 
iconophobes are sceptical that anything actually resembling 
an "image" is the cause of people's beliefs that they have 
"mental images." The iconophiles, on the other hand, insist 
that there are mental images as distinct effects of various 
causes (e.g. actual visual perceptions, the desire to solve a 
geometrical problem in one's head etc.) According to the 
iconophiles, mental images also have their own effects.
Chief among these are the apprehension by the people 
concerned of those mental images and their consequent belief 
that they have them.
According to Dennett, this debate is a spurious one. The 
protagonists feel strongly about the issue because they too 
are part of the population who have the so-called "mental 
images." But for Dennett, this does not afford them any 
special privilege. His suggestion is that they would be 
better advised to keep their own counsel and wait for science 
to provide them with an objective answer. For although the
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debate may look like a philosophical dispute, Dennett insists 
that:
"It is not. It is merely embryonic- 
scientific. What is remarkable is that 
so many people find it so difficult to 
let this issue be what it should be: a
scientific,empirical question, amenable 
to experimental probing. Why should 
anyone feel differently? Most of us 
laymen are quite content to be not only 
ignorant but opinionless about the normal 
causes of dandruff, inflation, earthquake 
and schizophrenia. We will let science 
tell us only if it will."7
Dennett attempts to dispel the misconceptions by setting out 
what, for him, are the only two possible viable approaches to 
the problem of mental images. These are the scientific 
approachS and his own version of a "phenomenological" 
approach.9 These two, in his scheme, do not have to be in 
conflict.
The scientific approach defines "mental images" simply as 
the normal causes of people’s beliefs about mental images and 
sets out on an objective investigation to find out the nature 
of these causes. Thus, the image-havers' statements that 
they have "mental images" are acceptable as data to be 
considered but nothing more. The scientist is quite prepared 
to discover that the cause of our belief in "mental images" 
is actually something unlike an "image."
The "phenomenological" approach, on the other hand,
"suspends," if I can put it that way, the issue of the causes 
of belief in mental images. It concentrates on the logical 
construct or "world" created by the beliefs in mental images.
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The phenomenological approach defines mental images simply as
the intentional objects of our beliefs about mental images.
"On this approach," Dennett says;
"mental images are at least as real as 
Santa Claus. Just as one might set out 
to learn all there is to be learned about 
Santa Claus, the intentional object, so 
one might set out to learn all there is 
to be learned about those intentional 
objects, people’s mental images."10
Dennett argues that the two approaches can complement each 
other rather than necessarily be in conflict. He makes the 
analogy of two sets of anthropologists studying the same 
tribe of forest-dwelling humans.H The phenomenological 
approach is analogous to that of the anthropologists who 
chart and describe the tribe’s beliefs about their forest-god 
while not necessarily accepting that such a god actually 
exists. The scientific approach, on the other hand, is 
analogous to that of the anthropologists who search for the 
cause of the tribe’s beliefs in the forest-god; the god’s 
actual existence or the trickery of a shaman.
Dennett sees three possible conclusions that could be made 
about the mental image. He discounts the first one. This is 
to say that the mental image is "both incorrigibly known and 
causally efficacious."12 This is similar to the idea on a 
wider level of saying that the human being is inhabited by a 
mysterious spiritual entity or soul. It is like the 
tribesman or woman saying that the forest-god exists in 
Heaven. It is to posit the existence of a "mental image 
h e a v e n . "13 This is anathema to Dennett. He insists that;
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"if mental images turn out to be real, 
they can reside quite comfortably in the 
physical space in our brains, and if they 
turn out not to be real, they can reside, 
with Santa Claus, in the logical space of 
fiction."14
Dennett leaves it to science to find out which of the two
remaining conclusions is the correct one. It may turn out
that there are "information-carrying structures in the
b r a i n "15 with such properties that would allow them to be
appropriately described as "images" and that it is these
structures that cause our belief in mental images. In that
case, the scientific iconophile would be correct and he could
confidently assert that:
"imaging is, and has been like normal 
veridical perception: just as pigs cause
one to see pigs ... images have caused 
him to believe he is having i m a g e s ."16
Alternatively, it might turn out that image-havers' beliefs 
are caused by structures in the brain lacking the 
characteristics that could appropriately be described as 
those of images. We would then have to conclude that the 
image-haver's beliefs in mental images are " i l l u s o r y ."17 
Dennett remains neutral and is content to wait for science to 
eventually confirm which of the two conclusions is correct.
Such, then, is Dennett's view of how we should approach the 
mental image. What is wrong with such a view? Where I 
believe it fails is in its attitude to human experience. It 
would be reasonable to say that people's reports that they 
have "mental images" should not be blithely accepted without 
question. But Dennett goes to the opposite extreme. He
Page - 258
looks at the human being from an almost totally external 
perspective.
He starts from the simple fact that people report having 
"mental images." However, he does not go very much further 
in actually exploring the mental images. That is, he does 
not try to describe the actual experience of having a mental 
image. I can just now produce a mental image of my own. I 
imagine the facade of my old school. That is an experience 
of mine in which I aimed at imaginatively viewing my old 
school. I knew I was not actually "seeing" the school as in 
a visual perception but I nonetheless gained what was for me 
an imaginary "view" of it.
Dennett isolates the mental image from that experiential 
context. He does not see the human being engaged in the
activity of imagining but, instead, looks at the human being
as an object reported to have images and then awaits a
scientist to find out for him if there is anything in that
being's brain corresponding to the reported images.
Of course, Dennett allows for his own form of 
"phenomenological" approach but this too suffers from his 
"externalist" attitude. It involves charting people's 
beliefs about mental images and he views this as analogous to 
charting people's beliefs about Santa Claus. His 
phenomenological approach targets people's beliefs about 
mental images because that is his device to get round the 
fact that his scientist has not yet found the corresponding 
brain structure. But a phenomenology should involve
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something more immediate than that. It should reflect on and 
try to describe the features of the actual experience of 
having a "mental image."
If we attach significance to the fact that we human beings 
appear to ourselves to be "experiencing centres" rather than 
just like any other objects in the world, then we cannot 
study the human being in the same absolute terms in which we 
might study such objects. From this perspective, it 
unnecessarily jars with human experience in general to brand 
a particular area of that experience as illusory. This is 
what Dennett could be seen to be doing when he leaves open 
the possibility that science will discover that our beliefs 
about mental images are caused by a structure in the brain 
not appropriately describable as "imagistic." Such a 
"discovery" would totally jar with my own experience in which 
I aimed at an imaginary view of my old school and succeeded, 
whatever the conditions that allowed me to do so. If we 
treat the human being as an experiencing centre, then we 
enter a fluid and ambiguous area where the question to ask is 
not "Does such a thing as a mental image exist in the human 
being?" but, rather, "From reflection, how would we describe 
the experience of having a mental image and what can we learn 
about the nature of that experience and how it is 
accomplished?"
Such an approach has the advantage of "dovetailing" with our 
experience. It might uncover detailed information about the 
mental image not immediately apparent in the actual 
spontaneous "all at once" experience but it can then be
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integrated with our experience as explaining how it is 
accomplished and how it is possible. This is the kind of 
approach I believe we can identify with that of Sartre in EX. 
Let us look at EX in a little more detail now, highlighting 
how Sartre avoids what I have tried to show are the 
deficiencies in Dennett's approach.
Sartre's essential starting point is to recognize that having 
a mental image is a human experience. Dennett simply notes 
that human beings report having "mental images." He 
concentrates on the notional image-thing and asks science to 
find out for him whether or not such a thing can be found in 
the brain. Sartre instead is concerned with the whole 
experience of having a mental image. He therefore makes what 
would seem a reasonable demand, namely that we should first 
of all reflect on and describe the experience of having an 
image.18 This entails trying to convey what we do in the 
actual experience of imagining rather than simply dealing 
with the loose concepts we use in everyday language after the 
event.
According to Sartre, such reflection brings out two basic 
facts about the experience of the mental image. First of 
all, he says, when I produce a mental image, I am not 
concerned with the image as an image but at the object I aim 
at through it. E.g. if I produce a mental image of Peter, it 
is Peter who is the object of my consciousness. It takes a 
secondary act of reflection to concentrate on the image as an 
image.19 What Sartre is getting at here is that producing a 
mental image is primarily someone's experience of imagining
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something. If we may talk of having a mental image as a kind 
of imaginative mode of "thinking," we might understand this 
better. What Sartre is saying is that in the experience of 
imagining Peter, I am thinking of Peter, not thinking about a 
thought of Peter. It is implicit that everything is in the 
imaginary mode but the explicit object of my "thought" is 
Peter himself.
The second fact Sartre highlights is that having a mental 
image is a particular kind of experience with its own 
distinctive traits.20 For example, I am able to report that 
I was "only imagining" Peter. Imagining, then, is not the 
same as perception. It is a different type of experience 
with its own characteristics.
I believe Sartre is correct in identifying these two points
about the mental image. He is simply saying something that
should not be controversial: namely, that having a mental
image is a human experience of someone relating to an object
in an "imaginary" way and that this type of experience has
its own distinctive characteristics as compared with, for 
example, perception. This should be obvious. When I produce 
a mental image of, for example, an absent friend, the object 
of my concern is my friend and it is an intrinsic aspect of 
this experience that I know I am not getting an actual visual 
perception; my experience is of the distinct imaginative 
type.
These two basic facts arrived at by reflection are, for 
Sartre, the essence of what the experience of the mental
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image is like.21 According to Sartre, we are here working in 
the realm of "certainty. "22 That is, no matter what the 
conditions are which make experiencing an image possible, the 
two points are basic factual reports about what the 
experience of a mental image is like. They are the first 
certain facts we have to go on when we set out to investigate 
the mental image.
Sartre argues that the first task in this investigation 
should be to stay within the realm of certainty and reflect 
on and describe the experience of the image, expanding on the 
two basic points. Only after gaining this grounding should 
we try to hypothesize about the nature of the "mental image. " 
Such hypotheses lie in the realm of the "probable, "23 i.e. 
they can only ever be approximations at explaining how the 
complex "all at once" experience of mentally imagining 
something is accomplished.
Sartre's charge, however, is that many psychologists ignore 
reflection on the actual experience of the mental image but 
instead launch straight into explanatory scientific 
hypotheses. Without a grounding in experience, these 
hypotheses fall into error.
A common error Sartre identifies is what he terms the 
"illusion of immanence. "24 This illusion is to believe (1) 
that the image is in consciousness and (2) that the object of 
the image is in the image. That is, the illusion consists of 
ignoring the fact that the mental image never arises outwith 
the experiential context of someone imagining something and
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so considering in isolation an image as some sort of 
independent thing or sensation.
It could be argued that Dennett suffers from a modern form of 
the illusion. He renders the human experience of mentally 
"viewing" things irrelevant and waits for science to confirm 
or deny the existence of an image-like brain structure.
Sartre instead proposes his own methodical approach. The 
first stage is to reflect on the experience of producing 
mental images. The second stage is to compare that 
experience with other types of imaginative experience. In 
the third stage, we are then able to formulate hypotheses 
about the nature of the mental image. Reflection and 
hypothesizing are here complementary. Reflective description 
tells us more precisely what the experience is that we are 
examining and the hypothesizing tries to explain how the 
experience is possible.
Sartre's first stage, I believe, is vital. In trying to 
describe the actual experience of the mental image, he helps 
clarify the issue. In everyday life, we talk loosely of the 
"mental image." Dennett treats this entirely literally and 
awaits a scientist to tell him whether or not such images or 
image-like brain structures exist. If they do, he has told 
us, then imaging is like perception and images cause one to 
believe one is having images. If not, then we are deluded. 
However, we have already seen from reflection that the mental 
image is a distinct experience not the same as perception. 
Reflection on the experience of the mental image, then, might
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well show that the issue is more complex than confirming or 
denying the existence of "images" as some kind of "mini­
perceptions . "
In carrying out the first stage, Sartre identifies what for
him are the four main characteristics of the experience of
the mental image. Firstly, he says, the mental image is a
"consciousness." That is, it is a form of awareness of an
object and one is primarily concerned with that object rather
than an image as such. When I perceive a chair, the object
of my concern is the chair. If I imagine the same chair, the
object of my concern is still the chair outside me, even
although in that case I do not encounter it actually present.
Or, if I imagine Peter, it is Peter I am directed towards
rather than an image for its own sake. Sartre therefore
defines the experience of the mental image as:
"a certain manner in which the object 
makes its appearance to consciousness, or 
... a certain way in which consciousness 
presents an object to itself."25
We must remember, here, that Sartre is reflecting on the 
whole experience of someone imagining something. He is not 
yet making any claims about how precisely the mental image is 
able to represent an object. He is simply saying that the 
experience of the mental image is one mode of being conscious 
of an object.
I believe Sartre is correct here. The image is first of all 
an experience for us. To say that the image is a 
consciousness is to record that the experience is someone's
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experience of imagining something. That the "something" is 
not the image itself for its own sake is something we can 
readily attest to from reflection on our own experience; if 
the image itself were always the object, we could hardly even 
have the word "image" since it already conveys the idea of 
representing something.
The second characteristic of the mental image identified by 
Sartre is that it is subject to "the phenomenon of quasi­
observation. "26 Sartre does seem to be accurately describing 
human experience here. What Sartre is basically saying - to 
put it in everyday language - is that when one has a mental 
image, it is by one's own mental creativity that one gets a 
"view" of the object. Because we are only mentally viewing 
the object, the "view" entirely depends on what I know about 
the object and my putting it into the view. This is a 
different - and poorer - type of "viewing" of an object than 
that of perception. When I actually see an object before me, 
in the case of visual perception, I look at it from ever new 
angles and can discover an infinity of details of it that do 
not depend on my creativity.27 when I imagine an object, I 
cannot observe it in this full way. It is a case of only 
"quasi-observation."28
In setting out in detail what the phenomenon of quasi­
observation is, Sartre compares the mental image with 
perception, as we have just looked at briefly, and also with 
the concept.
Page - 266
When I perceive an object, according to Sartre's reflection,
I can only observe it from one particular point of view at a 
time and there is an infinite amount of points of view 
possible. With perception, we have to "make a tour"29 of 
objects. Also,the perceived object is "brimming over"30 with 
an endless amount of details I can discover.
When I form a concept of an object, by contrast, I do not 
have to tour round the object and view it from various 
angles. With the concept, I seize the object all at once, in 
its entirety.31
Sartre, then, makes a sharp contrast between, on one side, 
perception which entails encountering and viewing the object 
in all its detail and, on the other side, the concept which 
involves encapsulating the entirety of the object all at once 
by a thought without requiring to "view" it. Sartre holds 
that the mental image fits into neither type but is 
intermediate between the two. On the one hand, it seems akin 
to perception in that one gets a kind of "view" of the 
object. On the other hand, it is like conceptualization in 
that one does not have to tour the object; one immediately 
knows what it is. This is because as a mental image, the 
"view" of the object is one I construct with what I know of 
it. It does not offer the scope for endless discovery of 
further details of the object since I can only get out of the 
image what I have put in. In that sense, the mental image 
suffers from an "essential poverty"32 in comparison to an 
actual perception of an object. The object is not present
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before me in all its detail and with its connections to the 
rest of the world surrounding it.
Sartre holds that from this description we can see that the 
mental image involves a combination of knowledge of the 
particular object and details of it that one wants to "view," 
in that sense "constructing" the object, but at the same time 
still being primarily concerned with the object and the wish 
to view it rather than an image for its own sake. The object 
thus only "appears" to me through and at one and the same 
time as my effort of imagining.
Based on these points, Sartre gives a provisional definition
of the mental image as:
"a synthetic act which unites a concrete 
non-imagined knowledge to elements which 
are more actually representative."33
Again, though, Sartre has not yet reached the stage where he
can hypothesize about the "representative elements."
The third characteristic identified by Sartre is that "the 
imaginative consciousness posits its object as 
nothingness."34 Sartre is here referring to the fact that 
the different ways of being conscious of objects, such as 
perception or imagination, involve their own way of affirming 
the status of the object concerned and how one is related to 
it. This is what Sartre means by "positing." With 
perception, for example, one posits the object seen as 
existing. I believe it is actually present before me.
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The mental image, according to Sartre, involves a very 
different type of positing action. I posit the object 
imagined as either non-existent, absent or existing 
e l s e w h e r e . 35 (Sartre also allows for a fourth category, a 
"neutralizing" positing act which applies to hallucinations, 
dreams and certain other types of imaginative consciousness). 
This is to say that when one produces a mental image one is 
well aware that the object is not actually truly present 
before one. In that sense, I negate the object or "posit it 
as nothingness." It is this difference in positing that 
makes the mental image distinct from perception.
Sartre puts forward two important points about how we posit 
the object as nothingness in the experience of the mental 
image. Firstly, the positing takes place within and as part 
of what makes up the experience of the mental image.
Secondly, it takes place within the context of the desire to 
"make the object present in its nothingness," i.e. gain a 
"view" of it even though I know it is not there. We can draw 
all these points together and illustrate them by looking at 
Sartre's example of someone producing a mental image of a 
dead loved one. The heartache felt is precisely the 
consequence of the fact that the mental image presents its 
object as no longer existing.36
The fourth characteristic of the mental image Sartre 
identifies is "spontaneity."37 Here Sartre again compares 
perception and imagination. He notes that in comparison to 
the imaginative consciousness, the perceptual consciousness 
"appears to itself" as passive.38 This is not to say that
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perception is an entirely passive "tabula rasa" type affair 
since Sartre later on discusses briefly the intentionality 
essential to perception. Sartre is simply referring to the 
fact that, as we experience it, perception involves a passive 
element in that we come across substantial objects "out 
there" which we did not will into existence.
The mental image, in contrast, does not involve such 
passivity. The imaginative consciousness entails instead a 
spontaneous creativity. When I produce a mental image, I am 
implicitly aware of myself as mentally creating a view of an 
object without believing that I have actually summoned it 
before me in reality.
This completes Sartre's initial phenomenological description 
of the mental image. From reflection, he has seen that the 
mental image is a way of being conscious of an object, that 
it provides a sort of "view" of the object, that this "view" 
incorporates the knowledge that the object is not actually 
present and that this viewing is a moment of mental 
creativity. Sartre has now exhausted his first reflective 
and descriptive stage. We still do not know at this stage 
how precisely the mental image delivers a "view" of an 
object. We do not yet know what the nature is of the 
"representative elements" that Sartre spoke of.
At this stage, though, Sartre still does not launch into 
forming hypotheses about how the mental image is 
accomplished. Sartre has so far only looked at one 
particular kind of imaginative experience, the mental image.
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However, Sartre notes that there are other types of 
imaginative experience, such as photographs, caricature 
drawings, impersonations etc., which are similar to the 
experience of the mental image in that they involve using 
some kind of image - even though not of the mental type - to 
get a view of a certain absent object through that image.
This also entails that, just as in the case of the mental 
image, the image is not considered for its own sake but only 
as helping us to reach out to the object we are concerned 
with. Sartre puts forward the reasonable proposition that 
before moving on to the stage of explanatory hypotheses, we 
should look at these other types of images and how they 
compare with the mental im a g e .39 This is another area 
overlooked by Dennett.
Sartre gives the example of wanting to recall the face of a 
friend, Peter. First, I produce a mental image of him but I 
find that it does not fully satisfy me. So next I look at a 
photograph of him. However, the photograph is a bit 
lifeless, I feel it misses Peter's character. I then look at 
a caricature drawing of him. This is a distorted line 
drawing exaggerating a few details of Peter. However, it 
delivers to me a characterful view of Peter. These three 
experiences, Sartre notes, have differences but all three 
nonetheless have the same aim of recalling the absent Peter's 
face. All three aim primarily at the object, Peter, and use 
some "material" - whatever its nature in whatever particular 
case - as an " a n a l ogue"40 of or, if I can put it this way, a 
"stand-in" for, the object.
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Sartre accepts that there are obvious differences.
Photographs and drawings etc. exist as objects in their own 
right in the outside world. But the nature of the "material" 
used in the mental image is more difficult to know. Once I 
stop producing the mental image, there is no "residue" left 
to examine whereas the photograph and drawing still exist 
before me when I stop using them. Nevertheless, the three 
experiences involve the same process of an intention (the 
goal of viewing an absent object) "animating" some material 
to make it an analogue of the aimed at object. The three 
experiences have the same form but use different materials.41
In view of this basic similarity, Sartre links non-mental
images with the mental variety as part of the same class or
as members of the "image family."42 Drawing all these points
together, Sartre produces a definition of the image in
general, i.e. mental or non-mental, as:
"an act which aims at an absent or non­
existent object as a body, by means of a 
physical or mental content which is 
present only as an ’analogical 
representative' of the object aimed 
at."43
Before moving on to hypotheses about how the mental image is 
accomplished, Sartre gives a phenomenological description of 
various members of the image family and compares them with 
the mental image. The instances of imaginative consciousness 
he selects are: looking at a photograph of someone, watching
an impersonation at a music hall, looking at a schematic 
drawing, experiences such as "seeing" a face in a fire, 
having a hypnagogic image and, finally, the mental image
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revisited. He starts off with instances where the material 
is heavily drawn from objects in the outside world that we 
can actually perceive, as in the case of the photograph, and 
progressively moves forward to cases where the material is 
poorer and less obvious until he returns to the mental image. 
This will give Sartre further information from experience to 
draw on when he moves on to attempting to formulate 
hypotheses about how we accomplish the production of mental 
images.
Sartre's procedure here in looking at these other types of 
imaginative consciousness is again indicative of his attitude 
to human experience. He does not look at the mental image in 
isolation. Rather, he looks at it as the experience of 
someone imagining something. He also looks at in relation to 
other types of imaginative experience and ultimately in 
relation to the question of the place of imagination in human 
life in general. This is a far broader-based procedure than 
Dennett's. Sartre too wants answers to the question of the 
nature of the mental image but not in a simplistic manner 
which will confirm or brand as illusion our experience of 
mental images. Sartre accepts that we have this experience 
of mentally "viewing" things and holds that the relevant 
question to ask is "How is it accomplished?" rather than "Is 
it illusory?" Part of the process of finding out how it is 
accomplished is to describe the experience and the similar 
experiences from the same family and use these descriptions 
to find relevant information to draw on when forming 
explanatory hypotheses. Since it is human experience we are 
dealing with here, it is also important to put the issue in
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an even wider experiential context by looking at the 
significance of imagination to human life in general.
Sartre gives quite detailed descriptions of each of the types 
of imaginative consciousness he investigates. I will look at 
them briefly, focusing particularly on the aspects Sartre 
finds useful in coming later on to form an explanatory 
hypothesis about the mental image.
The first example Sartre considers is that of looking at a 
photographic portrait of, for example, one's friend Peter.44 
Sartre compares this with observing a sign inside a building 
for "The Assistant Manager's Office." In both cases, we look 
at some object through which we are directed towards 
something else, an absent object (Peter or the office). In 
this respect, observing a sign and looking at a photographic 
portrait are similar.
However, there is an important difference. The photograph 
resembles the object whereas the sign is merely an 
arrangement of strokes which by convention only has the 
meaning "office." The photograph, in contrast, has been 
deliberately produced to look like the object it points to, 
Peter. Similarly to what happens with the sign, I see it and 
grasp the meaning intended. But unlike the case of the sign, 
we go further than just grasping a meaning. We realize who 
the photograph depicts and we treat it as if it is Peter even 
though we know he is not here.
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In the case of the photograph, then, I have a knowledge of 
Peter - in recognizing who the photograph depicts - and I 
take an attitude of treating that knowledge of Peter as if it 
were him before me, even though I know he is not here.
Sartre takes as his next example a performer in a music hall 
doing an impersonation of Maurice Chevalier.45 Here, the 
spectator has a double task to perform. He or she has to 
work out who the impersonator is impersonating by working it 
out from the signs used by the impersonator to show who is 
being impersonated (e.g. wearing a straw hat to signify 
Maurice Chevalier). The spectator also has to take the 
impersonator as. Maurice Chevalier. Watching the impersonator 
is treated as a way of viewing the absent Maurice Chevalier. 
The spectator accomplishes both parts of the task at the same 
time. That is, he or she immediately treats the impersonator 
as a representative of Maurice Chevalier at the moment of 
recognition. Thus he or she is likely to exclaim; "It’s 
Maurice Chevalier!"
In this example, the material is poorer, for the impersonator 
is not an exact likeness of Maurice Chevalier but merely 
imitates him with signs like the straw hat and exaggerated 
gestures. The spectator has to make do with these and treat 
the rest of the details of the impersonator’s body vaguely as 
representative of Maurice Chevalier’s body. However, for 
Sartre, this would not be enough in itself to give us a 
"view" of Maurice Chevalier. It is affectivity, for Sartre, 
that fills the gap. The impersonator succeeds in getting us 
to recapture the "feel" we have for Maurice Chevalier or the
Page - 275
affective sense we have of him. We rediscover his 
"expressive nature."
In the case of watching an impersonation, then, two important 
factors are used: knowledge (of what Maurice Chevalier is
like and that the impersonator's signs refer to him) and 
affectivity (in recapturing the "feel" of Maurice Chevalier). 
Sartre will later on be able to examine whether or not they 
play a role in the mental image.
Next Sartre looks at a case where the material is even less 
direct: schematic d r a w i n g s .46 He gives the example of a
group of simple lines which at first sight seem to be only 
lines but in which, if I look at them in different ways, I 
can see a face. These kinds of drawings are often used in 
the field of psychology.
When looking at these drawings, according to Sartre's 
description, we use our eyes to enact "symbolic movements" 
upon the lines in order to find out how they are to be 
interpreted. Our eyes play up and down the lines in a 
"symbolic pantomime" trying to find some object we know is 
supposed to be represented by them. At the very same moment 
that we arrive at the correct interpretation, that the lines 
represent a face, we see the face, we view the lines as an 
image of the face.
In this kind of imaginative experience, then, knowledge and 
movements are the two elements involved. Sartre is using 
"knowledge" in a broad sense. One is directed or intended
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towards the lines, looking for an object represented there, 
spontaneously drawing on our experience or "life-knowledge," 
if I can put it that way, in the search. Our knowledge is 
incorporated in the movements up and down the lines as we 
search for the object. We eventually reach the specific 
knowledge that the lines represent a face and the 
"knowledgeable movements," if I can describe them that way, 
remain in place to maintain the imaginary view of the face. 
Sartre has now discovered three factors - knowledge, 
affectivity and movements - which he can examine again later 
to see if they play a role in the mental image.
Sartre next looks at a type of imaginative experience in 
which the perceptual element of the material is even less 
than in the case of the schematic drawing. This is the kind 
of experience in which one imagines seeing objects, such as 
faces, in the flames of a fire, on wallpaper patterns etc.47
This type of imaginative activity is similar to that of 
looking at a schematic drawing, only this time an even 
stronger imaginative effort is required. The schematic 
drawing has at least been designed to represent something, 
even though one has to "work it out." The spot on the table­
cloth, however, to take Sartre's example, is simply a spot 
and has not been designed to represent the face I see there. 
Knowledge and symbolic movement is again being used here. 
Sartre describes the image here as an image "in the air." I 
previously saw the spot as simply a spot, the perception of 
the spot is not much of a material to use as an image. But I
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use it anyway to allow me to pretend to see the face in a 
specific locality.
Sartre's final example before returning to the mental image 
is the phenomenon of "hypnagogic images,"48 those vivid 
images people sometimes experience while in the process of 
falling asleep. From Sartre's description, this case is 
similar to that of seeing a face in the flames of a fire and 
such like, only this time it is even more extreme. One forms 
the image after trying to follow the entoptic spots on the 
eyeballs whilst one's eyes are closed and one is in the 
process of falling asleep. Again, the phenomenon of quasi­
observation applies. The images seem vivid and fantastic but 
they depend on what I put in and they are not the same as
perception. Sartre cites an example of a subject of a
psychological study who reported that he had a vivid 
hypnagogic image of a parasol. During the image, he was 
"seeing" the parasol from one side. Nevertheless, he could 
"see" a rib of the parasol's other side which ought to have
been hidden if this was a case of perception following the
normal laws of perspective.
Before going on to discuss the mental image again, Sartre 
reviews the ground he has covered so far in surveying the 
"image family" from the photographic portrait to the 
hypnagogic image. Sartre says that in all these cases there 
is a material which is not a perfect analogue of the object 
to be reached. One uses one's knowledge to act on it, "to 
fill in the gaps," so as to turn it into the representation 
of an absent or non-existent object. Sartre looks on the
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succession of cases he has examined as an evolution of 
imaginative consciousness in its material and knowledge in 
moving progressively from a case where the material is 
heavily drawn from perception (such as the case of the 
photograph) to cases where the material is meagre and the 
knowledge has to do more "filling in" (such as the case of 
the hypnagogic image in which the material is mere entoptic 
spots).
In the last section of his survey of the image family, Sartre
finally returns to the mental image. Gathering together
what he has learned from phenomenological description of the
mental image and its family, he defines the image as:
"an act that is directed towards an 
absent or non-existent object, as if it 
were an actual body, by means of a 
physical or mental content but which 
appears only through an 'analogical 
representative' of the pursued object."49
By "content" Sartre means simply an object one is conscious 
of, whatever its nature, which one uses to represent some 
other object. In the cases we just looked at we can at least 
see the physical object (such as the photograph, caricature 
drawing or blot) which we have used as a representative. In 
the case of the mental image, the "mental content" is more 
difficult to fathom. By saying that there is a mental 
content, Sartre is not descending to "the illusion of 
immanence" he previously condemned or saying that the mental 
image is some kind of mini-sensation in the head. Sartre is 
simply recognizing that when one produces a mental image of 
some object, one knows that the object is absent yet one does
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not simply have a concept of that object but a sort of "view" 
of it. One knows that one is not actually perceiving the 
object and that the object is absent yet one feels one is 
getting a kind of view of it. One is therefore aware of 
something, whatever its nature, that one is treating as a 
view of the object aimed at. The "something," then, only 
needs to fit the requirement that it be something one can be 
conscious of. It does not have to be - and could not be, 
given the mental image’s distinctiveness from perception - 
some kind of substantial "mini-thing" which is "in one's 
head."
The difficulty for Sartre is that one cannot readily get a 
hold of the content or analogue used in the mental image. 
Unlike what happens in the case of looking at a photograph, 
the analogue only lasts as long as the experience of the 
mental image and ends when the latter ends. Also, we are 
dealing with a spontaneous integrated experience in which I 
do not pay attention to the analogue for its own sake but 
only as a way of viewing the object I am concerned with.
It is at this stage that Sartre moves from the realm of the 
certain to the realm of the probable in an attempt to find an 
explanatory hypothesis about the nature of the mental image. 
Here Sartre freely draws on findings in psychology to draw up 
a hypothesis. However, the important thing is that Sartre's 
hypothesizing takes place within a wider phenomenological 
framework in which he accepts that we have the experience of 
mentally "viewing" things and in which he therefore attempts 
to find a hypothesis to explain how the experience is
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accomplished rather than to explain what "really lies behind 
it" or to explain it away and brand it as illusory. In 
forming a hypothesis, Sartre also draws on the elements he 
found in looking at the image family. Sartre's 
hypothesizing, then, takes place on the ground of his study 
of the experience of imagining.
Sartre's hypothesis is that the mental image is a synthesis 
of knowledge, affectivity and movement. That is, the mental 
image is an integrated experience in which I am intended or 
directed towards a particular object or, to put it another 
way, I have knowledge of an object and I take the attitude 
towards that object of wanting to view it. This is a 
knowledge, then, which has dropped down to a "debased" level 
in looking for a view of its object. Allied to this 
knowledge within the integrated experience is the affective 
sense one has of the object, allowing one to feel as if one 
is reaching the essence of the object. Accompanying all 
this, are subtle spontaneous bodily movements by which one 
"mimes" the object, giving one the feeling of having the 
object present before one. I treat all this as if it were 
the object present before me while at the very same time I 
know full well that the object is absent from me. In this 
way, one achieves an "imaginary view" of the object.
Sartre denies that there is any actual picture "in the head" 
but he is not thereby denying the experience of the mental 
image. As Sartre has shown, when one has a mental image one 
knows the object is not actually before one and one readily 
distinguishes the mental image from actual perception so, in
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that sense, one could say that the issue, when we reflect on 
the actual experience, never was a crude and simple matter of 
finding or not finding a "mini-picture" in the head. The 
experience of the mental image is a complex one in which, by 
a spontaneous integrated procedure, one gives oneself a sort 
of "view" of an object, the imaginary view. It is no use to 
complain that to feel one is getting a view of an object 
while knowing that one is not really seeing it is a 
contradiction. The human being intentionally uses a 
contradictory mixture, holding it in place at the time to get 
the "view" he or she desires.
Let us now take a brief look at each of the three aspects of 
the contradictory mixture Sartre has identified. Sartre 
deals with knowledge first.50 The "knowledge" involved here 
is at the basic level of knowledge of the object one is 
concerned about and what it is like. If I am imagining 
Peter, for example, I am intended or directed towards him, he 
is the object of my concern. But my mental image is of Peter 
the tall blond person. My intention, then, is not towards 
Peter in the abstract but as the person I know with his 
particular features. My intention is "charged" with 
knowledge. My mental image, then, is defined by the 
intention (I am concerned with Peter) which is in turn 
defined by my knowledge (of the characteristics of Peter).
The next important point for Sartre is to look at the 
attitude I take during this knowledgeable direction towards 
Peter. I have the attitude of wanting to view him. Sartre 
likens the attitude one takes when having a mental image to
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that involved when one is reading a n o v e l .51 When reading a 
novel, I take the words as presenting the world of the novel 
before me, (without even having to produce a mental image of 
whatever moment I am reading about). E.g. if I read that the 
characters in the novel entered a particular room, then I 
treat the next events and dialogues etc. as happening in that 
room. When reading a novel, then, I am in the attitude of 
taking the objects depicted (people, things etc.) as present 
before me. For Sartre, the mental image involves a similar 
sort of attitude. Even though I know the imagined object is 
not actually present, I put myself into the attitude of 
encountering it as an object before me, I want to view it.
Sartre next looks at affectivity.52 According to Sartre, the 
human being gives an "affective reaction" to the objects he 
or she comes across in perception. That is, we have our own 
"feel" for the objects around us, their "affective sense."
We can even relate to an object in a purely affective way. 
E.g. those instances when we feel the desire for something 
but cannot think what it is.53 On such occasions, one is 
conscious of the object aimed at only in its affective sense. 
In the experience of the mental image, one has this affective 
sense of the object together with the specific knowledge of 
what the object is and what features it has and also the 
desire to view the object. This affective knowledge of the 
object allows us to feel we have reached the "expressive 
nature" of the object. It provides one with the feel of the 
uniqueness and detail of the object in the absence of an 
actual perception of it.
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The third and final main element Sartre identifies is 
movement or, more precisely, kinaesthetic sensations (the 
sensations produced from our movements from the skin, 
muscles, tendons etc.)54 Sartre draws on psychological 
studies which show that subjects trying to remember the 
features of an object such as a picture of a tangle of lines 
use eye movements to try and remember. These eye movements 
are accompanied by kinaesthetic sensations. According to 
Sartre, when one produces a mental image one re-enacts these 
movements and sensations as part of the integrated 
experience. Because such movement is something actually 
taking place in the outside world, it has the role of 
allowing us to feel that the object is present before us to 
be viewed. Sartre gives an example from his own experience: 
he was imagining a swing swinging and found that he could not 
stop his eyes moving to and fro without ending the i m a g e .55
Sartre stresses that he has only given us a "probable 
d i s m e m b e r m e n t."56 That is, the mental image is a complex 
integrated experience and we can only give an approximation 
of disentangling the various aspects involved. The mental 
image is a contradiction in that we talk of "seeing" and 
"hearing" our images even though we are not actually 
perceiving anything. But the contradiction is basic to the 
very nature of the experience. The belief in the view of the 
imagined object or the attitude of putting oneself before 
objects is essential. We nonetheless are perfectly aware 
that we are not really perceiving. This is evident in the 
strange ways the object can appear. E.g. I might imagine 
seeing a thimble but see it from both the inside and the
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outside of it, something that would be impossible in actual 
perception.57 or I might imagine the Pantheon but be unable 
to count its columns from the image.58 But these 
contradictions are accepted within the overriding attitude of 
seeking a view of the object.
It could be argued that Sartre's method has in this way shown 
itself to be more useful, in a very practical sense, than 
that of Dennett. Sartre has examined and described the 
experience of having mental images and similar experiences of 
the same category and then, drawing on the information 
gleaned from these descriptions, he has come to a hypothesis 
about how the experience of the mental image is accomplished. 
Sartre does not take up a "mental image heaven" type of 
position which Dennett rightly brands as unscientific and as 
offering no plausible way forward. However, it could be 
argued that Sartre avoids what could be seen as Dennett's own 
mistake in misapplying scientific method in treating the 
human being in an inappropriate way as the same type of 
object as any other in the natural world. Sartre, it could 
be argued, is being more "scientific" in bearing in mind the 
evidence of human experience that we are not objects like any 
other but are "experiencing centres."
If we accept that point, then we do not go looking to confirm 
whether or not there is or is not an "image brain structure" 
and from this decide whether or not our experience of mental
images is illusory. We accept that we humans have the
experience of giving ourselves an "imaginary view" of
objects. I can just now imagine my old school, to go back to
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my earlier example. However I accomplish that experience, it 
patently is not an illusion. I carried out that act of 
imagination, I recall doing it and no "scientific 
explanation" can tell me that I did not really imagine the 
school. What can be done is to investigate the details of 
how the experience is accomplished, as Sartre has done.
Sartre has attempted to tease out the various elements 
involved in producing a mental image. Natural science could 
push this further in looking at how the brain works but such 
investigation is part of the process of showing how human 
consciousness is possible rather than explaining it away.
Sartre studies the human being in general in BN with the same 
type of approach. In BN he does not claim that there is a 
"ghost" inhabiting the human body but describes the human 
experience of being a conscious bodily existent who "lives" 
or "exists" the body. Sartre’s EX could be seen, therefore, 
as a concrete application of the BN type of view of the human 
being to a specific area of human life, the imagination. In 
showing how knowledge, affectivity, and movement come 
together in the mental image, Sartre's EX gives us a specific 
detailed example of how the integrated conscious bodily 
existent or "for-itself" of BN operates. Sartre's EX, then, 
can be seen as a specific example of the fruitfulness of 
Sartre's approach to the human being as more generally set 
out in BN.
I mentioned earlier that, since Sartre studies the mental 
image within its experiential context, he goes further than 
Dennett in that, having described the mental image and
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reached a hypothesis about how it is accomplished, he then 
broadens the question out to look at the place of imagination 
in human life. Before the close of this chapter, then, let 
us look briefly at what Sartre says here.
There are two main areas here. First, Sartre notes that 
mental images are used in the thought process even to the 
extent of producing imaginary "symbolic schemata" in the 
effort of understanding abstract concepts.59 Sartre asks why 
we turn to mental images. The second area is a far wider one 
in which Sartre asks whether or not imagination is essential 
to human consciousness and investigates what can be said 
about human consciousness from the fact that it has the 
capacity for imagination.
To take the first issue, Sartre immediately highlights the 
"symbolic function" of the mental image.60 He has already 
described how the mental image gives us a "view" of our 
intended object. The mental image, in this sense, symbolizes 
our intended object. Sartre argues that we turn to the 
mental image because of a basic desire to get a view or 
"intuition" of what we are thinking about. The abstract has 
to have some basis in the concrete otherwise it disappears as 
an absolute emptiness. Using mental images, including 
symbolic schemata, can be more primitive stages in the 
thought process leading up to the grasping of an abstract 
concept.
Sartre’s position here fits in with his position in BN that 
consciousness has to be consciousness of something and that
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we cannot conceive how a pure consciousness on its own could 
have anything to be conscious of. Consciousness cannot be 
such except as that of the integrated conscious bodily for- 
itself relating to the in-itself. The latter, through this 
relation, becomes the world but at the same time contingently 
exists irrespective of our existence and beyond our ability 
to control it by fiat of our wills. EX gives us a concrete 
example of how this situation is manifested in human life.
Our object is not here but we are not content with the pure 
thought of the object. Even though we know the object is 
absent, we still strive to get a grasp of it concretely 
before us, even if only in the imaginary.
Sartre discusses the second, wider area in the conclusion of 
EX. I described Sartre's position as looking at the mental 
image within its experiential context. Sartre broadens this 
out by looking at the mental image in relation to the human 
experience in general of being a conscious existent. He 
wants to investigate what we can say about the nature of 
consciousness from the fact that it imagines.
Sartre asks whether imagination is a "contingent" 
specification of consciousness or a "constitutive structure" 
of it.61 In other words, he is asking whether imagination is 
just an ancillary ability of consciousness or, on the 
contrary, an essential aspect of consciousness without which 
the latter would not be possible. By looking at the 
implications of the act of imagination, Sartre hopes to 
supply us with the answer.
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Sartre first of all states that consciousness is 
"constitutive of a w o r l d . "62 Sartre obviously does not mean 
"constitutive" in the sense in which Berkeley's God is 
constitutive of a world by means of ideas alone. For Sartre 
goes on to say that the fact that consciousness is 
constitutive of this particular world with its earth, 
animals, its people and their story is contingent.63 That it 
is this kind of world that we end up with is a contingent 
fact. This view here is totally in line with the BN position 
that the for-itself makes the in-itself a world while at the 
same time the in-itself exists contingently and independently 
of us and thus entails that the world has a "co-efficient of 
adversity" such that it can "resist" our wishes.
Sartre next looks at how we "constitute" the world in the 
concrete example of a particular moment of perception.
Sartre compares a perceptual act with that with an 
imaginative act. When I perceive an object, I may not 
actually be able to see it in its entirety. I nevertheless 
grasp the object as that object without having to imagine the 
hidden parts or even specifically think of them. Sartre 
gives the example of seeing patterns on a r u g . 64 Parts of 
some of them are hidden under the legs of an armchair. But I 
do not imagine the hidden parts or feel that they are absent. 
I simply "know" within the perception that the patterns 
continue under the chair. I do not imagine the hidden parts 
or concentrate on them. I perceive whole real patterns. 
Sartre draws from this the conclusion that whatever I 
perceive, I do so on the basis of reality as a whole without 
having to specifically attend to that whole reality for its
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own sake. The conscious human being, in a moment of 
perception, then, "constitutes the world" in that he or she 
treats the world as that whole reality which is the ground 
upon which is highlighted the particular object he or she is 
focusing on.
Sartre now looks at the imaginative act. E.g. I could form a 
mental image of the hidden patterns under the chair. For 
Sartre, this is a reversal of what happened in the perception 
of the patterns on the rug. During the perception, the 
hidden patterns were part of the reality as a whole on which 
my perception was grounded but which was not specifically 
attended to. But now when I imagine the hidden patterns, I 
isolate them, detaching them from reality as a whole to 
present them to myself in the imaginary way. I constitute 
the hidden patterns as an image. I know the hidden patterns 
are not actually visible but I "view" them in the imaginary 
way or, in Sartre's terminology, present them to myself in 
their absence or nothingness. From this, Sartre describes 
the imaginative act as "at once constitutive, isolating and 
annihilating."65
From all this, Sartre draws out what he believes to be the
two main conditions which consciousness must meet if it is to
be able to imagine. Firstly, "it must be able posit the
world in its synthetic totality" and secondly;
"it must be able to posit the imagined 
object as being out of reach of this 
synthetic totality, that is posit the 
world as a nothingness in relation to the 
image."66
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In simpler language, I have to grasp the world as the overall 
situation in which I live and which specifically is the 
situation in which I cannot have the object I imagine present 
before me in actuality. This is in fact a double negation: 
the world or my present situation lacks the presence of the 
object I aim at and the object I imagine lacks actual 
presence in the world before me. Sartre describes this as 
both a nothingness of the imagined object in relation to the 
world and a nothingness of the world in relation to the 
imagined object.67
Putting it in more general terms, Sartre is saying that to 
imagine, we must be able to constitute the world as a whole 
and negate it. For Sartre, this constitution and negation of 
the world is something that we do continuously in everyday 
life. It would be involved in, for example, perceiving an 
object, engaging in an action, or even affective situations 
such as missing a dead p e r s o n . 68 All these examples involve 
looking at the world from a particular perspective by which 
one makes it a whole and by which one negates it at the same 
time. I see a particular object, thus taking the world as 
the unified ground on which the object appears. For Sartre, 
there is a fundamental negation here in that merely by taking 
the world as a whole, one sets oneself up as "free" from 
it.69 This is in the BN sense of maintaining oneself as a 
conscious existent by being conscious of the world as not me. 
(In BN terms it would also, of course, involve negation in 
looking at the world as the ground for seeing this object 
rather than another.) Engaging in an action involves seeing 
the world as a whole or situation lacking something which I
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intend to rectify by my action. Missing a dead person means 
seeing the world as an emptiness in the light of the fact 
that one's friend is d e a d .70
Sartre concludes from this that the conditions for being able 
to imagine are the same as for being a conscious existent or 
experiencing centre in general. For Sartre, then, the 
ability to imagine is an essential one to consciousness. If 
consciousness were "in-the-midst-of-the-world"71 or a 
determined causal process like any other, it would be 
engulfed in the material world and would be unable to step 
back from it and negate it as a whole from a perspective. It 
would therefore not be able to imagine, nor could it 
meaningfully perceive, act or in any way rise out of the 
anonymity of, to use the BN term, the in-itself. It would 
not then even be consciousness. Sartre thus denotes the 
human being as a "being-in-the-world"72 rather than "in-the- 
midst-of-the-world" like the mute objects outside us.
(Sartre borrows these terms from Heidegger, though, of 
course, he puts his own slant on them).
For Sartre, then, the conditions which make imagination 
possible are the same ones that allow human consciousness to 
exist. Because of this, our everyday activities before real 
objects in the real world can easily, and often do, lead to 
mental images. As Sartre puts it, every concrete situation 
of the human being is "pregnant with imagination."73 The 
mental image is an explicit manifestation of our constitution 
and negation of the world.
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Up to this point, Sartre's position seems totally compatible
with his view of the conscious human being and the world as
set out in BN, only here focusing on the specific example of
imagination. However, in EX, Sartre pushes further forward
his view that the mental image is the manifestation of the
negating power of consciousness. He argues that the negating
function "can manifest itself only in an imaginative act."74
From what we have just seen about negation in everyday
activities, Sartre obviously does not mean that only a mental
image involves negation whereas action, perception or
anything else does not. What he ia doing is to label our
non-imaginative activities as implicitly imaginative in so
far as they involve negating the world in identifying a lack
to be plugged. Whenever the conscious human being is
involved in a situation in the "real," i.e. non-imagined,
world, there is, according to Sartre's formulation, an
implicit reference to a corresponding imaginary element (the
lack to be filled). Or in Sartre's words;
"the realizing consciousness always 
includes a retreat towards a particular 
imaginative consciousness which is like 
the reverse of the situation and in 
relation to which the situation is 
defined."75
The imaginary, Sartre says, is the implicit meaning of the 
real.76
I find Sartre's position here unsatisfactory. Earlier in EX, 
as we have seen, Sartre rigorously distinguished perception 
and other activities in the "real" world from the separate 
"unreal" world of the imaginary. Sartre is now blurring this 
distinction by talking of a hidden retreat to the imaginary
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involved in our activities in the real w o r l d . 77 vJe could 
point to some justification of Sartre's position here. For 
example, when one engages in an action - e.g. building a 
fence - one is thinking of an as yet non-existent object 
which one wishes to bring into existence. One could call 
this non-existent fence an "imaginary" one and, before 
carrying out the task, one could make the negation explicitly 
manifest by producing a mental image of the future fence. 
However, acting in the real world with a goal in mind is 
quite distinct in our experience from producing mental 
images. When I act to achieve something, I perform the task 
in the real world with the attitude that I have a specific 
concrete goal which I fully expect to achieve in the world.
In the light of this, it does not seem appropriate to 
describe the goal as part of the "imaginary" and as something 
we "retreat" to. The goal, rather, is an integral aspect of 
what we experience as concrete acts in the real world.
Sartre, I believe, rectifies this fault in BN. As we looked 
at earlier, in BN, Sartre studies action and how this 
involves projecting a non-existent state of affairs that one 
intends to bring into existence. Sartre does not in BN 
identify such lacks as imaginary but, as we saw earlier, 
gives them a new term, "negatites" (literally "negatities"). 
This, I would argue, is more appropriate and preserves the 
distinction between the attitude of imagination and that 
involved in attending to the real world.
Notwithstanding this qualification, however, I believe we can 
see how EX can be treated retrospectively as an illustration
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of the usefulness of Sartre's BN type of approach to the 
human being as a conscious bodily existent or for-itself. In 
particular, Sartre's acceptance of the experience of the 
mental image allied to investigation of how it is 
accomplished by an integration of knowledge, affectivity and 
movement gives us a practical application of Sartre's 
approach in BN of treating consciousness as such but as 
arising out of the unified conscious bodily existent or for- 
itself.
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CHAPTER 5; THE "SKETCH FOR A THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS” AS AN 
APPLICATION OF "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS"
Sartre's Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions,! published in 
1939, a year before EX, can, I believe, also be looked at as 
a concrete application of the BN type of approach to the 
human being to a particular area of human life, in this case 
the emotions. The Sketch (as the work will hereafter be 
referred to) can serve retrospectively as an illustration of 
how the integrated conscious bodily human being or for-itself 
of BN operates.
Sartre himself points us in the direction of treating the 
Sketch in this way. In his introduction and conclusion to 
the Sketch, Sartre stresses that his investigation of the 
emotions requires a fuller theory of the human being and the 
world in general. In the introduction, Sartre says that he 
is offering only a sketch of a phenomenological theory of the 
emotions. A full phenomenology, he suggests, would first of 
all set out the essence of "man," "consciousness" and the 
"world." This would also be an "anthropology,"2 in Sartre's 
wide sense of the term, giving us the essence of what it is 
to be human. Work such as the Sketch would eventually rest 
on the foundation of this fuller phenomenology. In the 
conclusion, Sartre designates the fuller theory as 
"progressive"3 phenomenology which subsumes "regressive"4 
phenomenology or particular investigations such as that of 
the emotions. Here, I should point out that Sartre in the 
Sketch deals primarily with emotions in the sense of full 
scale emotional outpourings such as a fit of anger. I will 
have more to say on this aspect of the Sketch later.
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Sartre's later BN provided the fuller phenomenology.
However, I believe that a close reading of the Sketch shows 
that Sartre at this stage is already operating under the same 
basic view of the conscious human being and the world that he 
expounds at length later, in BN. He does not yet use the 
terms "for-itself" and "in-itself" but the basic meanings of 
the concepts can be found in the Sketch. Sartre here insists 
that the human being must be studied in terms of 
consciousness but he also views consciousness and the body as 
aspects of a synthesis. He also talks of the body as 
"immediately l i v e d"5 by consciousness, anticipating the 
detailed study of the lived body undertaken by Sartre in BN. 
He applies this kind of thinking in the Sketch in studying 
how our emotions are expressed physically. Sartre, then, is 
clearly operating in the Sketch with the same basic view of 
the human being as an integrated conscious bodily existent or 
for-itself that he employs in BN. Hence Sartre in the Sketch 
(and elsewhere) sometimes uses the term "consciousness" as 
synonymous with "human being," the proviso being that the 
consciousness spoken of is always the embodied consciousness 
of the human being.
Sartre's treatment of the world in the Sketch is also similar 
to his BN view. He views the world as a deterministic one in 
which we have to follow difficult procedures in order to 
achieve our goals. But he also looks at how the world 
appears to us objectively as imbued with our interests. This 
is consistent with Sartre's view in BN of how being-in-itself 
exists independently and contingently but only appears as a
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"world," strictly speaking, through the for-itself*s 
consciousness of it.
I shall therefore attempt here to show how the Sketch can 
serve as an illustration of the usefulness of Sartre’s 
approach to the human being. In this regard, the Sketch is 
particularly interesting in that Sartre there makes some 
explicit points about methodology, points he puts into 
practice in the later EN without specifically discussing them 
for themselves.
Sartre begins with his methodological points. He attacks the 
prevalent approach of psychology to the human being as too 
narrowly "scientific." The psychologist using this approach 
treats his or her subject, the human being, as the physicist 
treats his.6 (Going back to my earlier examples, this is the 
same basic approach used by Armstrong or Dennett. )
Sartre makes two main criticisms of this approach by which he 
also sets out his own methodological principles. Firstly, he 
argues that the narrow scientific approach, as I will call 
it, has a too restricted concept of experience. (E.g. 
studying only the physical behaviour and physiological 
changes in the body involved in emotion without any wider 
view of what emotion means for the human being.) Sartre, 
using Husserlian terminology, argues that room must be made 
for the "experience of essences. "7 We need not get bogged 
down in the Husserlian terminology here. Sartre’s basic 
point is that by the very fact that we decide to investigate 
the emotions we, who are the people who have the emotions.
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already have some idea, even if undeveloped, of what emotion 
as our experience is. Or, to use the terminology, we already 
have experience of the essence of emotion.
This leads on to Sartre's second criticism of the narrow 
approach. Sartre's complaint is that it does not take 
account of the fact that, in studying the human being, the 
investigator "ia himself that which he is studying."8 From 
this perspective, to study the human being with the same 
attitude the physicist takes with his or her subject is to 
ignore an important aspect of the human being. It entails 
that he or she is not studying human beings as they actually 
are.
Earlier, I argued that we must take account of the fact that, 
in our everyday lives, we feel ourselves to be "experiencing 
centres" for whom the things and events of the world mean 
something. I argued that any reductionist theory trying to 
explain this "conscious" aspect of human existence away by 
identifying it with the purely physical grates against our 
experience since, no matter what the theory says, we still 
have the feeling of ourselves as experiencing centres. I 
argued that it was therefore more true to the facts to accept 
consciousness as such while at the same time allowing for the 
study of what makes it possible. I treated BN as a detailed 
carrying out of such an approach. Sartre here in the Sketch 
is explicitly stating that this is his type of approach. He 
wants to attempt to study the emotions in terms of the 
conscious human being.
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Sartre next gives a general overview and criticism of classic 
and psychoanalytic theories of the emotions. I am not here 
going to deal with these theories in detail. However, it 
will be useful to briefly look at Sartre's treatment of them 
for the light they shed on the kind of problems Sartre wants 
to solve with his own theory. As against the peripheric 
theory which concentrates on the physical aspects of emotion, 
Sartre wants to formulate a theory of the emotions 
introducing consciousness as their producer. As against the 
Gestaltists and psychoanalytic theorists, Sartre wants his 
theory to use the concept of consciousness explicitly and 
consistently.
The peripheric theory, as expounded by William James among 
others, literally puts the consciousness of the emotion on 
the periphery and lays most emphasis on the physical bodily 
occurrence. A feeling of sadness does not cause a woman to 
cry. It is, rather, the other way round: the woman is sad
because she cries. Emotion is simply a bodily upset and an 
awareness of it. For Sartre, this theory cannot adequately 
explain the emotions. For example, he notes that the 
physiological conditions of the body in anger and joy are 
very similar, the physiological upset in anger being slightly 
more intense. "For all that," Sartre says, "anger is not a 
greater intensity of joy; it is something else, at least as 
it presents itself to consciousness."9 Our experience as 
conscious human beings of feelings of joy and anger and so on 
cannot be reduced to the bodily occurrences accompanying 
them.
Page - 300
Sartre with his theory, then, will try to explain the 
emotions with reference to consciousness, to show how the 
conscious human being becomes emotional. However, this 
leaves Sartre with the problem of showing how consciousness 
relates to what we ordinarily see as the bodily 
manifestations of emotions such as quickening of the 
heartbeat, tears etc. This mirrors the problem we saw 
earlier at the general level of how consciousness is related 
to the body.
Sartre sees other theorists, such as Janet, the Gestaltists 
and the psychoanalysts as going beyond the peripheric theory 
but not far enough. Janet studies emotional behaviour rather 
than just physiological upsets. He views emotional behaviour 
as one of defeat brought on when life becomes too difficult. 
Janet gives the example of a patient who wants to make a 
confession. However, it is too difficult for her so she 
breaks down and cries.10 For Sartre, this usefully 
introduces "finality,"H looking at the ends involved in a 
human enterprise. According to Sartre, however, Janet does 
not pursue this consistently. He talks of the emotional 
behaviour as an automatic diversion of liberated nervous 
energy, thus heading back in the direction of peripheric 
theory.
Sartre sees the Gestaltists as more consistently using the 
concept of finality. For example, they treat anger as 
functional, as in the case of tearing up the paper on which a 
problem is written. They study the break-up of one "form" 
and its replacement by another, e.g. calmness replaced by the
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State of anger, Sartre insists, however, that we must have 
some conception of consciousness as that which constitutes 
the different forms and is continuous through them.12
Sartre commends psychoanalysis for examining the 
"significance" to the human individual as a whole of "psychic 
facts" such as the emotions.13 Sartre gives the example of a 
woman who faints whenever she sees laurel. The psychoanalyst 
discovers that she had an unfortunate experience in childhood 
in a locale with laurel bushes. The psychoanalyst's 
explanation is that the woman faints to avoid the painful 
memory motivated by the laurel.14
Sartre accepts the use of finality here. However, he rejects 
the underlying principle of psychic causality employed by 
psychoanalysis.15 Emotional behaviour is seen as caused by 
the "unconscious." For Sartre, this detracts from the idea 
of significance that psychoanalysis introduced. There is an 
inconsistency in that emotional behaviour is looked on as 
both purposive and as the result of an unconscious causal 
process. Sartre wants to show how emotion is the product of 
a unitary consciousness.
However, this leaves Sartre with his own problem. Sartre 
himself admits that the significance of our emotions is not 
always explicit. They are not a matter of voluntary 
deliberation. We even sometimes struggle against our 
emotions, e.g. trying to master our fear or control our 
anger. "Thus", Sartre concedes:
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"we have not only no consciousness of any 
finality of emotion, we are also 
rejecting emotion with all our strength 
and it invades us in spite of ourselves. 
Phenomenology must resolve these 
contradictions."16
Psychoanalysis, then, has accounted for this problem in its
own way with its notion of the unconscious. Sartre is
rejecting the unconscious but he will then have to find his
own way to account for this problem.
Before we look at Sartre's sketch of a theory, then, we can 
sum up the task before him. He has to formulate a theory of 
the emotions showing explicitly and consistently how 
consciousness is responsible for them. In doing so he must 
also try to account for two outstanding issues: the relation
of consciousness to the physical aspects of emotions and the 
problem of the "unconscious." Let us now look at Sartre's 
sketch of a theory, bearing these points in mind.
First of all, let us remember that Sartre deals primarily 
with full scale emotional outpourings such as flight in fear 
or a fit of anger with bodily behaviour and physiological 
occurrences such as the pounding of the heart or trembling. 
Sartre looks at various examples of such emotions. However, 
he first of all makes what for him is an essential point from 
the outset. This is that the individual acting emotionally, 
or the emotional consciousness from Sartre's perspective, is 
primarily non-reflective and directed at the emotive object 
in the world rather than at the "emotional state" itself, 
though reflection on the latter is a possible secondary 
phenomenon.
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What Sartre is saying here is that when I am angry or afraid, 
I do not first of all reflect on the fact that I an angry or 
afraid. Such reflection is perfectly possible but anger or 
fear means first of all being conscious of the fearful or 
hateful object. The experience of anger or fear is first of 
all an awareness of some object which has the quality of 
hatefulness or of being frightening. E.g. I am aware of a 
despicable person or of a menacing dog. During the 
experience, the "despicableness" is part of the person or the 
"menace" is part of the dog. It is only secondarily that I 
can reflect on myself and tell myself explicitly that I am 
angry or afraid.
For Sartre, then, when one acts emotionally one does not 
primarily reflect on oneself. But this does not mean that 
one is "unconscious." One has a "non-positional" or "non- 
thetic" consciousness of self. That is, I experience 
carrying out the activity I am engaged in but without 
specifically going through a mental process of saying to 
myself that I am going through this activity. For Sartre, 
this applies to any of our normal everyday activities, not 
just to the emotions.
This is the same view that we saw Sartre employs later in BN 
with his notion of the "pre-reflective cogito" and also 
earlier in The Transcendence of the Ego (see Chapter 1 of 
this thesis). I believe Sartre is correct here. Human 
beings do not engage in a continuous introspection. Yet my 
activities are precisely my activities and, as we saw Sartre 
argue in BN, if I was not conscious of self in the primary
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non-thetic way then I would not be able to reflect on my 
activities as mine. I would not be able to connect them to 
myself.
In the Sketch, Sartre gives his notion of non-thetic
consciousness of self an interesting and dramatic twist when
he states that:
"unreflective conduct is not unconscious 
conduct. It is non-thetically conscious 
of self; and its way of being conscious 
Q f  s e l f  i s  t o  t r a n s c e n d  a n d  a p p r e h e n d  
i t s e l f  Q u t - l n  t h e - w o r l d . a s a  q u a l i t y  o f  
things."17
Consciousness is not primarily conscious of self but of the 
world. However, this world is its world with objects that 
concern it with qualities of being joyous or horrible and so 
on that it puts into them. Sartre is here giving a 
conception of the world as "self-ized," if I can put it that 
way. Consciousness, in being conscious of the world, is 
being conscious of itself non-reflectively in seeing its 
concerns out there in the world.
Let me now give a brief overview of Sartre's theory.
Firstly, Sartre notes that the goals of our normal everyday 
activity have to be achieved in specific ways involving 
difficult procedures. To take my own example, to fix my 
television set I have to solder wires, replace valves and so 
on. Our world is difficult. When this difficulty becomes 
too much for us we become emotional, transforming ourselves 
so that we can transform the world into one not governed by 
difficult procedures but by "magic." E.g. I attempt to fix 
my television set but to no avail. It is too difficult. I
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throw down my tools in disgust and give the television set an 
angry thump, exclaiming "oh that damned stupid thing!" But 
this emotional behaviour is not effectual. It does not try 
to alter the object by normal procedures. Rather, by magic 
it imposes a new quality on it. E.g. by my tantrum I 
transform the television set from the object I dearly want to 
repair into "that damned stupid thing" which I am not going 
to bother with any more.
In this example I am not reflecting that I have made myself 
angry to get out of a difficult task. Nevertheless, under 
Sartre’s view of consciousness, it is not the case that my 
"sub-conscious" mind has caused my anger and that I am 
unaware of this. It is just that consciousness is not 
reflecting on itself but is directed at the television set 
"needing to be fixed" and then at the television set that has 
become that "damned stupid thing."
Let us now look at Sartre's theory in more detail. The
grasping of specific means (difficult procedures) as the only
way to achieve our goals is described by Sartre as "the
pragmatic intuition of the determinism of the w o r l d . "18
Sartre compares the world, as the environment in which our
activities have to take place, with a pin-ball machine:
"you ... set the little balls rolling: 
there are pathways traced between hedges 
of pins, and holes pierced where the 
pathways cross one another. The ball is 
required to complete a predetermined 
course, making use of the required paths 
and without dropping into the holes.
This world is difficult."19
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Sartre is here simply referring to the fact of our experience 
that specific actions are required to achieve our goals. We 
cannot achieve them by waving a magic wand. Our "normal, 
well adapted activity" accepts this.20
Sartre contrasts this with emotional behaviour in which one 
acts on the world as if it were governed by magic. Emotion 
for Sartre, then, involves a transformation of the world.
The task is too difficult and I cannot put up with this 
difficult world any longer. I therefore try to change the 
world by living it as though it was governed by magic rather 
than pin-ball machine style determinism. I do this non- 
reflectively. I am not specifically conscious of my 
emotional condition but, rather, of the magical world. 
However, this emotional conduct is not effectual. I do not 
modify the object by using procedures. I just impose a new 
quality on it (like the stupidness of my television set).
Sartre gives a simple example of this imposition of a new 
quality on the object of consciousness. I lift my hand to 
pluck a bunch of grapes but find that they are beyond my 
reach. I "resolve" the difficulty by shrugging my shoulders 
and muttering that the grapes are too green, magically 
conferring on them the disagreeable quality. For Sartre, 
emotion is an extreme version of this type of behaviour. In 
the grapes example, he says, "the comedy is only half 
sincere";
"But let the situation be more critical; 
let the incantory behaviour be maintained 
in all seriousness: and there you have
emotion."21
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Sartre examines various cases of full-blown emotions where we 
are really captivated by the new quality of the object. We 
believe it and our behaviour together with the physiological 
changes in our body (e.g. pounding of the heart) express 
this:
"during emotion, it is the body which, 
directed by the consciousness, changes 
its relationship with the world so that 
the world should change its qualities.
If emotion is play-acting, the play is 
one that we believe i n . "22
Sartre looks first at "passive f e a r ."23 He takes the example 
of fainting at the sight of a ferocious beast. This seems to 
be the least well-adapted response one could take since it 
leaves me defenceless before the danger. However, it makes 
sense as purposive magical behaviour. I faint, suppressing 
myself as if by doing this I will have suppressed the beast.
Sartre next turns to flight in "active f e a r ,"24 e.g. fleeing 
from the ferocious beast. This might seem a puzzling example 
to use in that running away could well be effective if I 
succeed in shaking the beast off and thus escape the danger. 
What Sartre is saying, however, is that as emotional 
behaviour it does not have that kind of rational intention.
As emotion its magical purpose is to flee from the beast, to 
turn away from it as if that would make it disappear.
Flight, Sartre says, is "fainting away in p l a y . "25
From fear, Sartre moves on to sadness, firstly "passive 
s a d n e s s . "26 This is characterized by dejected behaviour.
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muscular relaxation and cold at the extremities. One sulks 
and tries to have the least possible contact with the outside 
world. One seeks out solitude, to be "alone with one's 
sorrow."
However, for Sartre, this appearing to meditate on one's 
sorrows is part of the act. One is faced with one's normal 
daily activities, the usual things "to be done." However, 
one is deprived of one of the "accustomed conditions" of 
one's activity. Melancholy is a way of suppressing the 
obligation to find new ways of going about one's activities 
without the accustomed condition. Sartre gives the example 
of becoming financially ruined so that one is deprived of 
one's usual means of transport, one's c a r .27 Melancholy, 
here, is a way of suppressing the need to look for new ways 
of coping with one's activities, e.g. taking the bus. It 
turns the world into a bleak one where one no longer cares 
about the "things to be done." (We could think of stronger 
examples such as a person whose loved one has died and who 
"cannot live without her.")
For Sartre, such emotion transforms our normal differentiated 
affective world into one of "affective z e r o ."28 My world is 
normally one in which I have numerous activities of varying 
importance, friends I especially like to see and so on. 
However, I cannot bear dealing with all this without the 
thing or person I have lost. I suppress it all by 
withdrawing into the refuge of my room, turning the world 
outside into a bleak one where things no longer matter.
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Again, this is ineffectual. It does not help us cope with 
our activities, it just confers a quality of being valueless
on them. One is hiding from them just as the fainter hides
from the beast.
Sartre next considers the "active" form of sadness.29 He 
takes Janet’s example of a woman patient who came to see him 
to make a confession but, in the event, could not bear to do 
so and burst into tears.30 Sartre views the sobbing as a 
magical behaviour by which the woman transforms the world 
into an incredibly hostile and demanding one. While she is 
sobbing at this hostile world she cannot make the confession;
it will have to be made later.
Again, this behaviour is ineffectual. It is a "magical play­
acting of impotence"31 which only postpones the task to be 
performed. However, Sartre stresses that he does not mean 
that this is a case of reflective behaviour deliberately 
employing crocodile tears. The woman is not specifically 
thinking about herself: she is directed at the confession to
be made and the world which is hostile.
Moving on to Sartre's discussion of anger, he considers this 
emotion to be "the most evidently functional."32 Sartre 
gives various examples, e.g. being unable to resolve a 
problem and "resolving" the trouble by tearing up the paper 
on which it is written.33 Or, in the course of a battle of 
banter with a friend, I cannot think of a quick come-back to 
his last witticism. So instead of a witticism I go into a 
fit of anger.34 % magically impose the quality of
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hatefulness on the object so that I can reproach it, avoiding 
the original problem. Again we see the ineffectualness: the
tension is resolved but not the actual original problem which 
is avoided.
Up to this point, Sartre has been dealing only with 
distinctly unhappy situations. Sartre admits that joy would 
not at first sight fit his theory. However, Sartre claims 
that a closer look shows that joy can indeed takes it place 
within his theory. He views it as magical impatient 
behaviour. He gives the example of someone who has just been 
told that he has won a lot of money or that he is soon going 
to see a long-absent loved o n e .35 The object of the lucky 
person's desire (the money or the loved one) is on its way 
but therefore still separated from him by a length of time. 
Also, to use the money or to relate to the loved one is going 
to involve specific activities over a long period of time in 
the "pin-ball" deterministic world. For now, one indulges 
oneself, dancing for joy to symbolically or magically possess 
one's desired object in an instant.
Even joy, then, is ineffectual in Sartre's theory. It is 
ineffectual in the sense that it can only mimic total 
possession of its object. The object will ultimately have to 
be related to by deterministic procedures.
Sartre also considers the slightly different type of full­
blown emotion involved in immediate reactions of horror and 
wonder. E.g. I am frozen in terror at the sight of a 
grimacing face at the w i n d o w .36 For Sartre, this is an
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inversion of the situation in the other examples. I was 
expecting the normal deterministic world but suddenly 
confront an unexpected magical aspect of the world. I am 
frozen in terror, believing the face can act on me now 
magically despite the space and the window between us.
This concludes Sartre's series of cases of full-blown 
emotion. Sartre stresses that he is not claiming that his 
series is definitive. There are an infinite variety of 
different types of emotions, e.g. anger developing from fear 
(or anger as "fear s u r p a s s e d"37 ), we have to look at each 
particular emotional situation. The cases Sartre has looked 
at are simply examples to illustrate his theory.
Sartre now considers in more detail the relationship between 
consciousness and the body when we are engaged in the kind of 
full-blown emotional behaviour as in his examples. This is 
the aspect of the Sketch I find most important for my 
purposes, more so even than whether or not Sartre's precise 
interpretation of emotion as magical avoidance of problems is 
correct (though I will also consider that question). I have 
studied BN as showing how the human being should be looked at 
as an integrated conscious bodily existent whose conscious 
life can be accepted as such rather than be reduced to 
something else. The Sketch gives us an example of this 
approach in practice in the particular area of the emotions. 
Sartre tries to show how the emotions are the meaningful 
product of the conscious or experiencing human being but also 
how at the very same time they are a way the human being as a
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conscious bodily existent directly experiences the world in 
which he or she lives.
Sartre treats an instance of full-blown emotion in a similar 
way to how he treats the mental image in EX. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, Sartre views the mental image as a 
synthesis of an imaginative attitude towards an object, the 
affective sense one has of the object and also bodily 
movement which performs the function of making the object 
seem actually present. Sartre, in the Sketch, treats 
emotional outpourings in a similar way as a synthesis of a 
particular type of attitude to the world and its objects and 
an accompanying physiological upset of the body which 
symbolizes our seriousness in this new attitude. The one 
major difference from the case of the mental image is that 
the emotional attitude confronts the object directly rather 
than through an analogue.
From Sartre's examples, we can see that there are three main 
aspects of an emotional outpouring. Firstly, the 
directedness of consciousness towards an emotive object (e.g. 
the frightening beast); secondly, emotional behaviour 
(running away, screaming or whatever); and thirdly, 
physiological disorder of the body (e.g. trembling). A full- 
scale emotional outpouring of the type in Sartre's examples 
has all three aspects. The physiological aspect raises the 
question of the relationship between consciousness and the 
body in emotion.
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A full-blown emotion, for Sartre, is accompanied by belief.
It is "almost undergone,"38 he says. That is, we are quite 
seriously engaged in an emotional attitude: we are not
jesting. Emotion is not something we can put on merely by
displaying the appropriate behaviour such as running away. 
E.g. I really believe a certain object is horrifying and my 
physiological condition, trembling etc., expresses this. I 
am spellbound by the horrifying quality I put into the
object. Neither can I stop emotion at will; it is more like
something that "fades away of itself."39
For Sartre, then, the physiological phenomena "represent the 
genuineness of the emotion, they are the phenomena of 
belief."40 The physiological aspect is part of the synthesis 
of the emotion along with the directedness to the object and 
the behaviour. The physiological phenomena are analogous to 
the behaviour, e.g. the trembling expresses the fear for 
which one is running away. But at the same time they cannot 
be reduced to the behaviour. They cannot be stopped like the 
behaviour (e.g. in fear "one can stop oneself from running 
but not from trembling.")41 Physical upset is an essential 
part of emotion.
This directly faces us with the problem of the body. Sartre 
has been trying to show how emotion is produced by 
consciousness but here he is admitting that uncontrollable 
physiological disturbance is essential to it. Sartre's 
answer is that the physiological disturbance is meaningless 
except as part of the synthesis of emotion that the conscious 
human being enters into. It is here that we can see how
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Sartre is operating with the same view of the human being as 
an integrated conscious bodily existent that he employs in BN 
(as we discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis).
Sartre points out that the body has a dual nature since it is 
an observable object in the world but is also "immediately 
lived by the c o n s c i o u s n e s s ."42 The body is the lived body of 
the conscious human being. Sartre even describes the body as 
"the point of view upon the universe immediately inherent in 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ."43 Sartre in this way inverts the traditional 
notion of the mind in the body.
This consciousness which lives the body transforms itself to 
live the world in the magical way. It therefore transforms 
the body too. It is similar to falling asleep and becoming a 
dreaming c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 44 what Sartre means by all this is 
that becoming emotional is a spontaneous activity of the 
integrated conscious bodily human being. He points out that 
the physiological disorder involved is a fairly ordinary 
upset of the body 4 5  (and we can recall that the upset is 
similar for two very different emotions, anger and joy). The 
upset is spontaneously lived by the conscious human being and 
only has significance as an aspect of emotion through this.
It is in this sense that Sartre describes the upset as the 
body "raised to the level of b e h a v i o u r."46
All this is done in a non-reflective way. We have a non- 
thetic consciousness only of the finality of our emotion. We 
are primarily directed at the magical world. One is non- 
thetically conscious of oneself only and it is only to this
Page - 315
extent, for Sartre, that emotion is insincere. Consciousness 
is "caught in its own s n a r e . "47 it reacts to its emotive 
object but this reaction is itself emotional and heightens 
the emotion. E.g. in the case of fear, "[t]he faster one 
flees the more one is a f r a i d . "48 Consciousness attributes 
the captivating quality to the frightening or whatever object 
and it can be freed only by a purifying reflection or by the 
disappearance of the emotional situation.
Sartre has in this way, I believe, given us a practical 
demonstration of the usefulness of his BN type of approach 
towards the human being as an integrated conscious bodily 
existent. The human being is a biological body in the world. 
That biological body gives rise to what we call 
consciousness. From a certain perspective, this 
consciousness cannot be reduced to something non-conscious. 
That is, any attempt to reduce it still leaves us with our 
own experience of ourselves as conscious. E.g. if we were to 
"translate" the emotions into Armstrong language as purely 
dispositions to behave in certain sorts of ways, then there 
would be something left over and unaccounted for. That is, I 
can still recall my vivid emotional experience of the hateful 
person or the frightening beast. We experience ourselves as 
conscious bodily existants and this experience is as much 
part of the evidence to be examined as is the physical body 
that can be observed as an object in the outside world.
Sartre has not cut out either aspect of the human being in 
his treatment of the emotions. He has looked at how the 
human being as a conscious bodily existent sometimes reacts 
to the world in the emotional way, an experience involving an
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attitude to the world and an expression of this attitude in 
the physiological condition of the body.
I shall later move on to consider the question regarding how 
useful Sartre's theory is in actually interpreting the 
meaning of emotion for the human being. But first of all, am 
I correct to place the Sketch within a wider view of the 
conscious human being and the world akin to that of BN?
Ronald Aronson in his book, Jean-Paul Sartre - Philosophy in 
the W o r l d 49 alternatively characterizes Sartre at the stage 
of the Sketch as setting up an opposition between 
consciousness, viewed as signifying and as distinct from the 
determined objects outside it, and the Newtonian-style 
deterministic world, with no idea that consciousness forms 
this world.
However, I believe Aronson's account of what Sartre says in 
the Sketch is too simplistic. In the introduction, Sartre 
speaks of how a fuller phenomenology would investigate the 
source of the world, the "transcendental and constitutive 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s"50 (borrowing a term from Husserl once again). 
Sartre does not elaborate further, that is left to the future 
progression, but it shows that Sartre even here is operating 
with an idea of the world as owing its form in some way to 
consciousness. There is a balance in Sartre's comments about 
the world in the Sketch. On the one hand, the world is 
marked out with our concerns and interests (one's self out 
in the world as a quality of things) and we can act on it 
but, on the other hand, we cannot act by fiat, to get what we 
want requires us to go by the rules of the "real" world by
Page - 317
using specific procedures. This is the same type of balance 
as in BN: the for-itself makes the in-itself a world through
its consciousness of it but the in-itself is independent 
being and does not of itself require to be made into a world 
and leaves the world with a co-efficient of adversity which 
resists us.
Aronson also argues that in the Sketch and in EX 
consciousness is opposed to the deterministic world and is 
free only to "withdraw" from it into imagery or the 
emotions.51 Again, I believe this is too simple. In EX, as 
we saw in the preceding chapter, Sartre sees negating 
activity as involved in action or affactivity ( e.g. missing 
a dead person), although he viewed this as an implicit 
reference to the "imaginary." Also, Sartre's examples of 
imagining objects absent friends etc. presuppose perceiving 
and acting in the world first, otherwise we would not have 
anything to represent in imagery. In the Sketch, emotional 
behaviour is an escape into magic we sometimes use when we 
cannot cope with the determinism of the world. But this 
presupposes our using our freedom in the deterministic world, 
filling it with our concerns and choosing the activities we 
carry out. In this respect, we should remember that Sartre 
does not simply talk of the determinism of the world but of 
the "pragmatic intuition of the determinism of the w o r l d . "52 
We pragmatically respect the determinism of the world and 
work with it in order to achieve our goals. In BN, Sartre 
does talk more of actions in the world but this is not a 
stunning departure from the earlier works. They were 
concerned with more limited aspects of human life. In BN, as
Page - 318
he had already presaged in the Sketch, Sartre extends his 
analysis.
We can now return to the question of how Sartre's sketch of a 
theory stands up as an interpretation of what emotion means 
for the human being. The first point to note is that Sartre 
concentrates on the emotions in the sense of full outbursts 
of emotional behaviour. But surely this is too restrictive. 
What about the emotions people may be said to have not just 
in outbursts but also generally in normal life? E.g. the 
love of one's wife or husband or someone who is not at this 
moment jumping for joy or wailing in sorrow but who if he or 
she is asked about it or reflects on it will say that he or 
she is generally happy with life or full of sadness.
However, we must remember that Sartre is offering a sketch of 
a theory only. He concentrates on full-blown emotional 
behaviour as the culmination of our emotionality and since it 
presents philosophical problems about the relation of 
consciousness to the body. But a close reading of the Sketch 
shows that Sartre does also have a wider conception of 
emotion.
In his introduction, Sartre says that a proper 
phenomenological study of the emotions "would deal with 
affectivity as an existential mode of human reality."53 i 
take this to mean that all our activities and dealings with 
things in the world involve emotion in the sense of the 
"feel" or affective quality they have for us. In this 
respect, we can recall that Sartre says in EX that we imbue
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all objects that we perceive with affectivity and that these 
affective qualities are bound up in the objects as their 
deepest sense for us. Sartre also, when considering the 
example of joy, distinguishes between joy as a full-blown 
emotion and joy as "the joyful feeling which betokens an 
equilibrium or a state of adaptation."54
Full-blown emotional behaviour, then, is a case where our 
affectivity becomes heightened and is given priority. E.g. 
the person I love whom I have not seen for a long time is 
invested with a quality of belovedness. When I jump for joy 
at seeing the person again, I give this quality heightened 
importance (though, of course, I am directed at the person 
who has this quality, not at the latter per se).
Sartre’s theory of the (full-blown) emotions, then, rests on
this prior emotionality or affectivity of ours. This is also
borne out by Sartre's view, in the Sketch, of the world as
mapped out with our concerns. This affectivity is a
practical example of how we make the world properly our
world. Sartre's conclusion also bears out the view that
Sartre has a wider view of emotionality on which the
outpourings rest. For there he again speaks of how his
regression on the emotions is limited. It is a theory of
emotion which;
"postulates an antecedent description of 
affectivity so far as the latter 
constitutes the being of the human- 
reality - i.e. in so far as it is 
constitutive of our human-reality to be 
affective human-reality."55
In the progression, we would proceed from such a wider view.
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This general affective aspect of human beings allows us to 
account for "general" emotions such as the love of a husband 
and wife for each other. The couple are not at this moment 
engaged in a passionate embrace and are not even with each 
other but the love still exists. It is a quality they have 
put into the world and it comes to the fore in emotional 
moments.
Sartre also allows for emotional moments which have not 
reached the full-scale level. He talks of "subtle"56 
emotions where one grasps an emotive quality of the world but 
not to the extent of being overcome by it. There are also 
"weak"57 emotional moments in which one imbues objects with 
only a weak affective character. Sartre also identifies 
"spurious"58 emotional moments, e.g. feigning delight at a 
gift I am not really greatly interested in. Sartre by no 
means, then, restricts us to emotional outbursts.
But as regards the latter, Sartre stresses their 
ineffectualness and how they are a self-deluding attempt at 
escape. Sartre in his discussion of psychoanalytic theorists 
even describes them as "bad faith,"59 the term he uses 
extensively in the later BN. This raises the question of the 
value of the emotions. If the emotions are avoidance 
behaviour or bad faith, is Sartre suggesting that we should 
give them up?
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Spiegelberg sees Sartre as heading in this direction. As 
regards this issue, he writes in The Phenomenological 
Movement;
"This strikingly low estimate of the 
place and right of the emotions in the 
human economy would seem to suggest that 
an authentic existence which faces up to 
the world would not only have to purify 
but to eliminate the emotions completely, 
as the stoics would have us do. Sartre 
does not suggest this explicitly. But 
this is one of those occasions where his 
underlying Cartesianism comes to the 
fore. Certainly, Sartre is anything but 
an emotive irrationalist.
... his 'theory' may well serve as a 
working hypothesis, provided it does not 
block our way to alternative hypotheses.
A less rationalistic and moralistic 
approach might well consider whether 
emotions do not have such alternative 
functions as preparation for active 
change rather than for futile escape from 
reality."60
Certainly, Sartre does emphasize the escapism of the 
emotions. However, I believe three things Sartre says in the 
Sketch counter-balance the impression that he is "anti­
emotions." Firstly there is his view that it is part of the 
essence of the human being to be "affective human reality." 
Secondly, there is Sartre's characterization of the emotional 
consciousness as non-thetically conscious so that the 
emotions are "insincere" only to that extent, not pre- 
meditatively. Thirdly and finally, there is Sartre's 
declaration towards the end of the book that emotion is one 
of the "great" and "essential" attitudes of consciousness.
Let me now look at each of the three in turn.
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As I discussed earlier, for Sartre progressive phenomenology 
would proceed from a basis viewing the human being as in 
essence affective human-reality. In the Sketch, Sartre 
implicitly operates with a wider view of emotionality in the 
sense that the human being as an affective being fills the 
world with his or her concerns and affective qualities. The 
full-blown emotions are the climax of this affectivity.
Sartre certainly does not suggest that we ought to dispense 
with affectivity. It would be an impossibility to do so on 
this view. For the human being is held to be in essence a 
being which creates its own concerns and interests and has 
its own feelings about its situation. This wider 
emotionality is not something we could stop. It is not 
considered bad faith but is part of what makes us humans 
rather than objects in the world pure and simple. Sartre 
certainly would not want, then, to "eliminate the emotions 
completely" if that also included the wider emotionality.
Secondly, Sartre views the emotional consciousness as non- 
thetic and only insincere to that extent. 61 Now Sartre said 
that most of our activity is done in a non-thetically 
conscious way and that (full-blown) emotion is a non- 
thetically conscious transformation and that we captivate 
ourselves in it. This raises the question of how far it 
would be possible for us to eradicate emotional outbursts, 
how far it would be possible to make a reflective decision to 
eradicate them and stick to this decision. I think Sartre 
accepts that emotion is one of those capacities the human 
being has which he or she will give expression to at some 
point, though it is still consciousness that makes itself
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emotional. What we could do is to reflect on and try to 
better understand our emotionality and prevent ourselves from 
taking it to excess. This would accord with Sartre's 
"existential psychoanalysis" in BN where (as we saw in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis) he says that the human being builds 
up his or her own character starting from a (pre-reflective) 
"choice of being." It would not be possible simply to change 
one's character or end a neurosis at will. Nevertheless, our 
character and any neuroses we have are not parts of our 
consciousness as a brick is part of a house. Consciousness 
is responsible for their development. By reflecting on 
ourselves it would be possible to bring to more explicit 
awareness why we are the way we are and begin to deal with 
our problems.
As regards Sartre's view of emotions as escape into "magic" 
and as bad faith, I believe he does have a point. It fits 
well as an interpretation of such cases as fainting in the 
face of a problem: suppressing myself so that the problem is
no more, as if my turning away would make it go away. Or the 
case of passive sadness. One can see what Sartre means there 
by "magic": one cannot cope with one's normal activities so
one "puts a spell on them" to get rid of them, the spell 
consisting of an imposition of a quality of valuelessness on 
them as part of the "bleak" world.
However, I think the idea of emotion as bad faith could be 
taken too far. In BN, Sartre uses the term "bad faith" to 
cover those times when we try to deny our freedom and rest in 
some situation, e.g. the waiter who puts everything into just
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"being" the perfect waiter, hiding behind the role. An 
authentic existence would mean accepting our freedom and not 
trying to hide behind roles or one's "character" perceived as 
a pre-given, unchangeable trait. However, in BN, Sartre also 
uses the term "bad faith" in a another sense, although he 
does not explicitly say that it is different. I am referring 
to his description of reflection on oneself as a kind of bad 
faith. Reflection on oneself is possible, Sartre says, but 
it is never possible to fully step outside of oneself to 
reflect on oneself with total objectivity as if being another 
person looking on. Reflection, then, is bad faith in that 
one is attempting the impossible, to objectify oneself.
Sartre's point is perfectly understandable. I can reflect on 
myself but I am myself and can never escape from this, I 
cannot fully reflect on myself objectively. However, Sartre 
obviously cannot be telling us to stop reflecting on 
ourselves. Is this, then, not stretching the concept of bad 
faith too far? Our reflection has limitations but this is 
not on a par with the self-delusory life of Sartre's famous 
waiter. Taking the term "bad faith" to extremes, we could 
call producing a mental image bad faith because we know we 
cannot fully recapture the substantial presence of an object 
"in the flesh" through an image. In EX, Sartre recognizes 
the limit but does not apply the tag of "bad faith" to 
imagery.
In the Sketch, Sartre actually only uses the term "bad faith" 
once. But he does say in general that the emotions are 
ineffectual and escapist. Now just as I have tried to
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distinguish between bad faith proper and activities that have 
their built-in limitations so we could examine the degree of 
ineffectualness and escapism of different emotions. E.g. a 
description of dancing for joy as bad faith would seem to be 
rather harsh and "killjoyish. " But we could say that joy is 
ineffectual in the sense that my dance for joy which 
gleefully seizes the beloved person as a whole will have to 
give way to the actual more complicated moment to moment 
pursuing of the relationship. We could then also take on 
board Spiegelberg's suggestion that emotion could function as 
preparation for change. E.g. I dance for joy, seizing the 
situation as a whole as a swimmer before the start of a race 
looks at the length of the pool and takes a deep breath. 
Sartre himself gives a slight suggestion of this when he says 
that the man who dances for joy on being told by a woman that 
she loves him is for the moment giving himself a rest. On 
the other hand, fainting at the approach of a beast is 
ineffectual and in bad faith to a more extreme degree, 
denying the danger but, far from preparing me to cope with 
it, exposing me to it. At the most extreme end, emotion 
could cross the boundary into "mental illness," e.g. a 
sadness that developed into an indefinite withdrawal from the 
world. We could, then, make the notion of bad faith or 
escapism more flexible.
If I may turn now to the third aspect of the Sketch counter­
balancing its seeming anti-emotions stance, Sartre near the 
end of the book describes emotional behaviour as "the return 
of consciousness to the magical attitude, one of the great 
attitudes which are essential to it."62 so far from
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disparaging the emotions, in this instance they are great and 
essential. But how can Sartre say that the magical attitude, 
which he has described as a debasement of consciousness and 
is ineffectual etc., is great and essential? I believe we 
can find a clue to the answer from EX. There, our ability to 
imagine is essential in the sense that it is an expression of 
the same conditions for the existence of consciousness in 
general. The conditions were that consciousness be able to 
posit reality as a whole and negate it. The imagination is 
seen as an expression of that same ability. Imagination is 
essential, then, in that a consciousness that could not 
imagine would not be consciousness for it would not meet the 
conditions of imagination and of consciousness in general.
Similarly, the magical attitude is "great" and "essential" 
for a consciousness which did not meet the conditions of 
possibility for descending to this attitude (the conditions 
being the ability to imbue the world with one’s own concerns 
etc.) would not meet the conditions for consciousness in 
general.
Taking these three aspects of the Sketch into account, then, 
we can see that the position is a little more complicated and 
ambiguous than simply being "anti-emotions."
However, from the perspective of our study of what the human 
being is, the main import of the Sketch, as I pointed to 
earlier, is in providing us with a practical demonstration of 
using Sartre's approach towards the human being as an 
integrated conscious bodily existent.
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But before I close this chapter, I wish to take a look at the 
one specific instance in the Sketch where Sartre deals with 
the social. This is a passage which concerns our perception 
of and dealings with other people. It is worth quoting at 
length;
"... the category of ’magic' governs the 
interpsychic relations between men in 
society and, more precisely, our 
perception of others. The magical, as 
Alain says, is 'the mind crawling among 
things'; that is, an irrational 
synthesis of spontaneity and passivity.
It is an inert activity, a consciousness 
rendered passive. But it is precisely in 
that form that others appear to us, and 
this, not because of our position in 
relation to them, nor in consequence of 
our passions, but by essential necessity.
Indeed, consciousness can only be a 
transcendent object by undergoing the 
modification of passivity. Thus the 
meaning of a face is, first of all, that 
of the consciousness (not a sign of the 
consciousness) but of a consciousness 
that is altered, degraded - which 
precisely is passivity."63
I believe this relates to Sartre's view of consciousness as 
necessarily embodied, as set out more fully in BN. Since 
consciousness is not a substance on its own but lives the 
body, we do come into contact with other consciousnesses, 
other people whose bodies are immediately taken as conscious 
bodies. The conscious human being is a unity so we do not 
just infer that other people are conscious like us, being 
able only to infer this "because of our position in relation 
to them," i.e because we cannot get "inside" their minds "if 
they have such a thing." But at the same time, because 
(active) consciousness is (necessarily) embodied, one grasps 
another consciousness as both spontaneous and passive. E.g. 
one sees someone's face - since it is lived by consciousness
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- as fully the face of that person, not a sign emitted by him 
or her. But this other consciousness is rendered passive in 
the sense that one encounters it as expressed in objective 
happenings: facial expressions, actions and so on. One
encounters the face of the consciousness, the character of 
the consciousness etc. as objectified. Only the 
consciousness itself experiences its continual (non-thetic) 
consciousness of itself as actively responsible for what it 
does. This by "essential necessity" because consciousness is 
(necessarily) embodied. Sartre is further saying, I think, 
that the synthesis of spontaneity and passivity observed in 
other people is analogous to the synthesis of spontaneity and 
passivity I put myself into when I become emotional (in that 
I spontaneously put myself into the magical attitude and thus 
make the world magical but then become passive, in a sense, 
in that I then treat the world as simply being magical of
itself and react to it - by fainting, fleeing, hitting out
etc. - as if I was a passive existent affected by the world).
Sartre continues:
"... It follows that man is always a 
sorcerer to man and the social world is
primarily magical. Not that it is
impossible to take a deterministic view 
of the inter-psychological world or to 
build rational superstructures upon it.
But then it is these structures that are 
ephemeral and unstable, it is they that 
crumble away as soon as the magical 
aspect of faces, gestures and human 
situations becomes too vivid. And what 
happens then, when the superstructures 
laboriously built up by the reason 
disintegrate, and man finds himself 
suddenly plunged back again into the 
original magic? That is easily 
predicted; the consciousness seizes upon 
the magic as magic, and lives it vividly 
as such. The categories 'suspicious' and
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’disquieting', etc. designate the 
magical, in so far as it is being lived 
by consciousness or tempting 
consciousness to live it."64
This is another of Sartre's occasional instances where he 
throws in the outline of another idea with a vague promise to 
develop it later. My interpretation of it is that Sartre is 
saying that, because of the analogy mentioned above, it is 
easy to perceive other people as having magical qualities (as 
in the earlier case of the grimacing face at the window).
The "deterministic view of the inter-psychological world" and 
the "rational superstructures" built upon it refers to, I 
believe, how we can build up knowledge of each other and use 
"deterministic procedures" to get what we want out of each 
other. E.g. trying to "get on the right side of someone" and 
asking a favour of them in a way that one knows is likely to 
elicit a positive response. But this set-up can crumble 
before me. The person may behave differently than I 
expected. Their expression of displeasure, appearing in the 
spontaneous/passive way outlined above, can be treated by me 
in an emotional way. Sartre, as we saw in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, deals with relations with other people at greater 
length in BN and more clearly, in my view, in not being 
constrained in a slot within a discussion of the emotions.
This, however, brings us back to the point we reached at the 
end of Chapter 3 in Part 1. Sartre, has not here in the 
Sketch nor in PX nor in BN considered the social aspect of 
the human being in its full depth. He does not in these 
works have a detailed concern with how people in their inter­
actions give rise to a wider society and culture with a
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history and so on which then imposes the great weight of a 
deep social context on the individual. Let us move on now, 
as promised, to Part 3 where I attempt to show how Sartre 
maintains the approach of looking at the human being as a 
free conscious bodily existent or for-itself while extending 
his thought further into the social dimension.
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PART 3: THE FREEDOM OF THE FOR-ITSELF SITUATED AND ENGAGED
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CHAPTER 6: "SEARCH FOR A METHOD” AS A VIEW OF THE FOR-ITSELF
SITUATED AND ENGAGED
I began this whole exercise by posing the question of what
the human being is. I argued that a view of the human being
as a determined thing resulted in the reductio ad absurdum of
a theory of determinism which is itself determined in the
theorist. There is no-one left meaningfully holding the
theory, it is just one more event in a chain of caused
events. The chain of events is not even known as such: an
anonymous undifferentiation holds sway. Against this, I
pointed to our own experience of ourselves as experiencing
centres. This experience remains despite the theory, leaving
the latter with something unaccounted for. I argued that
there was a case for trying to study the human being within a
perspective of accepting him or her as an experiencing
centre.
I have been using Sartre’s philosophy as offering us such a 
perspective. I have gleaned from his works a view of the 
human being as a conscious bodily existent and we saw how 
Sartre identifies this experiencing type of existence as the 
original freedom. However, in Chapter 2, I also looked at 
how Sartre in BN did not pursue the issue of wider society 
far enough. The social situation in which the human being 
arises was treated by Sartre as a given to be transcended by 
the individual for-itself towards its own goals. He did not 
pursue the issue of how individual human beings in their 
complex inter-relations give rise to a wider society which 
then becomes the ready-made context within which the 
individual for-itselfs arise. He did not show enough
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appreciation of the great prior weight of social context on 
the individual.
Balancing this, we also saw in Chapter 3 how there is an 
embryonic social concern in BN in that Sartre investigates 
the foundations of how we in the first place treat other 
people as other people like ourselves. He looked at how the 
for-itself has a being-for-others and he also portrayed the 
human being as situated in relation to all other human beings 
(although this still did not lead Sartre to consider the 
broader societal question I have raised).
Another point of balance raised was that the human being as 
an experiencing centre must not be erased from the equation 
once more by taking a deterministic view of how society 
affects us. We have to have some conception of the 
experiencing human being who arises within the wider social 
context but who is a conscious existent coping with life 
within that system. If we take a simplistic view of the 
human being as determined by society, then we end up 
submerged under the anonymous undifferentiation once more 
since there are no experiencing centres to view society as 
such. We are thus, as I said earlier, pointed in the 
direction of maintaining but extending Sartre's holistic 
approach. This would involve retaining the idea of the human 
being as a free conscious bodily existent but trying to show 
how he or she remains such while operating in a socio- 
historical context.
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Sartre himself attempted to carry out this task in his later 
works. I am here going to briefly look at how Sartre deals 
with this issue in SM.^ SM was an introductory work leading 
towards the far larger Critique of Dialectical R e a s o n .2 
However, SM can stand on its own as a work and suits my 
purpose here in that it is a concise work dealing quite 
specifically with the issue of how we should conceive the 
relationship between the individual and society.
In this later stage of Sartre's development, of course,
Sartre had adopted Marxism. I am not here going to consider 
the question of whether or not Marxism is correct (that would 
require a thesis of its own) but, rather, tease out Sartre's 
conception of how the individual remains a free conscious 
existent while also being an aspect of the totality of 
society.
In SM, Sartre situates individuals within a continual 
dialectical totalization of history or, in other words, the 
on-going process of the development of society through the 
succession of the class conflicts of every era. Philosophy 
itself exemplifies this, according to Sartre, for there is 
only one living philosophy at a time and that philosophy 
expresses the general movement of society.3 Sartre is 
arguing here that every era has one major philosophy which 
serves as the centre of reference for all others, even 
opposing ones. The major philosophy grows out of the 
problems and contradictions of the historical period and 
therefore we cannot go beyond it until we have gone beyond 
the historical period itself.
Page - 335
Those intellectuals who appear after the birth of the 
philosophy of the time work within a cultural field which it 
dominates. Such intellectuals, then, are not properly to be 
called "philosophers." Sartre designates them "ideologists." 
They merely set the system in order or oppose it by a 
regression to the ideas of the past.4
The one philosophy of our time, according to Sartre, is
Marxism, and existentialism is relegated to the status of an
ideology. It is an enclave within Marxism.5 of
existentialism, Sartre says:
"[i]t is a parasitical system living on 
the margin of Knowledge, which at first 
it opposed but into which today it seeks 
to be integrated."6
Whereas in BN Sartre emphasized the continual ontological 
freedom of the for-itself even when one is at the mercy of 
the torturer, he now believes that Marxism expresses the 
demands of the proletariat in a society characterized by 
scarcity and exploitation. In a society split by class 
struggle, one gains one's livelihood at the expense of other 
people.7 Thus we have to consider the human being as first a 
worker producing the conditions of his or her life.8 in such 
a society there is an "immense crowd of sub-men conscious of 
their sub-humanity."9
Sartre now believes, along with Marx, that the reign of true 
social freedom when one could objectify oneself (in the sense 
of carving an image of oneself outside in the world through
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one's activity) without alienation could not begin until the
time when work was imposed by necessity was over:
"[a]s soon as there will exist for 
everyone a margin of real freedom beyond 
the production of life, Marxism will have 
lived out its span; a philosophy of 
freedom will take its place. But we have 
no means, no intellectual instrument, no 
concrete experience which allows us to 
conceive of this freedom or of this 
philosophy."10
In the current state of society, then, according to Sartre, 
social freedom is so lacking that we cannot even imagine what 
it would be like.
Is this Sartre's recantation of his previous work? Does this 
recognition of the absence of freedom entail that the 
ontologically free for-itself of BN is debunked? I do not 
believe so. Sartre does not relapse into determinism by his 
adoption of Marxism. He argues the first place that the 
original Marxism of Marx himself was non-determinist.H
Marx examined the totality of history and society. Society 
was founded on the relations of production which corresponded 
to a given level of the productive forces.12 in our period 
of history, the productive forces were in conflict with the 
relations of production. The capacity of the human being for 
creative work was alienated, the human being did not 
recognize himself or herself in his or her own product and 
his or her exhausting labour appeared to him or her as a 
burdensome compulsion, a hostile force.13
At the same time, however, Marx viewed this alienation as a 
historical reality suffered by concrete existents.
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Alienation was lived by people and was therefore irreducible 
to a knowing. Also, alienation was the alienation of a 
definite human capacity (as we looked at in Chapter 2 when I 
quoted Marx's comment on our "species being" in the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts). The human being was capable 
of objectification which would be free creative work. Thus 
the human being could "contemplate himself in a world which 
he has created."14
This is an important point for Sartre. He is still true to 
the notion that one's slavery or alienation can only appear 
on the ground of one's ontological freedom. From this 
perspective, we can argue that Marx's works implicitly demand 
a theory of consciousness such as that of Sartre. Only a 
human being as a free for-itself who values his or life and 
creative capacity can come to a view of himself or herself as 
oppressed.
For Marx, this oppression could only be overthrown through 
revolutionary praxis or activity in the world. Therefore, 
the human agency of concrete human beings was at the centre 
of the totality of society. Thus the true concrete was real 
people producing their lives, working, living the totality of 
society. Concrete people emerged as living the universal in 
the particular; that is, their life emerged on the 
background of the conflict of the relations and forces of 
production but was irreducible to it.
In SM, Sartre insists on the need to maintain existentialism 
because of the widespread misuse of Marxism in a simplistic
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deterministic fashion.15 This views society as determining 
the individual and the individual is seen as an abstract 
moment, only an expression of the determining society. The 
totality of society is seen as a universal entity of which 
particular facts are simply manifestations. Sartre holds 
that he is being more faithful to Marx and to the human being 
in holding that it is individual human beings who are the 
concrete moments. They make society real as the people who 
live it. Marx, according to Sartre's reading, likewise 
subordinated the facts to the totality but discovered the 
totality through the facts.
Sartre quotes approvingly Engels' statement that "men 
themselves make their history but on the basis of prior 
c o n ditions."16 However, the simplistic Marxists interpret 
this to mean that people are blindly determined by economic 
forces. People are seen as simply embodiments of the social 
structure. For Sartre, this is to make the human being "a 
vehicle of inhuman forces." He demands that Marxism "study 
real men in depth, not dissolve them in a bath of sulphuric 
acid." 17
However, neither is Sartre going to consider the human being 
in a void. He is not going to ignore the fact that the human 
being is situated in society. Thus, for example, he 
criticizes Western "amateur" psychoanalytic theorists such as 
De Man who tried to explain class conflict in terms of the 
proletariat's "inferiority complex," so ignoring the real 
socio-economic basis of class conflict.
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For Sartre, the dialectical knowing of humanity requires a
new rationality:
"[b]ecause nobody has been willing to 
establish this rationality within 
experience I state as a fact - absolutely 
no one, either in the East or in the 
West, writes or speaks a word about us 
that is not a gross error."18
Sartre's SM is the search for precisely this rationality.
Sartre maintains the autonomy of existentialism in order to
establish this new rationality but its purpose is to be
integrated into a Marxism devoid of mechanistic determinist
additions.
Sartre tries to formulate his own structural, historical 
anthropology (in Sartre's broad sense of the term, once 
again). Sartre takes on board the Marxist framework 
regarding how society develops. However, a close reading of 
SM shows that, while the "for-itself" is only mentioned once 
in a footnote, its haunting presence is there throughout.
The capitalist society of scarcity and exploitation imposes 
upon people but that society is the product of human agents 
who live the universal (the alienating society) in the 
particular as irreducible existents who also have within 
themselves the possibility of changing their society. In 
this way, SM maintains the for-itself but shows it situated 
and engaged in society. The human being must still be viewed 
as an ontological freedom, albeit an alienated one. Let us 
now look in more detail at how Sartre sets out this view.
In SM, Sartre views people and events as going to make up the 
totality of history and society. However, society is not
Page - 340
some sort of metaphysical entity with an independent being of 
its own as in, for example, some positions of functionalist 
sociology. Sartre wishes to avoid the fetishism of a ready­
made totality.19
Sartre instead takes a dialectical view which holds that:
"dialectic is at the start only the real 
movement of a unity in process of being 
made and not the study, not even the 
'functional’ and 'dynamic' study of a 
unity already m a d e . "20
Therefore, society is not an organism of which we are merely
the parts. Society is a moving totality which depends on the
people who make it up and on the relations between these
people.
We can understand this better by examining what Sartre says
is the structure of the human being. True to the for-itself
of BN, Sartre argues that the human being is characterized by 
his or her going beyond the present towards the future.21 
The human being is signifying in that even the least of his
or her gestures refers to the future, as in our earlier
example of the tennis player). For the individual's 
behaviour is defined not only by present factors but also by 
its relation to an as yet non-existent object, the project, 
which the individual is trying to bring into being by 
"praxis,"22 human activity by which the individual inscribes 
himself or herself in and, indeed, by which he or she makes 
the human world.
Thus the project has a double character. It is the negation 
of a (presently) refused reality projected to be produced.
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Therefore, in relation to the present given, praxis is 
negativity, the negation of a negation, but as such is also, 
in relation to the object aimed at, positivity. For Sartre, 
this "perpetual production of oneself by work and praxis is 
our peculiar structure." 23
The project is not to be confused with the will, though it 
can become this (just as the pre-reflective cogito of BN can 
become reflective). The structure of the human being is one 
of perpetual disequilibrium. That is, it is an immediate 
relation to the other-than-oneself. One projects oneself 
across the field of possibilities some of which one realizes 
to the exclusion of others. Thus, of the structure of the 
human being, Sartre says; "we call it also choice or 
freedom."24
One's whole life also makes up a unified project so that one 
continually has to deal with one's past history, spiralling 
past the same points again and again. Yet one still has to 
relate to these points with one's freedom.
However, there is a new development in Sartre's thought in SM 
in that he holds the basic project to be that of need. This 
more explicitly admits the constraints on the human being 
than the desire prominent in BN.
The concepts of praxis and the project in SM, on the other 
hand, are quite compatible with the ontological freedom 
described in BN. In BN, the world only exists as it is 
perceived by the for-itself. In SM, Sartre still holds this
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view. He says that "the world is human . . . profundity comes 
to the world through man."25 However, this is not only 
concerned with perception. The physical world has been 
worked over by human praxis so that many of the objects we 
live with every day are signs.26 That is, they are the 
objectification of someone else's (or even my own) praxis.
The thousand franc note, the pedestrian crossing, the 
signpost are, for Sartre, "collective objects" which are the 
result of a project which lies behind them and which 
addresses us through the objects. Therefore, while 
collective objects have a definite reality, that reality is 
parasitical; they are supported by the concrete activity of 
individuals.27
Groups such as the family, one's class or even the totality 
of society are collectives. However, now that we have 
examined the ontological structure of the human being, we can 
see that a group or a society can never have a metaphysical 
existence of its own. For Sartre, therefore, there are only 
real relations between people and relations between those 
relations. "Community," Sartre says, "escapes us on all 
sides."28 This means that "the totality exists at best only 
in the form of a detotalized totality."29 Society is the 
work of the human being.
However, for Sartre, that society is in our time one of 
scarcity and exploitation. While it is still incapable of 
emancipating itself from its needs, it is "thereby defined by 
its techniques and its tools."30 It is crushed by its needs 
and dominated by its exploitative mode of production.
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Sartre, then, accepts that Marxism has shown how class 
interests impose on individual interests and how, for 
example, the market - at first a complex of human relations - 
becomes reified so that it seems to be more real than the 
actual buyers and sellers.31 Capital becomes a power 
opposing working people.
This situation has a profound consequence for the human 
being. From birth, we live in an exploitative society so 
that we are "lost since childhood. "32 Even our speech and 
thought is deviated. Also, the human individual who projects 
himself or herself towards his or her field of possibilities 
finds that this field is a social one and is, for many 
people, a very restricted field. In contradictory capitalist 
society, "the capitalist owns the instruments of labour, and 
the worker does not own them."33 Therefore, to take Sartre's 
example, a working class person, due to lack of money, may 
not find the possibility of becoming a doctor open to him or 
her whereas it may be a real possibility for a bourgeois 
person.34 we are in this way defined negatively as well as 
positively in relation to the field of possibles. The 
working class person is aware of a lack, a future from which 
he or she is barred.
However, Sartre has already said that society is a 
detotalized totality. Even capitalist society is the product 
of human relations. Going back, then, to our example of the 
market, we see that its reality "no matter how inexorable its 
laws may be ... rests on the reality of alienated individuals 
and on their separation."35 Also, capital is a social power
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which has to be sustained by the activities of capitalists.
We could say, then, that Sartre is portraying capitalist 
society as the situation in which the for-itself exists. The 
for-itself in such a society is alienated but exists 
nonetheless. Thus Sartre says that the conditions of 
capitalist society are the conditions upon which people make 
history - but nevertheless it is the people who make it.36
Individuals and groups still perform real actions upon 
history. What happens in the society of class inequality and 
conflict is that the enterprise of individuals and groups can 
become countered by the actions of others so that they lose 
the real meaning of their action in the totalizing movement 
of history.37 it is only in this sense, then, that society 
can be said to "make" the human individual. However, Sartre 
holds that the human being is characterized by what he or she 
succeeds in making of what he or she has been made.38 Sartre 
refuses to confuse the alienated person with a thing. The 
human being is the being of praxis so he or she has to go 
beyond the conditions made for him or her in his or her 
practical activity.
Sartre gives as an example the position of a worker. His or 
her objective starting point is his or her work and wages but 
he or she goes beyond it in, for example, joining a union or 
voting to go on strike.39 This entails that "the individual 
is conditioned by the social environment" but also that "he 
turns back upon it to condition it in turn."40 The human 
being is "a dialectical surpassing of all that is simply 
given."41
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Sartre therefore proposes to use what he calls a
"progressive-regressive" method in studying society. In the
progressive moment, all the elements of society are studied
as part of the totality of society, using the Marxist
framework which, as we have seen, has identified that society
as one in which there is a conflict between the relations and
forces of production and in which the human being is
alienated. However, the method recognizes that this is only
the abstract, general truth. What is the real concrete is
how that general truth is lived by real people in their
particular circumstances. It would be wrong, therefore, to
take a person or an event and view them as mere appearances
which are in reality simply embodiments of the class
conflict. In fact, the class conflict is nothing except how
it is lived and suffered by concrete existents. Sartre
points out that:
"within the framework of the Marxist 
interpretation ... and for the 
intellectual who is experienced in the 
dialectical method, men, their 
objectifications and their labours, human 
relations, are finally what is most 
concrete"42
Therefore, in the regressive moment, we study our object - a 
group, a person, a book, an event etc. - in its historical 
particularity.
However, Sartre does not intend to study the object of 
enquiry in isolation. Therefore, his method is one of cross- 
reference between the object in its particularity and the 
wider societal context in which it is situated;
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"It will progressively determine a 
biography (for example) by examining the 
period, and the period by studying the 
biography."43
In this sense, then, everything is connected with everything 
yet each thing is distinct from all the rest. My life 
expresses in some way capitalist society: yet it is my life,
the life of a concrete, irreducible existent.
Therefore, Sartre uses Marxism as the "vertical synthesis" in 
which we will study everything as part of the totalization of 
history. However, within the vertical synthesis there are 
"horizontal syntheses" which are relatively autonomous from 
the vertical synthesis.44 They allow us to study people and 
events both in their particularity and as integrated into the 
general movement of society.
The horizontal syntheses are, for example, sociology and 
psychoanalysis (though for Sartre this is to be an 
existentialist psychoanalysis which will avoid the 
mechanistic aspects of Freudian thought). They allow us to 
study mediations between the individual and society. They 
show how the individual concrete emerges from the background 
of the contradictions of capitalist society. Thus, for 
example, psychoanalysis will show how the child, as an 
irreducible existent, experiences his or her class, without 
fully understanding it, through the mediation of his or her 
family, and how this will affect the project of his or her 
life.45
Again we can see that the for-itself as an ontological 
freedom is still at the centre of society. The human
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individual in the society of alienation is still faced with 
the responsibility of making choices in the project of life.
Sartre gives a very effective illustrative example of his 
notion that the individual lives the totality of society.
This example sums up the thesis of SM. A coloured man was a 
member of an air-base ground crew on the outskirts of 
London.46 He was prohibited by his colour from joining the 
flying personnel. However, he revolts against this by 
stealing an aeroplane and, with no experience as a pilot, 
flies it across the Channel eventually to be killed in 
France. Thus he chose a brief dazzling freedom, a freedom to 
die. Objectively, this event demonstrated the struggle 
between the colonized and the colonialists, and the fact that 
the colonized had not yet gone beyond the stage of individual 
acts of revolt. But subjectively, this event for the 
coloured man grew out of his recognition of the prohibition 
as a personal impoverishment. The event showed how the 
coloured man lived in the concrete the racist situation.
Both aspects of the man's act made up a unity but at the same 
time they were irreducible to each other. They showed the 
"multi-dimensional unity of the act."47
Sartre's discussion of "comprehension" also shows that he 
retains the for-itself in his philosophy. In BN, as we saw 
earlier, Sartre argued that with the pre-reflective cogito 
the for-itself is continually conscious of existing and 
cannot step outside of this. In this sense, consciousness of 
existing is distinguished from the knowledge of an object 
outside of oneself. In SM, the concept of comprehension
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applies these ideas to the human disciplines. Sartre says 
that the human being is "the existent which we are."48 we 
therefore cannot approach human society as if it were an 
object entirely outside of us. We can understand other 
people and their products only because we are people 
ourselves with comprehension of human existence. We 
comprehend ourselves and others as human existants who 
project themselves from the present towards the future. Thus 
the dialectical totalization of knowledge is founded on 
"rational and comprehensive non-knowledge" and "the 
historical totalization will be possible only if anthropology 
understands itself instead of ignoring itself."49 
Existentialism, then, is integrated into Marxism as its very 
foundation.
In this light, we can see that Sartre is as far from 
determinism as ever. Sartre has not debunked the for-itself 
but has, rather, given us a practical extended pursuit of the 
for-itself's facticity and being-for-others by looking at how 
we live within a social context. He has shown how the for- 
itself of BN is situated in society.
However, Sartre does not stop there. We saw earlier how 
Sartre says that the human being can lose his or her 
enterprise in the totalization. The human being is an 
ontological freedom, a for-itself, situated in an alienating 
society with an absence of social freedom. But the human 
being is also the being of possibilities. To say what 
humanity is also to say what it can be and vice v e r s a .50 
Importantly, for Sartre, humanity has the possibility of
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liberating itself from the situation of alienation. This can 
come about through the Marxist project, according to Sartre: 
the proletariat and its allies as a group of "for-itselfs," 
if I can put it that way, uniting in the common aim of 
realizing the reign of (social) freedom. This will be the 
moment when "History" will have one meaning - from the people 
making it in common.51 in this sense, we can view SM as 
Sartre's study of how the conscious human being or for-itself 
of BN is situated in society and also as his advocacy of how 
the for-itself should be engaged in action in society.
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We human beings are bodily existents living in "the world" 
both as the natural environment around us and also as the 
social "milieu" in which we arise. But in that very living 
in the world we feel ourselves to be "experiencing centres."
I began this work in search of a view of the human being (or 
an "anthropology" in its widest sense) which can study the 
human being without denying or trying to reduce to something 
else this conscious aspect of the human being.
I believe we can see how Sartre's philosophy, as developed 
from his early years through to the later period, can provide 
us with such a view. I have tried to show how Sartre takes a 
very balanced approach (contrary, perhaps, to popular 
conception). From his studies of consciousness and of how we 
as conscious existents "live" or "exist" our bodies, I drew 
out the conception in Sartre's philosophy of the human being 
as an integrated conscious bodily existent whose physical 
body (including the central nervous system etc.) is the 
ground upon which consciousness arises. Consciousness is 
made possible by our biological make-up but this does not 
have to entail identifying our conscious life as being 
identical to the firing of brain neurons. Sartre is not 
being extreme but simply accepting for examination all the 
evidence about the human existent, including our feeling of 
ourselves to be experiencing the world, an experience which 
in point of fact in our actual lives - even for the most 
hardened reductionist theorist - is something irreducible and 
remains with us, impervious to reductionist theory.
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I said above that Sartre is not being extreme with such a
position. There are other writers, even those conversant
with neurophysiological findings etc., who do not accept that
we need to reduce consciousness to being identical to the
physical processes in the body without which it would not
exist. For example, John Searle, in his interesting work on
intentionality, operates with a conception of the processes
of the brain as giving rise to the mental without there being
a need to identify mental phenomena with something else and
for him, the extreme is in attempting such an identification
or reduction. Searle states that his view of mental states
and events is "totally realistic";
"... I think there really are such things 
as intrinsic mental phenomena which 
cannot be reduced to something else or 
eliminated by some kind of re-definition.
There really are pains, tickles and 
itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, 
perceptual experiences, experiences of 
acting, thoughts, feelings and all the 
rest. Now you might think that such a 
claim was so obviously true as to be 
hardly worth making, but the amazing 
thing is that it is routinely denied, 
though usually in a disguised form, by 
many, perhaps most, of the advanced 
thinkers who write on these topics."1
Searle concludes his work by noting the incompleteness of 
current neurophysiological knowledge. However, he speculates 
that:
"if we come to understand the operation 
of the brain in producing Intentionality, 
it is likely to be on principles that are 
quite different from those we now employ, 
as different as the principles of quantum 
mechanics are from the principles of 
Newtonian mechanics; but any principles, 
to give us an adequate account of the 
brain, will have to recognize the reality 
of, and explain the causal capacities of, 
the Intentionality of the brain."2
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Sartre, of course, does not delve in to that kind of 
biological detail but I believe we can see that Sartre's 
acceptance of our conscious experience as such and as arising 
from the lived body is a reasonable and balanced approach to 
take. Sartre's studies of the mental image and the emotions 
are concrete examples of how such a balanced approach can be 
used. Sartre with these examples shows how the human being 
as a unified conscious bodily existent brings into play the 
cognitive, affective and physical aspects of himself or 
herself all at once in meaningful experiences which, as 
experiences, defy reduction.
Sartre adopts a similar balance in approaching the social 
dimension of the human being. Human beings arise in a pre­
existing societal context but it is each individual human 
being who makes the abstraction of the social situation real 
by living it. Sartre's position allows him to look at the 
complexities of the forces in society at a given era which 
set out the conditions within which we live but he can then 
come right back down to how an individual human being copes 
in his or her own way with that situation, living it in the 
particular.
Sartre's view of the irreducible conscious bodily existent 
or ontologically free human being who lives in the particular 
the general physical and social environment can be used as 
the reference point for all our investigations within the 
human disciplines. Operating from that kind of 
"anthropology" ensures that we do not "erase ourselves" from
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the equation, which is the ultimate outcome of investigating 
ourselves using deterministic principles.
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